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1Introduction
This thesis analyzes optimal incentives and distributive justice in competitive envi-
ronments. It consists of three essays. The first two essays investigate theoretically
and empirically the optimal design of incentives in dynamic tournaments. The third
essay analyzes empirically how personal income earned in the competition with oth-
ers changes individuals’ perceptions of what is a socially just distribution of this
income.
The first two essays focus on tournaments, a type of competitive incentive mech-
anism. In tournaments, a principal induces e orts among a group of agents by re-
warding the best-performing agent with a monetary or non-monetary prize. The use
of such incentives, for instance in the form of bonuses or promotions, is widespread
within companies. Furthermore, tournaments play a crucial role in the assignment
of research grants or in incentivizing the development of new ideas. An important
feature of tournaments is that they are often repeated over time. For example, firms
usually operate over several years, making their workers compete against each other
multiple times. This generates a series of performance signals among the employees.
In the design of incentives for e ort provision, this dynamic nature of tournaments
raises at least three questions: (1) How should principals spread the rewards over
the di erent periods? (2) Which weight should principals give to recent performance
relative to performance in the more distant past? And (3) to which extent should
the principal reveal the results of past performance measurements to the agents?
The first essay addresses these questions in a game-theoretic framework. The
analysis relies on a dynamic two-stage tournament and allows for di erent objectives
of the principal as well as for general e ort cost functions and distributions of noise
in the performance signals. By simultaneously considering information revelation,
the spread of prizes and performance weights as design tools of the principal, the
essay provides several new results and generalizes a few existing results. The optimal
incentive policy has the following properties: First, the revelation policy depends
exclusively on properties of the e ort cost function. Second, the principal always
puts a positive weight on first-period performance in the second period. Third,
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the size of the optimal weight and the optimal prizes depend on properties of the
observation noise. In particular, the principal sets no first-period prize unless the
performance observations in period one are considerably more precise than in period
two. The analysis further reveals that the gains from good design are quantitatively
important: For a particular parameterization of the general model with normally
distributed observation noise and quadratic e ort costs, the expected e ort is at
least 40% higher when a principal chooses prizes and weights optimally than when
the principal uses two equal and independent tournaments in both periods.
The second essay uses a laboratory experiment to test whether the optimal pol-
icy identified in the first essay increases e orts as predicted in an environment with
real subjects. To derive the optimal policy, the second essay also relies on a normal-
quadratic parameterization of the general model. The experiment introduced the
optimal policy stepwise: It first implemented the optimal weight, and then also
the optimal prize spread. It turns out that only the policy that implements both
the optimal weight and the optimal prize spread increases e orts, while its e ect
is smaller than predicted. Nevertheless, all policy adjustments a ect the behavior
of the participants and change the distribution of e orts across periods. The direc-
tions of these changes correspond widely to the predictions of the theoretical model.
Overall, there is significant over-expenditure compared to the theoretical predictions
and a high degree of heterogeneity in behavior across participants. Measures of indi-
vidual attributes from a pre-experimental questionnaire completed eight days ahead
of the laboratory experiment explain parts of this heterogeneity. In particular, the
results suggest that one explanation for the small e ect of the optimal policy, which
generates a high degree of ex-post income inequality, is that it induces particularly
low e orts among prosocial participants.
The first two essays generate insights that are relevant to the design of com-
petitive incentive systems in practice. Clearly, the precise nature of the optimal
incentives for a less stylized setting – i.e., with more periods and agents – is likely to
di er from the optimal policy derived in the first essay. Nevertheless, the theoretical
and empirical evidence provided in both essays jointly suggests that the timing of
incentives matters: The weight of past performance and the spread of prize money
across periods a ect individual behavior. They are, therefore, important parame-
ters to consider when designing competitive incentives in a repeated setting. This
highlights the relevance of theoretical arguments, as provided by the first essay, for
the design of incentive systems. However, the results suggest as well that practi-
tioners should not blindly rely on guidance from simple material utility models in
the design of competitive incentives. In fact, one interpretation of the results of
the second essay is that practitioners should examine competitive incentives also re-
garding their distributive e ects and potential consequences for workers with social
preferences. Failing to do so may not only lead to wrong predictions of the e ects
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of policy adjustments. It may as well lead to policies which are less e cient than
possible.
The third essay takes the existence and design of such competitive incentive
systems as given and asks whether the income that individuals earn in competitive
interactions with others a ects their perception of what is a socially just distribu-
tion of this income. The question is motivated by the well-established empirical
finding of a negative relationship between individuals’ income and their support
for redistributive public policies. A common explanation for this pattern is self-
interest: While high-income individuals want less redistribution to avoid high taxes,
low-income individuals want to benefit from transfers and thus support more redis-
tribution. However, empirical evidence suggests that support for redistribution is
not only driven by self-interest, but also by individuals’ fairness views, i.e., their
perceptions of what is a just, or fair, distribution of income in society. Therefore,
the negative relationship between support for redistribution and income may as well
be due to systematically di erent views of rich and poor individuals on what is a
fair income distribution.
To test this hypothesis, the third essay analyzes experimentally if individuals’
income, and how this income is generated, changes their fairness views. The ex-
periment consisted of an income generation phase and a distribution phase. In
the income generation phase, participants received a high or a low income either
through luck or through an e ort-based tournament. In the distribution phase, a
subset of subjects was asked to make distributive decisions over the incomes of two
other pairs of subjects – one pair in which income di erences were due to luck, and
one in which income di erences were due to e ort. Strategic behavior that favors
self-interest was, therefore, ruled out. It turns out that low-income individuals redis-
tribute significantly more than high-income individuals when the source of income
di erences is the same as the one they experienced themselves. That is, when in-
equalities are due to luck (e ort), an individual who received a low income by lack
of luck (e ort) redistributes significantly more than an individual who received a
high income by luck (e ort). The e ect remains unchanged when controlling for in-
dividual performance in the e ort-based tournament, suggesting that self-selection
into di erent income levels does not drive the results. This implies that personal
income, and how the latter is generated, has a causal e ect on individuals’ fairness
views. Further analysis shows that an explanation for this result is a self-serving
bias in the attribution of responsibility over an outcome: Compared to low-income
individuals, high-income individuals tend to believe more that their outcome is the
result of e ort rather than of luck.
The third essay has important implications for our understanding of how soci-
eties think about redistribution. The results suggest that personal income changes
individuals’ views about a fair distribution of income in society. In fact, personal
income seems to increase the acceptance of income di erences. This provides an
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explanation for the negative relationship between support for redistribution and in-
come that goes beyond the channel of self-interest. Furthermore, it implies that
the conflict between rich and poor in the debate about redistribution is not only a
battle of personal interests, but also of di erent ideologies. This di erence in ide-
ologies is such that it increases the discrepancy in preferences for redistribution that
is already caused by selfish motives. Therefore, there will be disagreement between
rich and poor about income redistribution even if people are able to abstract from
their own personal stake in this redistribution. The results further imply that the
di erences in ideologies between rich and poor are also the result of di erent indi-
vidual outcomes in the process of income generation. As a consequence, an increase
in income inequality is likely to boost the polarization in political preferences within
society, which makes it harder to reach a consensus about the appropriate level of
redistribution in the long run.
5Chapter 1
Optimal E ort Incentives in
Dynamic Tournamentsı
joint with Armin Schmutzler
1.1 Introduction
In many contexts, groups of economic agents supply e orts repeatedly, thereby
giving rise to sequences of performance signals that principals can use to reward
e orts. First, most organizations assess their employees’ performance regularly.
This performance information plays a crucial role for decisions on bonus payments,
promotion and tenure. Second, in many arms-length relationships, buyers repeatedly
procure goods and services from the same pool of suppliers. They can use past
experience with these suppliers as a basis for the conditions of future interactions.
Third, school and university teachers repeatedly observe the performance of students
in their classes and can decide how to use this information for final grades.
Motivated by these real-world situations, we analyze the incentive e ects of di er-
ent approaches to rewarding repeated performance. Specifically, we ask the following
questions:
1. How often should principals reward agents for good achievements? Should
there be frequent small rewards or rare large rewards?
ıA revised version of this chapter is accepted for publication in Games and Economic Behavior :
Klein, A. H. & Schmutzler, A. (2016). Optimal E ort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.006.
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2. Which weight should principals give to recent performance relative to perfor-
mance in the more distant past?
3. To which extent should the principal reveal the results of past performance
measurement to the agents?
We answer these questions for dynamic tournaments. Tournaments are often
used instead of contracts which condition explicitly and exclusively on each agent’s
own performance. In particular, organizations indeed provide incentives with pro-
motion tournaments.1
Specifically, we consider a two-period tournament with two risk-neutral agents
with identical and known abilities. To see the incentive e ects of such tournaments
most clearly, we abstract from the important issue of selecting the agent with the
highest innate ability for a particular task. The principal chooses an incentive
system, consisting of (i) the distribution of the prize money across the two periods,
(ii) the weight of first-period performance in the second tournament and (iii) the
information revelation policy.
After observing the policy, the agents choose e ort levels in each period. The
principal observes the performance of each agent, which is a noisy measure of e ort.
In period 1, she awards the prize (if any) to the agent with the higher performance.
Under a full revelation policy, she communicates the performance of both agents
in the first period. Under a no revelation policy, she neither communicates perfor-
mance, nor who the winner was. In period 2, the agents choose e orts again. The
principal then allocates the second-period prize to the agent for whom the weighted
sum of first- and second-period performance is highest.2
In line with the existing literature, we consider the case that a principal regards
e orts in di erent periods and by di erent agents as perfect substitutes and thus
maximizes total e ort. Contrary to most of the existing literature, we also analyze
the optimal policy for a principal who regards e orts in di erent periods as imperfect
substitutes and wants to balance them across periods.3 We believe this is important,
because excessively low e orts in some period may cause large harm, which cannot
even be compensated by an extremely large e ort in other periods.
1A well-known argument for tournaments is that they are more credible because they are less
prone to manipulation by the principal than contracts that depend explicitly on the details of
performance: When performance is not verifiable, a principal may claim that performance was
low to save on performance pay. Tournaments reduce this incentive, because the total payments
to the agents are independent of performance.
2In the no revelation case, the game is static. The model thus becomes a special case of a multi-
battle contest where agents compete simultaneously in a multiplicity of dimensions (see, e.g.,
Franckx et al., 2004; Clark & Konrad, 2007; Kovenock & Roberson, 2010). However, the dynamic
cross-period e ects which occur under our full revelation regime are totally absent in these papers.
3Specifically, she maximizes the product of first- and second-period e orts, or equivalently, the
sum of the logarithms. Aoyagi (2010) also allows for more general objectives than maximizing
total e orts.
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Apart from allowing for imperfect intertemporal e ort substitution, our approach
di ers from previous literature in three ways. First, we simultaneously consider
information revelation, the prize distribution and performance weights as design
tools of the principal. Second, we include the possibility that the distributions of
the first- and second-period performance measures di er – e.g. in their precision
– reflecting heterogeneity of tasks across periods. Third, we allow di erent cost
functions across periods.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we generalize existing results on information
revelation. Previous analysis has shown for special cases that expected total e orts
are lower with revelation than without when marginal e ort costs are convex, and
conversely for concave marginal e ort costs (see Section 1.2). We show that this
result holds for perfect and imperfect substitutes, and for arbitrary first-period prizes
and performance weights.
Second, we clarify the relation between first-period prizes and first-period per-
formance weights as incentives for first-period e orts. For both revelation policies
and for perfect as well as imperfect substitutes, the optimal first-period prize is pos-
itive only if the distribution of the first-period observation error di erence is very
precise, that is, highly concentrated near zero. We then show that for quadratic
cost functions and normally distributed observation errors, this condition is never
satisfied. Even with more general distributional assumptions, the scope for using
first-period prizes is limited: For imperfect substitutes and quadratic cost functions,
the optimal first-period prize is never higher than the second-period prize.
Whereas the optimal first-period prize is typically zero, the optimal weight of
first-period performance in the second-period tournament is strictly positive for
both revelation policies, general cost functions and error distributions. The optimal
weight is higher the lower the adverse e ect of increasing the first-period weight on
future competitive intensity is. For quadratic cost functions, normally distributed
observation errors and perfect (imperfect) substitutes, the optimal weight is the ratio
of the variances (standard deviations) of second-period and first-period observation
error di erences.
Third, we show that the potential gains from good design are quantitatively im-
portant. In the normal-quadratic example, the expected e ort is at least 40% higher
when a principal chooses prizes and weights optimally than when she distributes the
prize money evenly across both periods without giving weight to first-period perfor-
mance in the second-period tournament.
The organization of the study is as follows. Section 1.2 discusses related litera-
ture. In Section 1.3, we introduce the model. In Section 1.4, we analyze the behavior
of agents for given policies. Section 1.5 characterizes the optimal policy. Section 1.6
interprets and sharpens our results in a normal-quadratic example. Section 1.7
concludes.
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1.2 Relation to the literature
In this study, we focus on the optimal design of multi-period rank-order tournaments,
in particular, on feedback policy, prize structure and weight of past performance.4,5
The only paper we are aware of that simultaneously analyzes these three design di-
mensions is Gershkov and Perry (2009). However, their set-up di ers substantially
from ours. Most importantly, after period one, the principal merely knows whether
there is a tie (arising with positive probability) or whether one of the agents has
performed better (and, if so, which agent); there is no information on the size of the
lead. In many contexts, such a coarseness of the information structure appears to
be appropriate. However, in other contexts, the principal can collect and commu-
nicate information that provides the agents with a clear picture of how much their
performance di ers from the performance of others. This information will typically
not be verifiable in a court, but for our purposes it is su cient that the principal
and the agents share a common understanding of the relation between promotion
chances and the information communicated about the agents’ relative positions.6
Also, Gershkov and Perry (2009) assume that the relation between winning proba-
bilities and e orts is the same in both periods, while we allow for di erences in the
error structure. Finally, they only focus on maximization of total e ort.
We mention in passing the substantial literature analyzing agent behavior in
repeated tournaments without addressing optimal design. Several of these papers
allow for e ects of first-period play on the second period that are determined by
technology rather than, as in our case, by the principal.7 Moreover, some papers
study two-period contests (rank-order, all-pay and Tullock, respectively) where the
total e ort in the two periods determines the winner of a final prize.8,9
4Nitzan (1994) and Konrad (2009) provide surveys of the literature on tournaments.
5A broadly related literature analyzes dynamic principal-agent relationships with moral hazard in
a non-competitive setting. Lewis and Sappington (1997) examine how current incentives should
optimally depend on past performance. Hansen (2013) and Chen and Chiu (2013) deal with the
optimal revelation policy. For reasons of space, however, we will focus on studies that deal with
repeated contests.
6With verifiable information, the principal could contract directly on e orts, and there would be
no need to use tournaments.
7See Baik and Lee (2000), Schmitt et al. (2004), Grossmann and Dietl (2009) and Grossmann
(2011).
8See Yildirim (2005) for Tullock contests and Hirata (2014) for all-pay auctions. Casas-Arce and
Mart´ınez-Jerez (2009) consider a related rank-order tournament where all agents whose total
performance is higher than a certain threshold win a prize.
9More broadly related, several papers analyze the agents’ behavior in a sequence of contests where
there is a prize for winning each contest, and an overall prize to the agent who is the first to win
a certain number of contests. Examples are Konrad and Kovenock (2009) and Krumer (2013).
The model of Sela (2011) is similar, the di erence being that there is no prize for winning a single
contest.
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1.2.1 Performance revelation
Several papers analyze the e ect of interim performance revelation on e orts in dy-
namic tournaments. In a setting similar to ours, Aoyagi (2010) shows that expected
e ort is higher with information revelation than without if and only if marginal ef-
fort costs are concave.10 Unlike in this study, there is only one prize, and first- and
second-period weights are the same. We endogenize these assumptions by providing
conditions under which the principal optimally chooses the prizes and weights in this
way. Moreover, we show that the optimal revelation policy has the same features
when these assumptions do not hold.
Ederer (2010) introduces incomplete information about ability. The results are
equivalent to those of Aoyagi (2010) if ability is non-complementary to e ort. If
e orts and ability are complementary, it is possible that information revelation leads
to higher expected e orts than no revelation even with quadratic e ort costs.11,12
1.2.2 The weight of past performance
Several authors ask whether there should be a bias towards the first-period winner
in the second period of a multi-period contest (Meyer, 1992; Harbaugh & Ridlon,
2010; Ridlon & Shin, 2013). Meyer (1992) considers a setting similar to our case
with information revelation and a single prize, but with risk-averse agents. She
shows that the cost-minimizing choice of an e ort vector requires a bias towards the
first-period winner.13 Our analysis shows that the argument for giving a headstart
also holds when the first-period prize is much higher than the second-period prize,
when intertemporal e ort substitution is imperfect and when there is no information
revelation. Finally, we provide results on the determinants of the size of the bias.14
10Aoyagi (2010) is quite general with respect to the objective of the principal, and he allows for
partial revelation. Denter and Sisak (2013) show that e ort may increase with revelation if
marginal e orts are concave. They use their set-up to analyze the e ect of polls on political
campaign spending, allowing for an initial asymmetry before the beginning of the first period.
11Using a similar framework, Ederer and Fehr (2007) and Marinovic (2014) study the issue of
credibility of the performance feedback.
12Other papers address the revelation policy in dynamic tournaments under very di erent assump-
tions. For example, Arbatskaya and Mialon (2012) analyze a lottery contest where first- and
second-period e orts are complements in a ecting the probability of winning. They find that
revelation of first-period e orts decreases total e orts. Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011) consider
a contest in which the agents either succeed or fail, and the prize is given to the agent who
succeeded more often. The optimal policy reveals performance only if both agents fail. Finally,
Zhang and Wang (2009) consider revelation policies in dynamic all-pay auctions with elimination.
13Ridlon and Shin (2013) show for a Tullock contest that an analogous result still holds for small
asymmetries in the abilities of agents. However, if the asymmetry is high, favoring the first-
period loser is optimal. In the dynamic all-pay auction of Harbaugh and Ridlon (2010), favoring
the first-period loser is always optimal.
14Contrary to us, Meyer (1992) assumes that the size of the bias is fixed ex ante rather than a
function of the performance di erence in period 1.
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1.2.3 Distribution of prize money
A small number of papers derives the optimal distribution of prize money across
periods when there is an exogenously given technological link between the first and
the second period, creating an asymmetry between the agents in the second period.
The e ects of such links are similar to those of a positive weight of past performance
in the assignment of the second-period prize. Contrary to us, the authors focus on
Tullock contests. For example, in Mo¨ller (2012), the prize money received in the first
period does not yield direct utility to the agents, but reduces their e ort costs in
the second period. Under some circumstances, the optimal policy requires a positive
prize both for the winner and for the loser in the first period.15 In Clark et al. (2012),
the winner in the first period may have lower e ort costs in the second period. The
e ort-maximizing prize structure is to give only a second-period prize. In Clark and
Nilssen (2013), second-period e ort costs fall with first-period e ort. The authors
provide conditions under which it is optimal to pay more than half of the total prize
money in the second period.16 Apart from the obvious di erence in the structure of
the contest, these papers do not analyze revelation policies, nor do they allow for
imperfect substitutes.
Some papers derive the optimal distribution of prize money across stages in a
two-period elimination tournament, where only the winners of the current period
compete again in the next period. A seminal paper is Moldovanu and Sela (2006).
Because elimination tournaments have a very di erent structure than our model,
the results are di cult to compare to ours.
1.3 The model
We consider a class of two-stage rank-order tournaments. Given a fixed budget
W > 0, a principal chooses an incentive system I, which is a tuple (÷,W1, ﬂ) œ
R ◊ [0,W ] ◊ {0, 1} to be explained below. For given I, agents i œ {1, 2} choose
e ort levels eit Ø 0 (t œ {1, 2}).17 The e ort cost function Kit (eit) has the following
properties:
Assumption 1.1. Kit is independent of i and di erentiable three times. It satisfies
K Õit > 0, K ÕÕit > 0, Kit (0) = K Õit (0) = 0. K ÕÕÕit (eit) Ø 0 or K ÕÕÕit (eit) Æ 0 must hold
globally.
15Since agents are initially symmetric, unequal prizes in the first period yield an asymmetry in the
second period through their e ect on second-period e ort costs. This result is therefore similar
to a positive weight on past performance in our setting.
16We have a similar result in the case of imperfect substitutes, but for very di erent reasons (see
Proposition 1.7).
17In the following, the use of i and/or j as an index always implies i, j œ {1, 2} and i ”= j.
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Thus, we can write Kt © Kit. Note that we allow first- and second-period tasks
to di er with respect to e ort costs. This reflects the idea that the e orts in the two
periods may be of very di erent types. Employees or suppliers may have to carry
out di erent tasks in di erent periods; students learn di erent kinds of material in
di erent phases of their education. Therefore, e ort costs may di er across tasks.
The agents maximize expected utility and are risk-neutral. Their utility is ad-
ditively separable in period-specific income and costs. At the end of each period t,
the principal observes performance, which is an imperfect measure sit = eit + Áit of
e ort. The error term Áit is independently distributed across agents and periods. In
each period, the error distribution is the same for agent 1 as for agent 2. However,
the error distribution in period 1 may di er from the one in period 2. This captures
the notion that tasks in di erent periods may also di er in terms of how easy it is
to monitor e ort.18
Based on the first-period performance, the principal awards the first-period prize
W1 to agent i if si1 > sj1. Furthermore, agent i receives the second-period prize
W2 = W ≠W1 if si2 + ÷si1 > sj2 + ÷sj1.19 The principal’s choice of the first-period
weight ÷ œ R thus determines the influence of past performance on the chance of
winning in the second period.
Under a full-revelation policy (ﬂ = 1), the principal communicates the measured
performance of both players to the agents before they choose their second-period
e orts. In practice, the principal will typically not communicate a concrete number.
Instead, she may communicate whatever relevant information she has to the agents,
thereby creating a common understanding about their relative performance.20 Under
a no-revelation policy (ﬂ = 0), the principal does not communicate the performance
assessment. She does not even communicate who won the first-period prize and
distributes both prizes at the end of period 2.
The following notation is helpful to describe the solution of the game.
Definition 1.1. The error di erence of player i in period t (t = 1, 2) is  Áit =
Áit≠Ájt, his relative first-period performance is  si1 = si1≠sj1 =  ei1+ Áit, where
 eit = eit ≠ ejt.
Clearly,  eit = ≠ ejt,  Áit = ≠ Ájt,  si1 = ≠ sj1. We make the following
assumption on the error distributions:
18In a non-tournament setting, Ke et al. (2014) show that organizations optimally hire workers
into easy-to-monitor jobs with low e ort costs and then promote them into di cult-to-monitor
jobs with high (marginal and absolute) e ort costs. In our setting, this would correspond to
‡1 < ‡2 and K1 (e) < K2 (e), K Õ1 (e) < K Õ2 (e).
19In each period, in case of a tie, the principal assigns the prize to each agent with probability one
half.
20As we will see, second-period e orts depend negatively on the absolute value of the performance
di erence in the first period. Hence, the principal has an incentive to always report equal
performances. This problem becomes negligible if the principal leaves the communication to
disinterested parties from within or outside the organization.
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Assumption 1.2.  Áit is distributed as Ft (s) on R with a symmetric, single-peaked,
strictly positive and continuously di erentiable density ft (s).
This implies ft (s) = ft (≠s), f Õt (s) = ≠f Õt (≠s) and E ( Áit) = 0.21 For some
results, we assume that the cost functions are quadratic:
Assumption 1.3. The cost function is Kt (eit) = kt2 (eit)
2 with kt > 0.
We assume that, given a fixed prize budget, the principal’s payo  is increasing
in e orts, where the e orts of di erent agents within periods are perfect substitutes
for the principal. We allow first- and second-period e orts to be either perfect or
imperfect substitutes. For perfect substitutes, the principal chooses the incentive
system so as to maximize expected total e orts. For imperfect substitutes, she max-
imizes the expected product of first- and second-period e orts. This corresponds to
a complementarity between first- and second-period e orts, making it desirable to
have similar e orts in both periods.
1.4 Behavior of the agents
We first analyze the equilibrium behavior of agents for given incentive system. The
following simple result is mentioned without proof.
Lemma 1.1.
(i) The conditional probability that si1 > sj1 given ei1 and ej1 is F1 (ei1 ≠ ej1).
(ii) The conditional probability that si2 + ÷si1 > sj2 + ÷sj1 given ei2, ej2 and  si1
is F2 (÷ si1 + ei2 ≠ ej2).
1.4.1 Full revelation
In period 2, a player’s information set consists of all combinations of period 1 e orts
and error di erences that are consistent with the own first-period e ort ei1 and
the observed relative performance  si1.22 We use the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE) to deal with this imperfect information (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 285).
The task is simplified because there are no o -equilibrium events to consider, as f1
is strictly positive on R. Moreover, period 1 enters player i’s payo s only via  si1
and ei1, so that the unobservable aspects of previous play (player j’s e ort choices)
are irrelevant for the players’ choices.
21The assumptions on the distribution of the error di erences are guaranteed to hold if the as-
sumptions hold for the distributions of the observation errors.
22This statement holds no matter whether the principal publicly announces the absolute perfor-
mance of each agent, or just the di erence.
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A pure strategy ‡i of player i consists of a first-period choice ei1 and a function
Ei2 mapping information sets (ei1, si1) to actions ei2. If player i chose ei1, observes
 si1 and assumes that player j plays the pure strategy ‡j = (ej1, Ej2), he will assign
probability one to the event that  Ái1 =  si1 ≠ ei1. We will always assume that
beliefs are formed in this way, without specifying them explicitly.
1.4.1.1 Second-period e orts
Using Lemma 1.1 (ii), the expected second-period payo  of agent i, conditional on
the relative first-period performance and second-period e orts, is
Ui2 (ei2, ej2, si1) = F2 (÷ si1 + ei2)W2 ≠K2 (ei2) . (1.1)
Thus, the first period influences the second-period payo  via the first-period relative
performance  si1. The corresponding first-order condition is
f2(÷ si1 + ei2)W2 = K Õ2 (ei2) . (1.2)
Though the game does not have any proper subgames because information sets in
period 2 are not singletons, payo s in period 2 are constant on information sets. We
use this in the following definition.
Definition 1.2. The second-period e ort game induced by  si1 is the game with
players i = 1, 2, strategy spaces Xi = R+ and payo s given by (1.1) for (ei2, ej2) œ
Xi ◊Xj.
We obtain the following result:
Lemma 1.2. Suppose ﬂ = 1 (full revelation) and W2 > 0.
(i) In any equilibrium of the second-period e ort game, e orts are symmetric and
satisfy
eúi2 ( si1) © eúi2 ( si1; ÷,W2, 1) = (K Õ2)≠1 [f2 (÷ si1)W2] . (1.3)
(ii) If e ort costs are su ciently convex, (1.3) defines the unique Nash equilibrium
of the second-period e ort game.
Proof. See Appendix A1.1.1.
Lemma 1.2 has some simple comparative statics implications.
Corollary 1.1. Suppose ﬂ = 1, ÷ ”= 0 and W2 > 0. Then eúi2 is decreasing in | si1|
and |÷|, and increasing in W2.
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Proof. See Appendix A1.1.2.
The result on | si1| implies that, if a laggard (an agent with  si1 < 0) increases
or a leader (an agent with  si1 > 0) decreases own e ort marginally in period
1, both players increase e ort in period 2.23 The other two results identify policy
e ects. In particular, increasing the absolute value of the first-period weight ÷
reduces second-period e orts.
In the PBE, the symmetric equilibrium of the second-period e ort game is played
after each realization of  si1. Thus, the expected second-period payo , conditional
on first-period performance, is
U si2 ( si1) © Ui2
1
eúi2 ( si1) , eúj2 (≠ si1) , si1
2
. (1.4)
The expected second-period payo , given first-period e orts, is
U ei2 (ei1, ej1) © E Ái1U si2 ( ei1 + Ái1) . (1.5)
1.4.1.2 First-period e orts
Using Lemma 1.1 (i), agent i’s optimization problem in period 1 is
max
ei1Ø0
F1 (ei1 ≠ ej1)W1 + U ei2 (ei1, ej1)≠K1 (ei1) .
The corresponding first-order conditions is
f1 ( ei1)W1 +
ˆU ei2
ˆei1
= K Õ1 (ei1) . (1.6)
The following definition is crucial for the intuition.
Definition 1.3. The intensity of second-period competition is given by
C (÷) = 2
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) f1 (s) ds.
The logic of the definition is as follows. For each agent, f1 (s) captures the density
of the event that the relative first-period performance of this player is s when e orts
are symmetric (as in equilibrium). Since both players choose identical equilibrium
e orts in the second period, f2 (÷s) = f2 (≠÷s) captures the density of the event
that a strike of luck of one agent in period 2 exactly compensates a strike of luck of
the other agent of size s in period 1. Therefore, C (÷) measures the joint probability
of the event that the second-period contest is a close run where a marginal e ort
increase of one agent will a ect the outcome of the second-period contest and tip
23This result reflects the ”well-known evaluation e ect or lack-of-competition e ect” (Ederer, 2010,
p. 742)
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the balance in his favor: When C (÷) is high, an agent who has been lucky in the
first period cannot be too sure about his winning prospects in the second period,
and will therefore continue to put in some e ort.
C (÷) is a function of the weight ÷ with several simple properties. First,
C Õ (÷) = 2
⁄ Œ
0
sf Õ2 (÷s) f1 (s) ds < 0 for ÷ > 0. (1.7)
An increase in the absolute value of the weight thus reduces the intensity of second-
period competition. Moreover:
C (÷) > 0;
C (0) = f2 (0) ; (1.8)
C Õ (0) = 0; (1.9)
C (÷) = C(≠÷). (1.10)
We sometimes invoke a regularity condition that simplifies the interpretation of our
results:
Assumption 1.4. For ÷ > 0, ÷C (÷) is increasing in ÷.
This conditions holds, for instance, in Example E1 below. The following condi-
tion rules out corner solutions in period 1:
f1 (0)W1 + ÷W2C (÷) > 0. (1.11)
Note that (1.11) can only be binding for negative ÷.24
The following result uses (1.6) to derive equilibrium e orts:
Proposition 1.1. Suppose ﬂ = 1 (full revelation).
(i) In any symmetric interior PBE, first-period e orts must satisfy
eú1 (÷,W1,W2, 1) = (K Õ1)
≠1 [f1 (0)W1 + ÷W2C (÷)] . (1.12)
(ii) Suppose the cost functions are su ciently convex. If (1.11) holds, (1.3) and
(1.12) describe the unique symmetric PBE strategies. If (1.11) is violated,
eú1 = 0 and (1.3) describe the unique symmetric PBE strategies.
Proof. See Appendix A1.1.3.
We defer the discussion of the second-order conditions to the appendix; there we
will show that they require su ciently convex cost functions.25
24We will show below that the principal will never choose negative values for ÷.
25The relevant condition is (A1.8).
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By Proposition 1.1, if Assumption 1.4 holds, then a higher positive weight of
past e ort always induces higher first-period e ort. The term in brackets on the
right-hand side of (1.12) is the marginal benefit from increasing ei1. The e ect on
the expected first-period payo  is f1 (0)W1; the e ect on the expected second-period
payo  is ÷W2C (÷), which is positive if ÷ > 0. This term reflects the direct e ect
of higher first-period e ort on second-period winning chances. The term does not
capture strategic e ects on the future e orts of the other player. Such e ects are
relevant in the game, but they cancel out in the symmetric equilibrium.26
We now characterize second-period e orts. Symmetry of the equilibrium in
Proposition 1.1 implies  si1 =  Ái1. Using (1.3) and taking the expectation over
 Ái1, we obtain:
Corollary 1.2. The expected e orts in period 2 in the full-revelation PBE described
in Proposition 1.1 are
E (eú2 (÷,W2, 1)) = 2
⁄ Œ
0
(K Õ2)
≠1 [f2 (÷s)W2] f1 (s) ds. (1.13)
Proof. See Appendix A1.1.4.
Together with Assumption 1.2, Corollary 1.2 implies that second-period e orts
decrease in |÷|. Thus, first-period e orts must increase at least locally in |÷| near the
optimal ÷. Therefore, by (1.12), Assumption 1.4 must hold locally near the optimal
÷. Otherwise, by Proposition 1.1 the principal could increase e orts in both periods
by reducing ÷, contradicting optimality of ÷.
1.4.2 No revelation
Under the no-revelation policy, agents simultaneously choose first- and second-period
e orts according to
max
ei1Ø0,ei2Ø0
F1 (ei1 ≠ ej1)W1 (1.14)
+W2
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
F2 (÷ (ei1 ≠ ej1 + s) + ei2 ≠ ej2) f1 (s) ds≠K1 (ei1)≠K2 (ei2) .
26To see this, suppose ÷ > 0; for ÷ < 0, the argument is reversed. If, for any given first-period
e ort choice, a player knew he was ahead of the other player, he would have a strategic incentive
to increase e orts to discourage player j from exerting e ort in the future, whereas the converse
would hold for a player who knows he is behind the opponent. Since the game is stochastic,
players have to consider the expected strategic e ects, which can be positive or negative, but
cancel out when first-period e orts are identical.
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The integral in (1.14) is the probability of winning the second-period prize, con-
ditional on e ort choices.27 This leads to a simple characterization of the Nash
equilibrium.
Proposition 1.2.
(i) Suppose ﬂ = 0 (no revelation). In any symmetric interior Nash equilibrium,
e orts must satisfy:
eú1 (÷,W1,W2, 0) = (K Õ1)
≠1 [f1 (0)W1 + ÷W2C (÷)] > 0; (1.15)
eú2 (÷,W2, 0) = (K Õ2)
≠1 [W2C (÷)] > 0. (1.16)
(ii) If the cost functions are su ciently convex and (1.11) holds, (1.15) and (1.16)
describe the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game.28
Proof. See Appendix A1.1.5.
Both e ort levels reflect standard cost-benefit considerations. The marginal ben-
efit of first-period e orts depends on the increased winning probabilities in period 2
(÷C (÷)) and period 1 (f1 (0)).
By Proposition 1.1 and Proposition 1.2, first-period e orts in any symmetric
equilibrium are non-stochastic and equal under both revelation policies; we thus
write eú1 (÷,W1,W2) for first-period equilibrium e orts.29
1.5 Optimal policy
We now characterize the optimal policy of the principal.30 To this end, we fix the
total budget asW , so thatW2 = W≠W1. Since we focus on symmetric equilibria and
e orts within periods are perfect substitutes, we can write the principal’s objective
in terms of the e orts of only one agent. As first-period e orts are non-stochastic,
27This follows from Lemma 1.1 (ii).
28In Appendix A1.1.6 we identify the meaning of “su cient convexity”. We also show that the
second-order conditions hold locally for arbitrary convex cost function.
29The result reflects the fact that the marginal e ect of first-period e ort on expected second-
period payo s is identical under both policies. Intuitively, a marginal increase of ei1 has positive
e ects on the second-period payo s of player i if it su ces to tip the balance in the contest in
period 2 in his favor. The probability that this happens, which is captured by C (÷) for both
players, is independent of whether information on  si1 is revealed to players before they choose
second-period e orts. In this argument, it is important to start from the respective equilibrium,
with equal e orts in both periods.
30In the following discussion, we assume that, for given error distributions and e ort cost functions,
second-order conditions hold for all allowable choices of the policy variables. This is for instance
true for the normal-quadratic example of Section 1.6.
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the principal’s objective functions for perfect and imperfect substitutes, respectively,
are:
V P (÷,W1, ﬂ) © eú1 (÷,W1,W ≠W1) + E (eú2 (÷,W ≠W1, ﬂ)) ; (1.17)
V I (÷,W1, ﬂ) © eú1 (÷,W1,W ≠W1) · E (eú2 (÷,W ≠W1, ﬂ)) . (1.18)
1.5.1 Optimal revelation policy
According to (1.17) and (1.18), the principal chooses the revelation policy that in-
duces higher expected second-period e orts, no matter whether e orts are perfect
or imperfect substitutes. Using Jensen’s inequality, we can compare the expected
second-period e orts in the equilibria characterized by Proposition 1.1 and Propo-
sition 1.2:31
Proposition 1.3. ’ ÷ œ R,W1 < W :
(i) If K ÕÕÕ2 Ø 0, then eú2 (÷,W ≠W1, 0) Ø E (eú2 (÷,W ≠W1, 1)).
(ii) If K ÕÕÕ2 Æ 0, then eú2 (÷,W ≠W1, 0) Æ E (eú2 (÷,W ≠W1, 1)).
Proof. See Appendix A1.2.
For quadratic costs, (i) and (ii) together imply that expected second-period ef-
forts are equal under both revelation policies.32 Proposition 1.3 applies to all val-
ues of ÷ and W1 and, in particular, to those that maximize eú2 (÷,W ≠W1, 0) or
E (eú2 (÷,W ≠W1, 1)). Thus, even if the principal has chosen the optimal parame-
ters for a given revelation policy, switching to the other revelation policy is beneficial
if the corresponding condition on K ÕÕÕ2 holds. Hence, we have proven:
Corollary 1.3. The optimal revelation policy is the same for perfect and imperfect
substitutes, with ﬂ = 0 if K ÕÕÕ2 > 0 and ﬂ = 1 if K ÕÕÕ2 < 0. For K ÕÕÕ2 = 0, expected
payo s are independent of the revelation policy.
The result extends Aoyagi (2010) who shows that, for one prize (W1 = 0) and
equal weights (÷ = 1), the e ort cost function completely determines the optimal
revelation policy.33 Our result shows that this statement holds for arbitrary W1 and
÷.
31Intuitively, with revelation, the agents base their second-period decisions on the revealed asymme-
try between players, whereas, without revelation, the expected asymmetry is decisive. Compare
second-period decisions with and without revelation for given e ort choices in the first period:
For error realizations where the asymmetry is low (high) relative to expectations, e orts will be
higher (lower) with revelation than without.
32Intuitively, the role of K ÕÕÕ2 is an immediate consequence of the fact that second-period e orts
are the inverse of marginal costs for ﬂ = 0 and the expectation of the inverse of marginal costs
for ﬂ = 1. Thus, concavity (convexity) of the inverse marginal costs is decisive for which regime
yields higher e orts on expectation.
33Ederer (2010) also treats this case in his discussion of non-complementary abilities.
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1.5.2 Optimal weight of past performance
The principal can give incentives for first-period e orts with W1 or ÷. The next
result shows that, no matter how high the first-period prize is, the principal should
always assign a positive weight to past performance in the second-period contest.
For perfect substitutes, we denote the optimal choice of ÷ conditional on W1 and
ﬂ as ÷P (W1, ﬂ) and the optimal choice of W1 conditional on ÷ as W P1 (÷, ﬂ). For
imperfect substitutes, we write ÷I(W1, ﬂ) and W I1 (÷, ﬂ).
Proposition 1.4. ÷P (W1, ﬂ) > 0 and ÷I(W1, ﬂ) > 0 ’ W1 < W and ﬂ = 0, 1.
Proof. See Appendix A1.3.1.
This result holds because, for ÷ = 0, the marginal e ect of ÷ on first-period e ort
is positive and bounded away from zero (a first-order e ect), whereas it is zero for
second-period e ort (a second-order e ect). To understand the latter point, note
that the adverse e ect of increasing ÷ > 0 on second-period e orts arises because the
second-period contest becomes more asymmetric, that is, less competitive (C Õ (÷) <
0). As C Õ (0) = 0, this adverse e ect vanishes as ÷ approaches 0.
Proposition 1.4 states that performance evaluation should always have some
memory: Firms should consider not only the recent performance of employees and
suppliers, but also the performance in the distant past. Similarly, students should
not only be judged with respect to their recent performance. The open question
is: How large should the “shadow of the past” be? To answer this question for
perfect substitutes, the next result characterizes the weight of past performance for
quadratic costs (Assumption 1.3). In this case, revelation and no revelation imply
the same behavior. Thus, we write ÷P (W1) © ÷P (W1, 0) = ÷P (W1, 1), and similarly
for W P1 (÷). Furthermore, we write
1
÷P ,W P1
2
= argmax÷,W1 V P (÷,W1).
Proposition 1.5. Suppose Assumption 1.3 holds. Then, ’ W1 < W , ÷P (W1)
satisfies -----C Õ (÷)C (÷)
----- = 1k1
k2
+ ÷ . (1.19)
Proof. See Appendix A1.3.2.
(1.19) captures the trade-o  between strengthening first-period incentives and
weakening second-period competition. Changes in the error distributions that in-
crease the sensitivity
---CÕ(÷)C(÷) --- of second-period competition to the first-period weight ÷
for all ÷ reduce the optimal ÷.34 Furthermore, the higher first-period marginal e ort
costs are compared to second-period marginal e ort costs, the lower is the optimal
34We illustrate this in Figure 1.2 below.
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÷. Note that (1.19) and thus the optimal ÷ is independent of the first-period prize
W1.35
1.5.3 Optimal first-period prize
We now supply several results on the optimal prize structure. We also use these
results to obtain further insights on the optimal weights.
1.5.3.1 Perfect substitutes
For perfect substitutes, we confine ourselves to quadratic costs (Assumption 1.3) in
the main text. The results are special cases of more general, but less transparent
results that we state and prove in Appendix A1.4 (Proposition A1.1 and Proposi-
tion A1.2).
For quadratic costs, it is optimal to give only one positive prize. Depending on
the observation error distributions, the prize should be based only on first-period
performance (W P1 = W ) or on second-period performance as well (W P1 = 0).
Corollary 1.4. Suppose Assumption 1.3 holds.
(i) If f1 (0) <
1
k1
k2
+ ÷
2
C (÷), then the optimal first-period prize conditional on ÷
is W P1 (÷) = 0. If ÷ ÷ œ R s.t. f1 (0) <
1
k1
k2
+ ÷
2
C (÷), then the unconditonally
optimal first-period prize is W P1 = 0.
(ii) If f1 (0) >
1
k1
k2
+ ÷
2
C (÷), then the optimal first-period prize conditional on ÷
is W P1 (÷) = W . If f1 (0) >
1
k1
k2
+ ÷
2
C (÷) ’ ÷ œ R, then the unconditonally
optimal first-period prize is W P1 = W .
Proof. See Appendix A1.4.3.
The intuition is straightforward. By (i), when second-period competition (as
captured by C (÷)) is intense enough relative to the precision of the first-period
measurement (as captured by f1 (0)), then second-period e orts should be positive,
which requires a second-period prize.36 Otherwise (case (ii)), there should be no
second-period prize. However, we will show in Section 1.6 that W P1 = 0 always
holds in a normal-quadratic example. Note that the condition under which there is
no first-period prize is easier to satisfy when first-period marginal e ort costs are
high compared to second-period marginal e ort costs.
35This is due to the fact that W1 enters ˆV
P (÷,W1)
ˆ÷ linearly. The relevant expression is (A1.18).
Since ˆ
2V P (÷,W1)
ˆ÷ˆW1
< 0, the increase in payo  by setting ÷ optimally depends positively onW≠W1,
the prize paid in the second period.
36Note that f1 (0) is a purely local measure of precision, capturing the probability that identical
e orts translate into identical performance measures.
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Beyond quadratic e ort costs In Appendix A1.4, we provide results on the
optimal first-period prizes and weights for general cost functions. These results
imply Corollary 1.4 for K ÕÕÕt = 0 as a special case. When K ÕÕÕt ”= 0, the e ort
choices with and without information revelation are no longer identical, so that the
optimal policies do not coincide. Proposition A1.1 in the Appendix characterizes
the optimal prize structure with information revelation for K ÕÕÕt Æ 0, in which case
information revelation is superior to no revelation by Proposition 1.3. Conversely,
Proposition A1.2 in the Appendix characterizes the optimal prize structure without
information revelation for K ÕÕÕt Ø 0, where no information revelation is superior
to revelation by Proposition 1.3. The interpretation of the general propositions is
similar as for quadratic costs: If the first-period contest is too noisy, it is optimal
not to give a first-period prize.
1.5.3.2 Imperfect substitutes
For imperfect substitutes, we also obtain a general condition under which the optimal
first-period prize for a given past weight is zero with performance revelation. The
result applies if K ÕÕÕt Æ 0, so that revelation is optimal by Corollary 1.3.
Proposition 1.6. Suppose K ÕÕÕt Æ 0 for t = 1, 2. For all ÷ > 0, W I1 (÷, 1) = 0 if
f1 (0) < ÷C (÷).
Proof. See Appendix A1.5.1.
Thus, as with perfect substitutes, this (su cient) condition is easier to sat-
isfy if the first-period signal is not very precise (f1 (0) is low) and second-period
competition C (÷) is intense. To obtain stronger results, we now specialize to
quadratic e ort costs. As behavior is the same with and without revelation, we
write ÷I(W1) © ÷I(W1, 0) = ÷I(W1, 1) and similarly for W I1 (÷). Furthermore, we
write
1
÷I ,W I1
2
= argmax÷,W1 V I (÷,W1). We obtain:
Proposition 1.7. If Assumption 1.3 holds, the optimal first-period prize conditional
on ÷ is W I1 (÷) Æ W2 ’ ÷, so that the optimal unconditional first-period prize is
W I1 Æ W2 .
Proof. See Appendix A1.5.2.
There is no counterpart of this result for perfect substitutes, where it can, in
principle, be optimal to refrain from inducing second-period e ort altogether. For
imperfect substitutes, principals aim at a balanced e ort distribution. Therefore,
they need to make sure not to give excessive first-period prizes, because they are
already providing indirect incentives for first-period e ort through the weight ÷.
The following result specifies the optimal solution further:
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Proposition 1.8. Suppose Assumption 1.3 holds.
(i) W I1 (÷) > 0 if and only if f1 (0) > 2÷C (÷). In this case
W I1 (÷) =W
f1 (0)≠ 2÷C (÷)
2f1 (0)≠ 2÷C (÷) > 0.
(ii) The optimal
1
W I1 , ÷
I
2
satisfies one of the following necessary properties:
(a) W I1 = 0 and
-----C Õ(÷I)C(÷I)
----- = 12÷I .
(b) W I1 = W
f1 (0)≠ 2÷IC
1
÷I
2
2f1 (0)≠ 2÷IC (÷I) > 0 and
-----C Õ(÷I)C(÷I)
----- = C
1
÷I
2
f1 (0)
.
Proof. See Appendix A1.5.3.
Result (i) describes the optimal prize structure conditional on ÷. As with per-
fect substitutes, the optimal first-period prize is positive if first-period precision
(captured by f1 (0)) is high and second-period competition C (÷) is low. Moreover,
the result sharpens Proposition 1.6 by showing that, at least for quadratic costs,
f1 (0) < ÷C (÷) is not necessary to guarantee that the conditionally optimal prize
structure satisfies W I1 (÷) = 0. Finally, the result shows that, when Assumption 1.3
and Assumption 1.4 hold, first-period prizes and weights are substitutes: The opti-
mal first-period prize is lower the higher the first-period weight ÷ is.
Result (ii) describes the unconditionally optimal solution
1
W I1 , ÷
I
1
2
for quadratic
costs. There are two possibilities, both depicted in Figure 1.1. According to (a),
the first-period prize may be zero, in which case the optimal first-period weight
is described by a simple condition that depends exclusively on C (÷) (see point
A on the horizontal axis in Figure 1.1). As with perfect substitutes, the weight
is lower if the adverse e ect of ÷ on future competition is higher. By (b), the
first-period prize may be positive, in which case the optimal first-period weight is
determined by a condition that depends on error distributions not only via C (÷),
but also via f1 (0) directly, as captured by W I1 (÷) (see point B on the diagonal
line in Figure 1.1).37 The error distributions determine which of the two cases in
Proposition 1.8 applies. For instance, with normal error distributions, the first-
period prize is zero (see Corollary 1.6 below).
Note that in contrast to the perfect substitutes case (Proposition 1.5 and Corol-
lary 1.4), the optimal weights and prizes are independent of the relation between
first- and second-period e ort costs and entirely determined by the properties of the
observation error distributions.
37Note that W I1 (÷) is typically not linear.
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Figure 1.1: Necessary conditions for imperfect substitutes
1.5.4 Restrictions on allowable policies
In some circumstances, principals may not be free to choose arbitrary incentive sys-
tems. For instance, there may be a limit on the extent to which they may consider
past performance in current evaluations. Then first-period prizes may act as substi-
tutes for performance weights: For instance, with perfect substitutes, Corollary 1.4
shows that it is weakly easier to satisfy the condition for W P1 (÷) = W and corre-
spondingly weakly more di cult to satisfy the condition for W P1 (÷) = 0 when ÷ is
bounded above. Conversely, the prize structure may be restricted. For instance, a
principal may have to spread the prize sum evenly. According to Proposition 1.7,
W1 Æ W2 must hold for the optimal first-period prize with imperfect substitutes. In
cases where an unconstrained principal would set W1 < W2 , a principal who has to
set W1 = W2 is giving excessive first-period incentives relative to the unconstrained
case. To make up for this, she has to adjust the weight of first-period performance
downwards.
1.6 A normal-quadratic example
To obtain sharper results, we introduce a simple example.
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Example E1. The cost function is Kt (eit) = k2e2it for t = 1, 2. The error di erence
 Áit is normally distributed with variance ‡2t .38
Example E1 satisfies Assumption 1.1 and Assumption 1.2.39
Corollary 1.5. In E1, a PBE exists. The equilibrium e orts under revelation and
no revelation are
eú1 (÷,W1,W2) =
1
k
Ô
2ﬁ
QaW1
‡1
+ ÷W2Ò
‡22 + ‡21÷2
Rb ; (1.20)
eú2 (÷,W2, 0) = E (eú2 (÷,W2, 1)) =
W2
k
Ô
2ﬁ
Ò
‡22 + ‡21÷2
. (1.21)
Proof. See Appendix A1.6.1.
Comparative statics for second-period e orts are straightforward. Lower mar-
ginal e ort costs, higher second-period prize, lower first-period weight and higher
first- and second-period precision induce higher second-period e orts. Analogous
results hold for period one. First-period e orts also increase if the second-period
precision increases, given ÷ > 0: The parameter change makes first-period e ort
more worthwhile, because the positive e ect on winning the second-period prize
increases. Finally, a redistribution of the prize sum from period 2 to period 1
increases first-period e orts, because the positive e ect of an increase in the first-
period prize is always stronger than the negative e ect of an identical decrease in
the second-period prize.
Figure 1.2 illustrates Proposition 1.5 for Example E1. It shows how the opti-
mal weight ÷P depends on the sensitivity
---CÕ(÷)C(÷) --- of second-period competition to
÷, which is low if the second-period performance measurement is relatively impre-
cise compared to the first-period measurement, implying a higher optimal weight of
first-period performance.
Corollary 1.6 characterizes the optimal policy. The results endogenize the as-
sumption that W1 = 0 and ÷ = 1 in Aoyagi (2010) for identically normally dis-
tributed error distributions (‡1 = ‡2).40
Corollary 1.6. In E1,
(i) ÷P (W1) = ‡
2
2
‡21
’ W1 < W . Furthermore, ÷P = ‡
2
2
‡21
and W P1 = 0.
(ii) necessary conditions for the optimum are ÷I = ‡2‡1 and W
I
1 = 0.
38A normally distributed error di erence follows, for example, from normally distributed observa-
tion errors.
39In the appendix, we also derive the second-order conditons ((A1.37) and (A1.39)).
40Similarly, we provide a justification for the model of Ederer (2010) with non-complementary
abilities in which W1 = 0 and ÷ = 0.
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Figure 1.2: Necessary conditions for ÷ with perfect substitutes
Proof. See Appendix A1.6.2.
(i) shows that it is optimal to give only a second-period prize with perfect sub-
stitutes. Incentives for first-period e orts come exclusively from the weight of past
performance, which is the ratio of the error variances in the two periods. (ii) yields
a similar result for imperfect substitutes, with variances replaced by standard devi-
ations. Note that ÷I > ÷P if and only if ‡2‡1 < 1: Greater precision of the second-
period performance measure leads to higher second-period e orts compared to the
first-period e orts. With imperfect substitutes, where an even e ort flow is desired,
a greater weight of the first period is used to mitigate the asymmetry.
The example demonstrates the importance of the right incentive system. To see
this, suppose that initially the principal chooses (÷,W1) =
1
0, W2
2
, so that there
are two independent and identical tournaments. Next, suppose that the principal
introduces the optimal policy in two steps: First, she maintains the equal divi-
sion of the prize sum across periods, but chooses the optimal weight ÷P
1
W
2
2
, so
that (÷,W1) = (‡
2
2
‡21
, W2 ). Finally, she chooses prizes and weights optimally, so that
(÷,W1) = (‡
2
2
‡21
, 0). Simple calculations (available on request) show that if the princi-
pal sets only ÷ optimally, the relative increase of her payo , compared to the initial
situation, is
EP÷ ©
V P
1
‡22
‡21
, W2
2
≠ V P
1
0, W2
2
V P
1
0, W2
2 =
Ò
‡21 + ‡22 ≠ ‡1
(‡1 + ‡2)
.
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Figure 1.3: Relative payo  increase when setting W1 and ÷ optimally
By optimally adjusting the prize structure as well, she achieves an additional
relative payo  increase of
EPW1 ©
V P
1
‡22
‡21
, 0
2
≠ V P
1
‡22
‡21
, W2
2
V P
1
‡22
‡21
, W2
2 =
Ò
‡21 + ‡22 ≠ ‡2Ò
‡21 + ‡22 + ‡2
.
The relative importance of these two e ects depends on the precision of the
performance measures. If second-period performance measurement is very precise
(‡2 ¥ 0), whereas the first-period measure is not, then EP÷ ¥ 0; If first-period per-
formance measurement is very precise (‡1 ¥ 0), whereas the second-period measure
is not, then EPW1 ¥ 0. Thus, getting the performance weight right (rather than
choosing ÷ = 0) is only important when second-period performance measurement
is imprecise; getting the second-period prize right (rather than splitting the price
equally) only matters when first-period performance measurement is imprecise.
Compared to the initial situation, the total relative payo  increase from setting
both W1 and ÷ optimally is
EP÷,W1 ©
V P
1
‡22
‡21
, 0
2
≠ V P
1
0, W2
2
V P
1
0, W2
2 = 2
Ò
‡21 + ‡22 ≠ (‡1 + ‡2)
(‡1 + ‡2)
.
Figure 1.3 shows how the total relative payo  increase from choosing the optimal
incentive system depends on the variances of the error distributions.
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EP÷,W1 attains its minimum for ‡1 = ‡2 at
Ô
2≠ 1 ¥ 41%. Thus, the percentage
payo  increase from implementing the optimal policy is lowest if both performance
measurements are equally precise. Even in this case, however, the benefits are
substantial: The principal can achieve 41% higher payo  with a budget-neutral
policy adjustment. Figure 1.3 further shows that if one of the performance measures
is very precise (‡t ¥ 0), then EP÷,W1 ¥ 1. Hence, the more precise one of the
performance measures, the more the principal can benefit from implementing the
optimal policy.
1.7 Concluding remarks
This study analyzes intertemporal e ort provision in two-stage tournaments. A
principal with a fixed budget for prizes faces two risk-neutral agents. She observes
noisy signals of e ort in both periods. She aims at maximizing either total e orts
(perfect substitutes) or the product of first- and second-period e orts (imperfect
substitutes). She decides (i) how to spread prize money across the two periods,
(ii) how to weigh performance in the two periods when awarding the second-period
prize, and (iii) whether to reveal performance after the first period.
We obtain several new insights. First, design matters. The potential losses from
suboptimal incentive systems are substantial. Second, several interesting results
of existing research on revelation policy and performance weights are much more
general than previously known, extending in particular to the important case that
e orts in di erent periods are not perfect substitutes. Third, we provide new results
on the determinants of optimal incentives. We show that the weight of past perfor-
mance should depend negatively on the extent to which a higher weight of the past
reduces competition. We also show how the spread of prizes across periods and the
choice of weights depends on the relative precision of performance measures in the
two periods. Finally, we show that, under quite general conditions, there should be
no first-period prize.
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Appendix
A1.1 Behavior of the agents
The proofs in this section generalize Aoyagi (2010) and Ederer (2010) (for non-com-
plementary abilities) who assume W1 = 0 and ÷ = 1.
A1.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1.2
Proof of part (i). Equilibrium e orts must be positive because f2 > 0 by As-
sumption 1.2 and K Õ2 (0) = 0 by Assumption 1.1. Since f2 is symmetric by Assump-
tion 1.2 and
≠ (÷ s11 + e12) = ÷ s21 + e22,
the left-hand side of the first-order condition (1.2) is equal for both agents. Hence,
eúi2 ( si1) = eúj2 (≠ si1), so that the second-period e orts are the same for both
agents. Thus, (1.2) becomes f2 (÷ si1)W2 = K Õ2 (ei2). As K ÕÕ2 > 0 by Assump-
tion 1.1, K Õ2 is strictly increasing and thus invertible. Thus (1.3) must hold in any
equilibrium.
Proof of part (ii). The following inequality guarantees that the second-period
payo s (1.1) of player i are strictly concave in ei2:
f Õ2 (÷ si1 + ei2)W2 < K ÕÕ2 (ei2) ’  si1 œ R; ’ ei2, ej2 œ R+. (A1.1)
(A1.1) requires K2 to be su ciently convex.41 If this condition holds globally, the
first-order conditions (1.2) characterize a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the equilib-
rium is unique, as (1.3) must necessarily hold in any equilibrium by part (i) of the
lemma.
A1.1.2 Proof of Corollary 1.1
The inverse function theorem yields
Ë
(K Õ2)
≠1ÈÕ (f2 (÷ si1)W2) = 1
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷ si1)W2)
2 .
41By Assumption 1.2, f Õ2 (÷ si1 + ei2) < 0 if ÷ si1 + ei2 > 0, so that (A1.1) always holds in
this case. For the case that ÷ si1 + ei2 < 0, suppose f Õ2 is bounded above. Then (A1.1) holds
globally if K ÕÕ2 has a su ciently high lower bound.
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Thus (1.3) implies
ˆei2
ˆ si1
= ÷f
Õ
2 (÷ si1)W2
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷ si1)W2)
2 ; (A1.2)
ˆei2
ˆ÷
=  si1f
Õ
2 (÷ si1)W2
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷ si1)W2)
2 ;
ˆei2
ˆW2
= f2 (÷ si1)
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷ si1)W2)
2 .
By Assumption 1.1, K ÕÕ2 > 0. By Assumption 1.2, if  si1 < (>) 0· ÷ ”= 0·W2 > 0,
then ÷f Õ2 (÷ si1) > (<) 0 and thus ˆei2ˆ si1 > (<) 0. This implies that ei2 is decreasing
in | si1|. As  si1 =  ei1 +  Ái1 we obtain the results for ei1 and ej1. Similar
arguments show that ˆei2ˆ÷ > (<) 0 for ÷ < (>) 0 and thus ei2 decreasing in |÷|.
Since f2 > 0 by Assumption 1.2, we have ˆei2ˆW2 > 0.
A1.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1.1
Proof of part (i). We first derive expressions for ˆU
e
i2
ˆei1
for symmetric first-period
e orts. This allows us to state the FOC.
Lemma A1.1.
ˆU ei2
ˆei1
-----
ei1=ej1
= ÷W2C (÷) (A1.3)
Proof. Applying the envelope theorem to (1.4), we obtain
dU si2 ( si1)
d si1
= ˆUi2
ˆej2
ˆeúj2 (≠ si1)
ˆ si1
+ ˆUi2
ˆ si1
. (A1.4)
Using (A1.2) and the symmetry of the density (Assumption 1.2),
ˆeúj2 (≠ si1)
ˆ si1
= ˆei2 ( si1)
ˆ si1
= ÷f
Õ
2 (÷ si1)W2
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷ si1)W2)
2 .
(1.1) implies
ˆUi2
ˆej2
= ≠f2 (÷ si1 + ei2)W2;
ˆUi2
ˆ si1
= ÷f2 (÷ si1 + ei2)W2.
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Using these equations in (A1.4) and inserting  ei2 = 0, we obtain
dU si2
d si1
= ≠ ÷f2 (÷ si1) f
Õ
2 (÷ si1)W 22
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷ si1)W2)
2 + ÷f2 (÷ si1)W2.
Using this in (1.5), we obtain
ˆU ei2
ˆei1
=
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
SU≠÷f2 (÷ ( ei1 + s)) f Õ2 (÷ ( ei1 + s))W 22
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷ ( ei1 + s))W2)
2 + ÷f2 (÷ ( ei1 + s))W2
TV f1 (s) ds
= ÷W2
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f2 (÷ ( ei1 + s)) f1 (s) ds
≠÷W 22
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f2 (÷ ( ei1 + s)) f Õ2 (÷ ( ei1 + s))
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷ ( ei1 + s))W2)
2f1 (s) ds.
Let
A :=
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f2 (÷ ( ei1 + s)) f1 (s) ds;
B :=
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f2 (÷ ( ei1 + s)) f Õ2 (÷ ( ei1 + s))
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷ ( ei1 + s))W2)
2f1 (s) ds.
With this notation,
ˆU ei2
ˆei1
= ÷W2A≠ ÷W 22B. (A1.5)
Substituting s = t≠ ei1 and ds = dt in A and decomposing the integral gives
A =
⁄ 0
≠Œ
f2 (÷t) f1 (t≠ ei1) dt+
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷t) f1 (t≠ ei1) dt.
Let u = ≠t. Symmetry of f1 and f2 by Assumption 1.2 implies f2 (÷t) = f2 (÷u) and
f1 (t≠ ei1) = f1 (u+ ei1). Hence,⁄ 0
≠Œ
f2 (÷t) f1 (t≠ ei1) dt =
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷u) f1 (u+ ei1) du.
Thus,
A =
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷u) f1 (u+ ei1) du+
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷t) f1 (t≠ ei1) dt
=
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷t) [f1 (t+ ei1) + f1 (t≠ ei1)] dt.
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Substituting s = t≠ ei1 and ds = dt in B and decomposing the integral, we obtain
B =
⁄ 0
≠Œ
f2 (÷t) f Õ2 (÷t) f1 (t≠ ei1)
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷t)W2)
2 dt+ ⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷t) f Õ2 (÷t) f1 (t≠ ei1)
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷t)W2)
2 dt.
Again using u = ≠t and appealing to symmetry, f2 (÷t) = f2 (÷u), f Õ2 (÷t) = ≠f Õ2 (÷u)
and f1 (t≠ ei1) = f1 (u+ ei1). Thus⁄ 0
≠Œ
f2 (÷t) f Õ2 (÷t) f1 (t≠ ei1)
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷t)W2)
2 dt = ⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷u) (≠f Õ2 (÷u)) f1 (u+ ei1)
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷u)W2)
2 du.
Hence,
B =
⁄ Œ
0
≠f2 (÷u) f Õ2 (÷u) f1 (u+ ei1)
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷u)W2)
2 du+ ⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷t) f Õ2 (÷t) f1 (t≠ ei1)
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷t)W2)
2 dt
=
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷t) f Õ2 (÷t) [≠f1 (t+ ei1) + f1 (t≠ ei1)]
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷t)W2)
2 dt.
Substituting the expressions for A and B into (A1.5) and using s = t, we obtain
ˆU ei2
ˆei1
= ÷W2
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) [f1 (s+ ei1) + f1 (s≠ ei1)] ds (A1.6)
+ ÷W 22
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) f Õ2 (÷s) [f1 (s+ ei1)≠ f1 (s≠ ei1)]
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷s)W2)
2 ds.
With  ei1 = 0, we obtain (A1.3).
Together, (1.6) and Lemma A1.1 imply
f1 (0)W1 + ÷W2C (÷) = K Õ1 (ei1) .
By Assumption 1.1, K Õ1 is invertible. We thus obtain (1.12) as a necessary condition
for any symmetric interior PBE.
Proof of part (ii). We know from Lemma 1.2 (ii) that (1.2) implies sequential
rationality in the second period. Moreover, from the discussion at the beginning of
Section 1.4.1, beliefs are consistent.
As K Õ1 (0) = 0 by Assumption 1.1, e orts must be positive in any symmetric
equilibrium if (1.11) holds. Thus, by part (i), (1.12) is a necessary condition for an
equilibrium. The second-order condition for player i is
f Õ1 ( ei1)W1 +
ˆ2U ei2
(ˆei1)2
< K ÕÕ1 (ei1) ’ ei1, ej1 œ R+. (A1.7)
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Inserting (A1.6) in (A1.7) gives
f Õ1 ( ei1)W1 + ÷W2
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) [f Õ1 (s+ ei1)≠ f Õ1 (s≠ ei1)] ds (A1.8)
+÷W 22
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) f Õ2 (÷s) [f Õ1 (s+ ei1) + f Õ1 (s≠ ei1)]
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷s)W2)
2 ds < K ÕÕ1 (ei1) .
The left-hand side of this inequality is decreasing in K ÕÕ2 , while the right-hand side
is increasing in K ÕÕ1 . For given policy parameters and distributions, (A1.7) there-
fore holds as long as min {K ÕÕ1 (0) , K ÕÕ2 (0)}, which is a lower bound for K ÕÕ1 (ei1) and
K ÕÕ2
1
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷s)W2)
2
, is su ciently large. In this case, the second-order condi-
tion can be guaranteed to hold whenever the slopes of f1 and f2 are bounded.
If these conditions hold globally, (1.12) thus describes an equilibrium, which is
the unique symmetric equilibrium.
A1.1.4 Proof of Corollary 1.2
Symmetry of the equilibrium implies  si1 =  Ái1. Hence, (1.3) implies
eúi2 ( si1, ÷,W2, 1) = (K Õ2)
≠1 (f2 (÷ Ái1)W2) .
Taking the expectation over  Ái1, we obtain
E Ái1 (eúi2 ( si1, ÷,W2, 1)) =
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
(K Õ2)
≠1 (f2 (÷s)W2) f1 (s) ds.
From the symmetry of the density by Assumption 1.2, we get (1.13).
A1.1.5 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Proof of part (i). From (1.14), the first-order conditions are
f1 ( ei1)W1 + ÷W2
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f2 (÷ ( ei1 + s) + ei2) f1 (s) ds = K Õ1 (ei1) ;
W2
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f2 (÷ ( ei1 + s) + ei2) f1 (s) ds = K Õ2 (ei2) .
For the symmetric case  ei1 =  ei2 = 0, this simplifies to
f1 (0)W1 + ÷W2C (÷) = K Õ1 (ei1) ;
W2C (÷) = K Õ2 (ei2) .
Inverting K Õ1 and K Õ2 yields (1.15) and (1.16).
Proof of part (ii). If (1.11) holds, first-period equilibrium e orts are positive
because K Õ1 (0) = 0 by Assumption 1.1. Equilibrium e orts in the second period are
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positive because W2C (÷) > 0 by Assumption 1.2. By part (i), (1.15) and (1.16) are
necessary equilibrium conditions.
Consider the following second-order conditions:42
f Õ1 ( ei1)W1 + ÷2W2
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f Õ2 (÷ ( ei1 + s) + ei2) f1 (s) ds < K ÕÕ1 (ei1) ; (A1.9)
K ÕÕ1 (ei1)W2
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f Õ2 (÷ ( ei1 + s) + ei2) f1 (s) ds
+K ÕÕ2 (ei2) ·
5
f Õ1 ( ei1)W1 + ÷2W2
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f Õ2 (÷ ( ei1 + s) + ei2) f1 (s) ds
6
(A1.10)
≠f Õ1 ( ei1)W1W2
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f Õ2 (÷ ( ei1 + s) + ei2) f1 (s) ds < K ÕÕ1 (ei1)K ÕÕ2 (ei2) .
If these conditions hold globally, the expected payo  of player i is a strictly con-
cave function of (ei1, ei2), so that (1.15) and (1.16) describe best responses, and
thus characterize a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, this is the unique symmetric
equilibrium.
A1.1.6 Discussing second-order conditions (no revelation)
Global second-order conditions We first show that (A1.9) and (A1.10) hold
for given policy parameters and distributions as long as Kt is su ciently convex for
t = 1, 2. For (A1.9), this is obvious, as the right-hand side is increasing in K ÕÕ1 ().
To see that the statement is also true for (A1.10), let
A © W2
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f Õ2 (÷ ( ei1 + s) + ei2) f1 (s) ds;
B © f Õ1 ( ei1)W1 + ÷2W2
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f Õ2 (÷ ( ei1 + s) + ei2) f1 (s) ds;
C © ≠f Õ1 ( ei1)W1W2
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f Õ2 (÷ ( ei1 + s) + ei2) f1 (s) ds.
With this notation, (A1.10) can be written as
K ÕÕ1 (ei1) · A+K ÕÕ2 (ei2) ·B + C Æ K ÕÕ1 (ei1)K ÕÕ2 (ei2) . (A1.11)
To prove that (A1.10) holds for su ciently convex cost functions, suppose it does
not hold for some pair of cost function ÊK1 and ÊK2. Let „Kt (e) = ÊKt (e) + Ÿ2e2. Then
(A1.11) for „K1 and „K2 is
ÊK ÕÕ1 (ei1) · A+ ÊK ÕÕ2 (ei2) ·B + C ÆÊK ÕÕ1 (ei1) ÊK ÕÕ2 (ei2) + Ÿ 1ÊK ÕÕ1 (ei1) + ÊK ÕÕ2 (ei2)≠ A≠B2+ Ÿ2.
42(A1.9) is the condition that expected payo s are strictly concave in ei1; (A1.10) is the condition
that the Hessian of the expected payo  function has strictly positive determinant.
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For all A and B, the right-hand side of this inequality can be made arbitrarily high
by increasing Ÿ, so that the inequality is satisfied and thus (A1.10) holds.
Local second-order conditions In the symmetric equilibrium,  ei1 =  ei2 = 0.
Using this equation in (A1.9) and (A1.10), f Õ1 (0) = 0 and the symmetry of f1 and
f2 (Assumption 1.2) gives
÷2W2
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f Õ2 (÷s) f1 (s) ds < K ÕÕ1 (ei1) ; (A1.12)A
W2
K ÕÕ2 (ei2)
+ ÷
2W2
K ÕÕ1 (ei1)
B⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f Õ2 (÷s) f1 (s) ds Æ 1. (A1.13)
By Assumption 1.2, f1 (s) = f1 (≠s) and f Õ2 (÷s) = ≠f Õ2 (≠÷s). This implies thatsŒ
≠Œ f
Õ
2 (÷s) f1 (s) ds = 0. Thus, the left-hand sides of (A1.12) and (A1.13) are all 0
and the inequalities hold automatically.
A1.2 Revelation policy: Proof of Proposition 1.3
(1.13) and (1.16) imply
eú2 (÷,W ≠W1, 0)≠ E (eú2 (÷,W ≠W1, 1)) =
(K Õ2)
≠1 ((W ≠W1)C (÷))≠ 2
⁄ Œ
0
(K Õ2)
≠1 (f2 (÷s) (W ≠W1)) f1 (s) ds.
Using Definition 1.3 and the symmetry of f1 and f2, the right-hand side can be
written as
(K Õ2)
≠1
3
(W ≠W1)
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
f2 (÷s) f1 (s) ds
4
≠
⁄ Œ
Œ
(K Õ2)
≠1 (f2 (÷s) (W ≠W1)) f1 (s) ds.
Substituting g (s) © (W ≠W1) f2 (÷s) , this becomes
(K Õ2)
≠1
3⁄ Œ
≠Œ
g (s) f1 (s) ds
4
≠
⁄ Œ
≠Œ
(K Õ2)
≠1 (g (s)) f1 (s) ds.
According to Jensen’s inequality, this expression is weakly negative (weakly positive)
if (K Õ2)≠1 is convex (concave), which is the case if and only if K Õ2 is concave (convex),
that is, K ÕÕÕ2 Æ 0 (K ÕÕÕ2 Ø 0).43
43The proof resembles Aoyagi (2010) and Ederer (2010) (case with non-complementary abilities),
but allows for W1 > 0 and ÷ ”= 1.
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A1.3 Optimal weights
A1.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1.4
We start with several auxiliary results. Then, we show that ÷ < 0 is never optimal.
Finally, we show that it is always optimal to increase ÷ from zero to some positive
value.
Lemma A1.2. Suppose ÷1 > 0 and ÷2 = ≠÷1. Then,
(i)
eú1 (÷1,W ≠W1, 1) > eú1 (÷2,W1,W ≠W1) .
(ii)
E (eú2 (÷1,W ≠W1, 1)) = E (eú2 (÷2,W ≠W1, 1)) .
(iii)
eú2 (÷1,W ≠W1, 0) = eú2 (÷2,W ≠W1, 0) .
Proof.
(i) From (1.12) and (1.15) and using (1.10), we have
eú1 (÷1,W1,W ≠W1)≠ eú1 (÷2,W1,W ≠W1) = (A1.14)
(K Õ1)
≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷1 (W ≠W1)C (÷1))
≠ (K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1 ≠ ÷1 (W ≠W1)C (÷1)) .
As K ÕÕ1 > 0, (K Õ1)≠1 is strictly increasing. Thus, (A1.14) is strictly positive.
(ii) (1.13) and f2 (÷2s) = f2 (÷1s) imply the result.
(iii) (1.16) and (1.10) imply the result.
Lemma A1.3. Suppose W1 < W . Then,
(i)
ˆeú1 (÷,W1,W ≠W1)
ˆ÷
-----
÷=0
> 0.
(ii)
ˆE (eú2 (÷,W ≠W1, 1))
ˆ÷
-----
÷=0
= ˆe
ú
2 (÷,W ≠W1, 0)
ˆ÷
-----
÷=0
= 0.
Proof.
(i) From (1.12) and (1.15),
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ˆeú1 (÷,W1,W ≠W1)
ˆ÷
= (A1.15)
(W ≠W1) (C (÷) + ÷C Õ (÷))
K ÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷))
È .
Hence,
ˆeú1 (÷,W1,W ≠W1)
ˆ÷
-----
÷=0
= (W ≠W1)C (0)
K ÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1)
È
= (W ≠W1) f2 (0)
K ÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 f1 (0)W1
È .
where the second equality follows from (1.8). As K ÕÕ1 > 0 and f2 (0) > 0,
ˆeú1(÷,W1,W≠W1)
ˆ÷
---
÷=0
> 0 provided W1 < W .
(ii) From (1.13),
ˆE (eú2 (÷1,W ≠W1, 1))
ˆ÷
= 2
⁄ Œ
0
sf Õ2 (÷s) (W ≠W1) f1 (s)
K ÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷s) (W ≠W1))
Èds. (A1.16)
Hence,
ˆE (eú2 (÷1,W ≠W1, 1))
ˆ÷
-----
÷=0
= 2
⁄ Œ
0
sf Õ2 (0) (W ≠W1) f1 (s)
K ÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (0) (W ≠W1))
Èds = 0,
where the second equality follows from f Õ2 (0) = 0. Next, from (1.16),
ˆeú2 (÷,W ≠W1, 0)
ˆ÷
= (W ≠W1)C
Õ (÷)
K ÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 ((W ≠W1)C (÷))
È .
Hence,
ˆeú2 (÷,W ≠W1, 0)
ˆ÷
-----
÷=0
= (W ≠W1)C
Õ (0)
K ÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 ((W ≠W1)C (0))
È = 0,
where the second equality follows from (1.9).
To see that ÷ < 0 is never optimal, note that Lemma (A1.2) (i)-(iii) implies that
for every ÷ < 0, ≠÷ > 0 yields strictly higher first-period e orts and equally high
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second-period e orts. Thus, for any revelation policy and whether e orts are perfect
or imperfect substitutes, the optimal ÷ is non-negative.
To see that for W1 < W the optimal ÷ is positive, note that by Lemma (A1.3)
(i) and (ii), increasing ÷ marginally from zero increases first-period e orts, while
there is no e ect on second-period e orts. Hence, for any revelation policy and
whether e orts are perfect or imperfect substitutes, the optimal ÷ is positive provided
W1 < W .
A1.3.2 Proof of Proposition 1.5
From (1.17),
ˆV P (÷,W1, 1)
ˆ÷
= ˆe
ú
1 (÷,W1,W ≠W1)
ˆ÷
+ ˆE (e
ú
2 (÷1,W ≠W1, 1))
ˆ÷
. (A1.17)
Using Assumption 1.3 and (1.7) to simplify (A1.15) and (A1.16), (A1.17) becomes
ˆV P (÷,W1)
ˆ÷
= (W ≠W1) (C (÷) + ÷C
Õ (÷))
k1
+ (W ≠W1)C
Õ (÷)
k2
. (A1.18)
Solving ˆV P (÷,W1)ˆ÷ = 0 and rearranging gives the result.
A1.4 Optimal prize structure for perfect substitutes
First, we provide results on the optimal prize structure for the case of general K1
and K2 that are not necessarily quadratic. As the revelation policy matters in
this case, we first address the optimal prize structure for the full revelation case in
Proposition A1.1. The result will rely on the Assumption that K ÕÕÕt Æ 0. This is
not a serious restriction: Corollary 1.3 states that K ÕÕÕ2 Æ 0 is the case in which full
revelation is optimal. Second, we consider the no revelation case in Proposition A1.2
for K ÕÕÕt Ø 0. Again, this is not a serious restriction because for K ÕÕÕ2 Ø 0 no revelation
is optimal by Corollary 1.3. Third, we derive Corollary 1.4 for K ÕÕÕt = 0.
A1.4.1 Full revelation
Proposition A1.1. Suppose K ÕÕÕt Æ 0 for t = 1, 2. For all ÷ > 0, W P1 (÷, 1) = 0
(W P1 (÷, 1) = W ) if and only if
Wf1 (0) < (>) (A1.19)
K Õ1
5
(K Õ1)
≠1 (÷WC (÷)) + 2
⁄ Œ
0
(K Õ2)
≠1 (f2 (÷s)W ) f1 (s) ds
6
.
Chapter 1: Optimal E ort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments 38
Proof. Using (1.12) and (1.13) in (1.17) gives
V P (÷,W1, 1) = (K Õ1)
≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷))
+ 2
⁄ Œ
0
(K Õ2)
≠1 (f2 (÷s) (W ≠W1)) f1 (s) ds.
This yields
ˆV P (÷,W1, 1)
ˆW1
=
f1 (0)≠ ÷C (÷)
K ÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷))
È
≠2
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) f1 (s)
K ÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷s) (W ≠W1))
Èds,
and hence
ˆ2V P (÷,W1, 1)
(ˆW1)2
=
≠K
ÕÕÕ
1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷))
È
(f1 (0)≠ ÷C (÷))21
K ÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷))
È23
≠2
⁄ Œ
0
(f2 (÷s))2K ÕÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷s) (W ≠W1))
È
f1 (s) ds1
K ÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷s) (W ≠W1))
È23 .
Since K ÕÕÕt > 0, K ÕÕÕt Æ 0 implies ˆ
2V P (÷,W1,1)
(ˆW1)2
Ø 0. Thus, there is no interior optimum.
For W1 = 0 and W1 = W , the principal’s expected payo s are
V P (÷, 0, 1) = (K Õ1)
≠1 (÷WC (÷)) + 2
⁄ Œ
0
(K Õ2)
≠1 (f2 (÷s)W ) f1 (s) ds;
V P (÷,W, 1) = (K Õ1)
≠1 (f1 (0)W ) .
Therefore,
V P (÷, 0, 1)≠ V P (÷,W, 1) =
(K Õ1)
≠1 (÷WC (÷)) + 2
⁄ Œ
0
(K Õ2)
≠1 (f2 (÷s)W ) f1 (s) ds≠ (K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W ) .
Hence, V P (÷, 0, 1)≠ V P (÷,W, 1) > (<) 0 if and only if (A1.19) holds.
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A1.4.2 No revelation
For the no revelation case, we again restrict the third derivative of the cost functions
in such a way that the revelation policy is optimal by Corollary 1.3.
Proposition A1.2. Suppose K ÕÕÕt Ø 0 for t = 1, 2. For all ÷ > 0
(i) W P1 (÷, 0) = 0 if
f1 (0)≠ ÷C (÷)
K ÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (÷WC (÷))
È ≠ C (÷)
K ÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 (WC (÷))
È < 0. (A1.20)
(ii) W P1 (÷, 0) = W if
f1 (0)≠ ÷C (÷)
K ÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W )
È ≠ C (÷)
K ÕÕ2 (0)
> 0. (A1.21)
(iii) If neither (A1.20) nor (A1.21) holds, W P1 œ [0,W ].
Proof. Using (1.15) and (1.16) in (1.17) gives
V P (÷,W1, 0) =
(K Õ1)
≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷)) + (K Õ2)≠1 ((W ≠W1)C (÷)) .
This yields
ˆV P (÷,W1, 0)
ˆW1
=
f1 (0)≠ ÷C (÷)
K ÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷))
È ≠ C (÷)
K ÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 ((W ≠W1)C (÷))
È
and
ˆ2V P (÷,W1, 0)
(ˆW1)2
=
≠(f1 (0)≠ ÷C (÷))
2 ·K ÕÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷))
È
1
K ÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷))
È23
≠(C (÷))
2 ·K ÕÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 ((W ≠W1)C (÷))
È
1
K ÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 ((W ≠W1)C (÷))
È23 .
Since K ÕÕt > 0, K ÕÕÕt Ø 0 implies ˆ
2V P (÷,W1,0)
(ˆW1)2
Æ 0.
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(i) Thus, the principal will set W1 = 0 provided
ˆV P (÷,W1, 0)
ˆW1
-----
W1=0
= f1 (0)≠ ÷C (÷)
K ÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (÷WC (÷))
È ≠ C (÷)
K ÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 (WC (÷))
È < 0.
(ii) She will set W1 = W provided
ˆV P (÷,W1, 0)
ˆW1
-----
W1=W
= f1 (0)≠ ÷C (÷)
K ÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W )
È ≠ C (÷)
K ÕÕ2 (0)
> 0.
A1.4.3 Proof of Corollary 1.4
Proof of part (i). With K ÕÕÕt = 0, Proposition A1.1 implies that W P1 (÷) is always
a boundary solution, with W P1 (÷) = 0 if 1k1f1 (0)W <
1
÷
k1
+ 1k2
2
WC (÷). This gives
the first result. Note that the left-hand side of the last equation is total e ort for
W1 = W , while the right-hand side is total e ort for some ÷ and W1 = 0. Hence,
if the inequality is satisfied for some ÷, then total e ort for this ÷ and W1 = 0 is
higher than for W1 = W , which shows that W1 = W cannot be optimal. In this
case, since there is no interior optimum by Proposition A1.1, W1 = 0 is optimal.44
Proof of part (ii). Analogous.
A1.5 Optimal prize structure for imperfect substitutes
A1.5.1 Proof of Proposition 1.6
Using (1.12) and (1.13) in (1.18) yields
V I (÷1,W1, 1) = (K Õ1)
≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷)) · (A1.22)
2
⁄ Œ
0
(K Õ2)
≠1 (f2 (÷s) (W ≠W1)) f1 (s) ds.
44This can also be derived from Proposition A1.2.
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Using (A1.22), we have
ˆV I (÷,W1, 1)
ˆW1
=
2 (f1 (0)≠ ÷C (÷)) sŒ0 (K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷s) (W ≠W1)) f1 (s) ds
K ÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷))
È
≠2 (K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷)) ·⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s)
K ÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷s) (W ≠W1))
Èf1 (s) ds.
Thus,
ˆ2V I (÷,W1, 1)
(ˆW1)2
=
≠2 (f1 (0)≠ ÷C (÷))
2 ·K ÕÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷))
È
1
K ÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷))
È23 ·
⁄ Œ
0
(K Õ2)
≠1 (f2 (÷s) (W ≠W1)) f1 (s) ds
≠ 4 (f1 (0)≠ ÷C (÷))
K ÕÕ1
Ë
(K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷))
È ⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) f1 (s) ds
K ÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷s) (W ≠W1))
È
≠ (K Õ1)≠1 (f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷)) · 2
⁄ Œ
0
(f2 (÷s))21
K ÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)≠1 (f2 (÷s) (W ≠W1))
È23 ·
K ÕÕÕ2
Ë
(K Õ2)
≠1 (f2 (÷s) (W ≠W1))
È
f1 (s) ds.
Since V I (÷,W, 1) = 0, W1 = W is never optimal. Since K ÕÕt > 0, K ÕÕÕt Æ 0 implies
ˆ2V I(÷,W1,1)
(ˆW1)2
> 0 if f1 (0) ≠ ÷C (÷) < 0. For this case, there is no interior optimum
and thus W1 = 0.
A1.5.2 Proof of Proposition 1.7
With Assumption 1.3, (A1.22) yields
V I (÷,W1) =
(W ≠W1)C (÷)
k1k2
(f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷)) . (A1.23)
Thus
ˆV I (÷,W1)
ˆW1
= C (÷)
k1k2
[f1 (0) (W ≠ 2W1)≠ 2÷C (÷) (W ≠W1)] . (A1.24)
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Because ÷ > 0, C (÷) > 0 and kt > 0, W1 > 12W implies
ˆV I(÷,W1)
ˆW1
< 0. Hence,
W1 <
W
2 ’ ÷.
A1.5.3 Proof of Proposition 1.8
Proof of part (i). Clearly W1 > 0 at the optimum if ˆV
I(÷,W1)
ˆW1
---
W1=0
> 0, that
is, using (A1.24), if f1 (0) > 2÷C (÷). To see that W1 = 0 at the optimum if
ˆV I(÷,W1)
ˆW1
---
W1=0
< 0 or, equivalently, f1 (0) < 2÷C (÷), first note that (A1.24) implies
ˆ2V I (÷,W1)
(ˆW1)2
= C (÷)
k1k2
[≠2f1 (0) + 2÷C (÷)] .
Thus ˆV I(÷,W1)ˆW1 is monotone in W1. Moreover, according to the proof of Proposi-
tion 1.7, ˆV I(÷,W1)ˆW1 < 0 ’ W1 > W2 . The last two statements imply that, whenever
ˆV I(÷,W1)
ˆW1
---
W1=0
< 0, then ˆV I(÷,W1)ˆW1 < 0 for all W1 Æ W2 and thus W I1 (÷) = 0. To see
that W1 = 0 at the optimum if ˆV
I(÷,W1)
ˆW1
---
W1=0
= 0 or, equivalently, f1 (0) = 2÷C (÷),
note that f1 (0) = 2÷C (÷) implies ˆ
2V I(÷,W1)
(ˆW1)2
< 0, so that ˆV I(÷,W1)ˆW1 < 0 ’ W1 > 0
and thus W I1 (÷) = 0.
For ˆV I(÷,W1)ˆW1
---
W1=0
> 0, the first-order condition ˆV I(÷,W1)ˆW1 = 0 yields W
I
1 (÷) =
W f1(0)≠2÷C(÷)2f1(0)≠2÷C(÷) > 0 for f1 (0) > 2÷C (÷). Summing up, we obtain
W I1 (÷) =
I
W f1(0)≠2÷C(÷)2f1(0)≠2÷C(÷) > 0, f1 (0) > 2÷C (÷) ;
0, f1 (0) Æ 2÷C (÷) . (A1.25)
Proof of part (ii). (A1.25) shows that W I1 must correspond to one of the two
cases mentioned in the proposition. To complete the proof, we derive the first-order
condition for ÷I (W1) for these two cases. From (A1.23), we obtain
ˆV I (÷,W1)
ˆ÷
= (W ≠W1)
2C (÷)
k1k2
(C (÷) + ÷C Õ (÷))
+ (W ≠W1)C
Õ (÷)
k1k2
(f1 (0)W1 + ÷ (W ≠W1)C (÷)) .
The first-order condition ˆV I(÷,W1)ˆ÷ = 0 yields
W1 = W
(C (÷))2 + 2÷C (÷)C Õ (÷)
C (÷)2 + 2÷C (÷)C Õ (÷)≠ f1 (0)C Õ (÷)
. (A1.26)
According to (A1.25), W1 = 0 is a necessary condition for an optimum with f1 (0) Æ
2÷C (÷). Inserting W1 = 0 in (A1.26) gives the first-order condition ÷ = ≠ C(÷)2CÕ(÷) ,
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which corresponds to Proposition 1.8 (ii) (a). Analogously, W1 = W f1(0)≠2÷C(÷)2f1(0)≠2÷C(÷)
is a necessary condition for an optimum with f1 (0) > 2÷C (÷). Inserting W1 =
W f1(0)≠2÷C(÷)2f1(0)≠2÷C(÷) in (A1.26) and solving for f1 (0) gives the first-order condition f1 (0) =
≠ (C(÷))2CÕ(÷) , which corresponds to Proposition 1.8 (ii) (b).
A1.6 The normal-quadratic example E1
A1.6.1 Proof of Corollary 1.5
We will proceed in three steps. First, we will provide several auxiliary results. Next,
we will derive su cient conditions for the second-order conditions to hold.45 Finally,
we will characterize the equilibrium.
(i) Auxiliary results Note that 2Ôﬁ
s x
0 exp (≠t2) dt is the error function, for which
2Ô
ﬁ
⁄ Œ
0
exp
1
≠t2
2
dt = 1. (A1.27)
Next, for E1,
ft (s) =
1
‡t
Ô
2ﬁ
exp
A
≠ s
2
2‡2t
B
. (A1.28)
Hence,
f Õt (s) = ≠
1Ô
2ﬁ
s
‡3t
exp
A
≠ s
2
2‡2t
B
; (A1.29)
f ÕÕt (s) =
1Ô
2ﬁ
s2 ≠ ‡2t
‡5t
exp
A
≠ s
2
2‡2t
B
;
f ÕÕÕt (s) =
1Ô
2ﬁ
3‡2t s≠ s3
‡7t
exp
A
≠ s
2
2‡2t
B
.
As s = ≠‡t (the solution to f ÕÕt (s) = 0 and f ÕÕÕt (s) < 0 ) maximizes f Õt (x), we obtain
’ x œ R f Õt (x) Æ ≠ 1Ô2ﬁ ≠‡t‡3t exp
1
≠ ‡2t2‡2t
2
and thus
f Õt (x) Æ
1
‡2t
Ò
2ﬁ exp (1)
. (A1.30)
Furthermore, (A1.28) implies
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) ds =
1
‡2
Ô
2ﬁ
⁄ Œ
0
exp
Qa≠A s÷Ô
2‡2
B2Rb ds.
45We only consider the second-order conditions for the full revelation case.
Chapter 1: Optimal E ort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments 44
Substituting s =
Ô
2‡2
|÷| t and ds =
Ô
2‡2
|÷| dt implies⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) ds =
1
|÷|Ôﬁ
⁄ Œ
0
exp
1
≠t2
2
dt.
With (A1.27), we get ⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) ds =
1
2 |÷| . (A1.31)
Next, (A1.28) and (A1.29) imply
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) f Õ2 (÷s) ds = ≠
÷
2ﬁ‡42
⁄ Œ
0
s · exp
A
≠s
2÷2
‡22
B
ds.
Substituting s =
Ô
t‡2
|÷| and ds =
‡2
2
Ô
t|÷|dt and noting that
sŒ
0 exp (≠t) dt = 1, we
obtain ⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) f Õ2 (÷s) ds = ≠
1
4ﬁ÷‡22
. (A1.32)
Furthermore, (A1.28) implies
C (÷) = 1
ﬁ‡1‡2
⁄ Œ
0
exp
Qca≠
Qas
Ò
‡21÷2 + ‡22Ô
2‡1‡2
Rb2
Rdb ds.
Substituting s =
Ô
2‡1‡2Ô
‡21÷
2+‡22
t and ds =
Ô
2‡1‡2Ô
‡21÷
2+‡22
dt yields
C (÷) =
Ô
2
ﬁ
Ò
‡21÷2 + ‡22
⁄ Œ
0
exp
1
≠t2
2
dt.
With (A1.27), we get
C (÷) = 1Ô
2ﬁ
Ò
‡21÷2 + ‡22
, (A1.33)
so that
C Õ (÷) = ≠ ÷‡
2
1Ô
2ﬁ (‡21÷2 + ‡22)
3
2
. (A1.34)
(ii) Second-order conditions Using K ÕÕt (eit) = k, (A1.1) simplifies to
f Õ2 (x)W2 < k ’ x œ R. (A1.35)
From W2 Æ W and (A1.30),
f Õ2 (x)W2 Æ
W
‡22
Ò
2ﬁ exp (1)
. (A1.36)
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(A1.35) and (A1.36) imply that a su cient condition for (A1.1) to hold is
k >
W
‡22
Ò
2ﬁ exp (1)
. (A1.37)
Similarly, (A1.8) can be written as
f Õ1 (x)W1 + ÷W2
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) [f Õ1 (s+ x)≠ f Õ1 (s≠ x)] ds (A1.38)
+÷W
2
2
k
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) f Õ2 (÷s) [f Õ1 (s+ x) + f Õ1 (s≠ x)] ds < k.
Using (A1.30), we obtain ’ x œ R
f Õ1 (x)W1 Æ
W1
‡21
Ò
2ﬁ exp (1)
;
÷W2
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) [f Õ1 (s+ x)≠ f Õ1 (s≠ x)] ds Æ
2W2 |÷ sŒ0 f2 (÷s) ds|
‡21
Ò
2ﬁ exp (1)
;
÷W 22
k
⁄ Œ
0
f2 (÷s) f Õ2 (÷s) [f Õ1 (s+ x) + f Õ1 (s≠ x)] ds Æ
2W 22 |÷
sŒ
0 f2 (÷s) f Õ2 (÷s) ds|
k‡21
Ò
2ﬁ exp (1)
.
This yields an upper bound for the left-hand side of (A1.38):
1
‡21
Ò
2ﬁ exp (1)
C
W1 + 2W2
----÷ ⁄ Œ0 f2 (÷s) ds
----+ 2W 22k
----÷ ⁄ Œ0 f2 (÷s) f Õ2 (÷s) ds
----
D
.
With (A1.31) and (A1.32), this upper bound can be written as
W1 +W2
‡21
Ò
2ﬁ exp (1)
+ W
2
2
k‡21‡
2
2 (2ﬁ)
3
2
Ò
exp (1)
Æ W
‡21
Ò
2ﬁ exp (1)
+ W
2
k‡21‡
2
2 (2ﬁ)
3
2
Ò
exp (1)
.
A su cient condition for (A1.8) to hold is thus
k >
W
‡21
Ò
2ﬁ exp (1)
+ W
2
k‡21‡
2
2 (2ﬁ)
3
2
Ò
exp (1)
. (A1.39)
(iii) Characterizing the equilibrium Proposition 1.1 thus characterizes the
PBE. As K ÕÕÕ2 = 0, Proposition 1.3 implies that e orts under both revelation policies
are equal in expected value. Inserting (K Õt)≠1 (x) = xk , (A1.28) and (A1.33) in (1.12)
and (1.13) yields (1.20) and (1.21).
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A1.6.2 Proof of Corollary 1.6
Proof of part (i). We first derive ÷P (W1). With (A1.33) and (A1.34), we obtain
C Õ (÷)
C (÷) = ≠
÷‡21
‡22 + ‡21÷2
.
Proposition 1.5 (i) thus implies ÷‡
2
1
‡22+‡21÷2
= 11+÷ as a necessary condition, which is
uniquely (and positively) solved by ÷ = ‡
2
2
‡21
> 0. Since the optimal ÷ must be
strictly positive by Proposition 1.4 and since the solution to the necessary condition
is unique and positive, the necessary condition is su cient and we have ÷P (W1) =
‡22
‡21
’ W1 < W . Next, we show that W P1 = 0. By Corollary 1.4, W P1 = 0 if ÷ ÷ such
that f1 (0) < (1 + ÷)C (÷). From (A1.28) and (A1.33), this condition is equivalent
to
1
‡1
Ô
2ﬁ
<
1 + ÷Ô
2ﬁ
Ò
‡21÷2 + ‡22
≈∆ ÷ >
‡22
‡21
≠ 1
2 .
In particular, this holds for ÷P (W1) = ‡
2
2
‡21
. Hence,W P1 = 0 and ÷P = ÷P
1
W P1
2
= ‡
2
2
‡21
.
Proof of part (ii). (A1.33) and (A1.34) yield
C (÷)2 + C Õ (÷) f1 (0) =
Ò
÷2‡21 + ‡22 ≠ ÷‡1
2ﬁ (÷2‡21 + ‡22)
3
2
> 0 ’ ÷.
This is inconsistent with
---CÕ(÷)C(÷) --- = C(÷)f1(0) as for ÷ > 0, ---CÕ(÷)C(÷) --- = C(÷)f1(0) is equivalent to
C (÷)2 + C Õ (÷) f1 (0) = 0. Therefore, according to Proposition 1.8 (ii) (b), W I1 > 0
cannot apply. Hence, Proposition (1.8) (ii) gives-----C Õ (÷)C (÷)
----- = 12÷
as the necessary condition for ÷I . Using (A1.33) and (A1.34), this can be written as
÷‡21
‡22 + ‡21÷2
= 12÷ ,
which is solved by ÷I = ‡2‡1 .
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Chapter 2
Motivating Workers in Dynamic
Tournaments – Experimental
Evidence
2.1 Introduction
Employees at General Electric in the 1980s and 1990s had a tough life: Every
year, supervisors ranked their personnel according to their relative performance into
the best 20%, the middle 70%, and the worst 10% of their team. This ranking
provided a basis for bonuses, promotions, and even firing decisions (Welch, 2005).
While the practice of imposing a fixed distribution upon workers has since been
criticized and replaced1 by more flexible mechanisms, the use of relative incentives
– or tournaments – for bonuses and promotions is still widespread within companies
(see, for example, Chlosta et al., 2014). Furthermore, tournaments also play a
crucial role outside of a human resources context, such as in the assignment of
research grants or in incentivizing the development of new ideas (see the examples
cited in Morgan & Wang, 2010; Letina & Schmutzler, 2014).
As the example of General Electric implies, an important feature of such tour-
naments is that they are often repeated over time. Indeed, firms usually operate
over several years, making their workers compete against each other multiple times.
This generates a series of performance signals among the employees. From the per-
spective of a firm, this dynamic nature of tournaments poses at least two questions:
(1) Should it take past performance signals into account when rewarding the em-
ployees today? In other words, should the firm consider the performance history of
its employees when distributing bonuses and making promotion decisions, or should
1See McGregor (2013) for an overview on recent developments.
Chapter 2: Motivating Workers in Dynamic Tournaments 51
it forget about the past and only consider the most recent performance signals? And
(2) how should it spread the money for rewards over the di erent periods?2 Should
rewards have the same size over time, or should they increase or decrease?
The goal of this study is to shed light on these questions from an experimental
perspective. To this end, I consider a principal who uses two consecutive tourna-
ments to induce e orts among agents, and has a fixed budget for prizes in these
two periods. Using the results from Klein and Schmutzler (2014), I derive testable
predictions for the optimal policy in this set-up in both dimensions (1) and (2), the
weight of first-period performance in the second tournament and the spread of prize
money across periods. I then use a laboratory experiment to test whether the opti-
mal policy increases e orts as predicted. Since actual behavior in tournaments very
often di ers from theoretical predictions (see, for example, Dechenaux et al., 2012),
such empirical evidence is an important complement to theoretical arguments in the
design of real-life working environments. Due to the limited observability of e ort
in the field, where it is only possible to measure performance as a noisy function
of e ort (Dechenaux et al., 2012, p. 3), laboratory experiments are a particularly
useful tool in this empirical analysis.
To derive the theoretical predictions, I consider a special case of the more general
model of Klein and Schmutzler (2014). I focus on the maximization of expected
total e orts, i.e. the sum of e orts across periods.3 Furthermore, I consider a parti-
cular parameterization of their model, which is easy to implement in the laboratory.
Moreover, this parameterization yields intriguingly simple closed-form solutions for
the optimal choice of the policy parameters: First, it is optimal to weigh past
performance just as strongly as current performance when assigning the second-
period prize, independently of how the prize money is spread across periods. Second,
the optimal spread of the prize money is such that for all positive weights of past
performance in the second-period prize, the principal should shift all the available
prize money to the second period. Hence, and third, when setting both policy
parameters optimally, the principal shifts all the available prize money to the second
period, and weighs past performance just as strongly as current performance in the
assignment of the second-period prize. Thus, in the optimal policy, the principal
assigns one large prize to the agent who performs best across both periods. As I will
argue below, several theoretical and experimental papers on dynamic tournaments
rely on a very similar structure without further justification.
2Another dimension concerns the revelation of performance information to the employees. See
Klein and Schmutzler (2014) for results and a review of further literature on this issue.
3Klein and Schmutzler (2014) also consider the maximization of the expected product of e orts
across periods.
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The experiment introduces the optimal policy stepwise. It consists of the follow-
ing treatments:
• the baseline policy with two independent but otherwise equal tournaments
• the partially optimal policy, in which the prize in the second tournament goes
to the participant with highest sum of performance over both periods
• the globally optimal policy, in which there is only one prize that goes to the
participant with highest sum of performance over both periods
The baseline policy captures the situation of a principal who rewards the best-
performing agent in each period with an equally sized prize, therefore only taking
current performance into account. The partially optimal policy weighs first-period
performance as strongly as second-period performance in the assignment of the
second-period prize, thus implementing the optimal weight of first-period perfor-
mance. The globally optimal policy additionally shifts all the available prize money
to the second period, and therefore implements both the optimal weight of first-
period performance and the optimal spread of the prize money.
This design allows me to identify the e ects of adjusting the policy parameters
towards the optimal solutions. First, I obtain the e ect of adjusting the weight
optimally from the baseline to the partially optimal policy (the weight adjustment).
Furthermore, I can identify the e ect of jointly adjusting the weight and the prizes
optimally from the baseline to the globally optimal policy (the weight-prize adjust-
ment). Finally, I observe the e ect of adjusting the prizes optimally, conditional on
setting the weight optimally, from the partially to the globally optimal policy (the
prize adjustment). Klein and Schmutzler (2014) predict that relative to the baseline
policy, total e orts increase by about 20% through the weight adjustment and by
about 41% through the weight-prize adjustment. The prediction for the increase
through the prize adjustment is 17% relative to the partially optimal policy.
The results suggest that the predictive power of the theoretical model is mixed.
Although the weight-prize adjustment successfully increases total e orts, its e ect is
only about 10%, which is a fourth of the predicted increase. The weight adjustment
does not increase total e orts. However, all policy adjustments a ect the behavior of
the participants and change the distribution of e orts across periods. The directions
of these changes correspond widely to the predictions of the theoretical model. In
particular, the behavior of the participants is in line with the prediction that the
weight adjustment increases first- and decreases second-period e orts. On the other
hand, I observe substantial over-expenditure of total e ort under all three policies.
However, over-expenditure decreases with the adjustment of the policy parameters
towards the optimum. Finally, there is a large degree of heterogeneity in behavior
across participants that contrasts with the prediction of symmetric e orts.
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The measures from a pre-experimental questionnaire completed eight days ahead
of the laboratory experiment explain parts of the variation in behavior across partic-
ipants. Under the baseline policy, e orts are decreasing in the participants’ degree
of loss-aversion. Furthermore, under the globally optimal policy, a prosocial orien-
tation towards other participants decreases e orts. I then argue that one reason
for the smaller e ect of the weight-prize adjustment compared to the prediction is
that it induces particularly low e orts among prosocial participants. Furthermore,
I conclude that the policy identified as optimal by the theoretical model may not be
the optimal policy for real-world incentive systems.
I also analyze the e ect of first-period asymmetry on second-period e orts. Un-
der the baseline policy, the weight of past performance is zero, so that first-period
asymmetry should have no e ect on second-period behavior. In contrast to this
prediction, the tournaments have a dynamic nature for the participants also under
the baseline policy. I show that this is driven by prosocial participants who exert
more e ort when they lost in the first period and less e ort when they won. This
is consistent with inequality aversion. On the other hand, under the partially and
the globally optimal policy, the behavior of prosocial participants does not di er
from that of non-prosocial participants. In line with the prediction of the theoret-
ical model, a higher size of first-period asymmetry reduces second-period e orts.
This suggests that the monetary link between first and second period through the
weight adjustment mitigates the e ect of inequality aversion on behavior under the
baseline policy. Under the globally optimal policy, I additionally identify a demoti-
vation e ect of being behind. A negative performance di erence, implying that the
participant had lower performance in the first period, is more detrimental to e orts
than an equally sized positive performance di erence.
This study provides insights which are relevant to the design of competitive
incentive systems in practice. Clearly, the precise nature of the optimal incentives
for a less stylized setting – i.e. with more periods and agents – is likely to di er from
the optimal policy analyzed in this study. Nevertheless, my results suggest that the
timing of incentives matters: I find that the weight of past performance and the
spread of prize money across periods a ect individual behavior. This means that
both are important parameters to consider when designing competitive incentives
in a repeated setting.
Furthermore, my findings emphasize the relevance of theoretical arguments for
the design of incentive systems. In particular, the results imply that comparative
statics predictions obtained from simple material utility models may be correct in
spite of potential countervailing behavioral phenomena. However, my results also
suggest that practitioners should not blindly rely on guidance from simple mate-
rial utility models in the design of relative incentives. I observe that the globally
optimal policy, which generates a high degree of ex-post income inequality, induces
particularly low e orts among prosocial participants. This suggests that practition-
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ers should examine relative incentives also regarding their distributive e ects and
potential consequences for workers with social preferences. Failing to do so may not
only lead to wrong predictions of policy e ects. It may as well lead to policies which
are less e cient than possible.
The study also contributes to several strands of the experimental and theoretical
literature on dynamic tournaments. First of all, it complements theoretical work
that relies on various types of tournament models and shows a beneficial e ect of
a positive weight of past performance on e ort provision (Meyer, 1992; Gershkov &
Perry, 2009; Ridlon & Shin, 2013; Klein & Schmutzler, 2014).4 Since I find that only
an optimal adjustment of both the weight and the prize spread increases e orts, an
independent analysis of the optimal weight without considering the optimal prize
spread, as in Meyer (1992) and Ridlon and Shin (2013), may be misleading. This
justifies the simultaneous analysis of both dimensions by Gershkov and Perry (2009)
and Klein and Schmutzler (2014).
Second, my results provide a rationale for the dynamic tournament structure in
a series of theoretical and experimental papers on the optimal revelation of past
performance (Ederer & Fehr, 2007; Ederer, 2010; Aoyagi, 2010; Ludwig & Lu¨nser,
2012). These papers rely on the assumption that there is only one prize for the agent
with highest sum of performance over two periods, which corresponds to the globally
optimal policy in this study. My results show that the globally optimal policy
performs better than other policies in inducing e orts, providing a justification for
this assumption.
Third, the study extends the experimental literature on the e ects of the prize
structure in tournaments. Previous papers focus on the number of prizes and/or
the spread between prizes in one-stage tournaments (Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2003;
Orrison et al., 2004; Harbring & Lu¨nser, 2008; Lim et al., 2009; Mu¨ller & Schotter,
2010; Freeman & Gelber, 2010; Chen et al., 2011; Sheremeta, 2011; Shupp et al.,
2013), or on the distribution of prizes across or within stages in dynamic elimination
tournaments (Delfgaauw et al., 2012; Stracke et al., 2014). I contribute to this liter-
ature by studying the spread of prize money across periods in dynamic tournaments
in conjunction with a positive weight of past performance.
In the rest of the study, I present the framework of Klein and Schmutzler (2014)
and its results in a compressed form (Section 2.2), develop treatments and hypothe-
ses (Section 2.3), describe the experimental design (Section 2.4), present the results
(Section 2.5), and conclude (Section 2.6).
4This result holds for symmetric (or su ciently symmetric) agents. Harbaugh and Ridlon (2010)
show for an asymmetric all-pay auction that it is optimal to weigh past performance negatively.
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2.2 A model of dynamic tournaments
2.2.1 Framework
The framework presented below captures the motivating example of an institution
that repeatedly uses tournaments to induce e orts. The model corresponds to a
particular parameterization of the normal-quadratic example of Klein and Schmut-
zler (2014), which itself is a special case of their general framework.5 The specific
parameterization allows me to derive closed-form solutions for the optimal choice of
the policy parameters.
Suppose that there are two agents, i œ {1, 2}, and two periods, t œ {1, 2}. In each
period, the agents choose e ort levels eit Ø 0 to maximize the di erence between
expected income and e ort costs.6 E ort costs are K (eit) = k2 (eit)
2.
The principal’s objective is to maximize total e orts, i.e. the participants’ sum
of first- and second-period e orts. At the end of each period t, the principal observes
agent i’s performance sit = eit + Áit, which is an imperfect measure of the agent’s
e ort eit. Áit is a stochastic observation error, which is independent across agents and
periods. The principal has a fixed budget W for prizes. Specifically, the principal
assigns the first-period prize W1 œ [0,W ] to the agent with highest performance in
period 1, so that agent i receives the prize if si1 > sj1.7 Furthermore, the principal
assigns what is left from the budget, W2 = W ≠W1, as a second-period prize to
the agent with a highest weighted sum of performance in period 1 and period 2:
Agent i receives W2 if si2 + ÷si1 > sj2 + ÷sj1. Here, ÷ œ R is the weight of past
performance in the second tournament. Note that ÷ > 0 (÷ < 0) gives an advantage
(disadvantage) to the agent with higher performance in period 1. If ÷ = 1, W2 goes
to the agent with the highest sum of performance over both periods.
Hence, the principal sets two parameters in designing the optimal incentive sys-
tem: (i) The spread of prize money across periods, which is uniquely determined
by the first-period prize W1, and (ii) the weight given to past performance in the
second period, ÷. A particular policy is thus defined by the parameters ÷ and W1.
Below, I first derive the behavior of the agents for given ÷ and W1. In the second
step, I determine the optimal policy ÷ú and W ú1 .
5Specifically, the results follow from the normal-quadratic example of Klein and Schmutzler (2014)
with ‡1 = ‡2.
6When using i and/or j as an index, I always assume i, j œ {1, 2} and i ”= j.
7In case of a tie, the principal assigns the prize with probability 0.5 to each agent.
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2.2.2 Behavior of the agents
2.2.2.1 Second-period behavior
I start by analyzing the behavior of the agents in period 2 for given realizations of
first-period performances si1.8 The probability that agent i wins the second-period
prizeW2 is P (÷si1 + si2 > ÷sj1 + sj2). Let si1 = si1≠sj1 be the relative first-period
performance of agent i and  Áit = Ái2 ≠ Áj2 the error di erence in period t. Note
that | si1| ”= 0 implies that the agents’ first-period performances were asymmetric,
while | si1| measures the size of this asymmetry. An agent with  si1 > 0 (< 0)
had higher (lower) performance in the first period.
I assume that the distributions of the observation errors Áit are such that their
di erence is normally distributed:  Áit ≥ N (0,‡2). In the following, I denote the
density function of  Áit by
„ (s) = 1
‡
Ô
2ﬁ
exp
A
≠ s
2
2‡2
B
,
and its cumulative density function by   (r) = s r≠Œ „ (s) ds. With the above notation
and distributional assumptions, the probability that agent i wins the second-period
prize can be written as   (÷ si1 + ei2 ≠ ej2).
The expected second-period payo  of agent i, conditional on first-period perfor-
mance and second-period e ort choices, is thus
Ui2 (ei2, ej2, si1) =   (÷ si1 + ei2 ≠ ej2)W2 ≠ k2 · e
2
i2. (2.1)
It depends on the realization of the relative first-period performance  si1. Maxi-
mizing (2.1) for a given  si1 yields the first-order condition9
„(÷ si1 + ei2 ≠ ej2)W2 = k · ei2. (2.2)
In the optimum, the agents equate marginal costs k · ei2 and marginal benefits of
e ort. The latter consist of the second-period prize W2 weighted by the marginal
increase of the probability of winning the prize „(÷ si1 + ei2 ≠ ej2). Since „ is
8The derivations in this section resemble Aoyagi (2010) and Ederer (2010). While both are less
restrictive with respect to the distributions of the observation error di erence and the e ort cost
functions, they assume W1 = 0 and ÷ = 1.
9This treats a particular realization of  si1 as a subgame of first-period play. However, formally,
there are no proper subgames in the second period. This is because the agents cannot distinguish
which specific combination of first-period e ort choices and first-period error realizations led to
a certain  si1, so that information sets are not singletons. Klein and Schmutzler (2014, pp. 10–
11) show how the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and an appropriate belief formation
rule can be used to deal with this type of information structure. The solution of the game is
nevertheless equivalent to that of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
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symmetric, and because (÷ si1 + ei2 ≠ ej2) = ≠(÷ sj1 + ej2 ≠ ei2), the left-hand
side of (2.2) is identical for both agents, so that in equilibrium, the e orts of both
agents must be equal.
Using ei2 = ej2 in (2.2), I obtain the second-period equilibrium e orts:10
eúi2 ( si1; ÷,W2) =
„ (÷ si1)W2
k
> 0. (2.3)
Because „ > 0, second-period e orts are always positive. The e orts react positively
to the second-period prizeW2. Moreover, they are decreasing in the absolute value of
the relative first-period performance  si1 and its weight ÷.11 This means that with a
non-zero weight of past performance, higher asymmetry in first-period performance
decreases e ort incentives in the second period. In turn, for given asymmetric first-
period performance, a higher weight of past performance in absolute terms decreases
second-period e orts. The reason is that with a nonzero weight of past performance,
the principal essentially gives a headstart of ÷ si1 in the second period to the
agent with si1 > sj1, unless the realizations of first-period performance were exactly
equal. This headstart reduces competition among the agents and decreases their
e ort incentives. Thus, a higher absolute value of first-period performance or of its
weight, which both increase the headstart, reduces second-period e orts. Hence, for
a nonzero weight of past performance to be optimal, it must have a positive e ect
on first-period e orts.
Finally, note that second-period e orts are symmetric. In particular, due to
the symmetry of the distribution of the observation errors, second-period e orts are
independent of the sign of the relative first-period performance  si1. In other words,
asymmetry in first-period performance decreases second-period e orts of both agents
equally.
2.2.2.2 First-period behavior
In the first period, the agents take the e ect of first-period e ort on the tournament
in the second period into account. I denote the expected second-period payo ,
conditional on first-period e orts ei1 and ej1, by U ei2(ei1, ej1). With   (ei1 ≠ ej1) as
the probability of winning the first-period prize W1, the expected first-period payo 
of agent i, conditional on first-period e ort choices, can be written as
  (ei1 ≠ ej1)W1 + U ei2 (ei1, ej1)≠
k
2 · e
2
i1.
10In Appendix A2.2.1, I derive the second-order condition under which (2.2) characterizes a unique
equilibrium in the second period.
11This follows from „(a·b)ˆa > (<) 0… a < (>) 0 ’ a, b ”= 0.
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The corresponding first-order condition is
„ (ei1 ≠ ej1)W1 + ˆU
e
i2
ˆei1
= k · ei1. (2.4)
In the first period, the agents equate marginal costs k · ei1 and marginal benefits
of e ort. The latter consist of the prize in the first period W1 weighted by the
marginal increase in the probability of winning „ (ei1 ≠ ej1), and the marginal e ect
of first-period e ort on second-period payo  ˆU
e
i2
ˆei1
. In Appendix A2.2.2, I show that
for symmetric first-period e ort choices, the latter can be written as
ˆU ei2
ˆei1
-----
ei1=ej1
= ÷
‡
Ô
2ﬁ
Ô
1 + ÷2
W2. (2.5)
Using „ (0) = 1
‡
Ô
2ﬁ and (2.5) in (2.4), I obtain the symmetric first-period equi-
librium e orts as12,13
eú1 (÷,W1,W2) =
1
k‡
Ô
2ﬁ
A
W1 +
÷Ô
1 + ÷2W2
B
. (2.6)
We see that first-period e orts depend positively on the first-period prize W1. The
sign of the e ect of the second-period prizeW2 depends on the sign of ÷: For positive
(negative) weights, a higher second-period prize increases (decreases) incentives to
exert e ort in period 1 through the negative (positive) e ect of more first-period
e ort on the second-period payo .
Using eúi1 = eúj1 in (2.3) and taking the expectation over the error di erence
in period 1 yields the expected value of the second-period e orts (see Appendix
A2.2.4):
E (eú2 (÷,W2)) =
W2
k‡
Ô
2ﬁ
Ô
1 + ÷2
. (2.7)
Note that second-period e orts are decreasing in the size of the weight ÷. The reason
is analogous to the discussion in Section 2.2.2.1: The expected asymmetry in the
second period increases with the absolute value of the weight of past performance,
which decreases (expected) second-period e ort incentives.
12In Appendix A2.2.3, I derive the second-order condition under which (2.6) characterizes a unique
symmetric equilibrium in the first period.
13Note that I neglect the potential existence of asymmetric equilibria in the first period. In the
second period, however, there only exists a symmetric equilibrium, which is unique.
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2.2.3 Optimal policy
Since first-period e orts are deterministic and e orts are symmetric across agents,
the principal’s payo  is V (÷,W1) = eú1 (÷,W1,W ≠W1) + E (eú2 (÷,W ≠W1, )).14
With (2.6) and (2.7), it can be written as
V (÷,W1) =
1
k‡
Ô
2ﬁ
A
W1 +
1 + ÷Ô
1 + ÷2 (W ≠W1)
B
.
I first focus on the optimal choice of the weight of past performance, ÷. Note
that the partial derivative
ˆV (÷,W1)
ˆ÷
= W ≠W1
k‡
Ô
2ﬁ
1≠ ÷
(1 + ÷2)
3
2
is positive for all ÷ < 1, 0 for ÷ = 1, and negative for all ÷ > 1, given that W1 < W .
To understand this, suppose the principal starts with a weight of 0 and increases it
gradually to 1. From (2.6) and (2.7), we know that this gives additional incentives
for first-period e orts, but reduces second-period e orts through the introduction of
asymmetry between the participants in period 2. What the result on ˆV (÷,W1)ˆ÷ tells
us is that as long as ÷ is smaller than 1, the positive e ect of increasing the weight
on first-period e orts dominates the detrimental e ect of limiting competition in the
second period. The e ects cancel out for a weight of 1. When increasing the weight
even further, the detrimental e ect on second-period e orts exceeds the positive
e ect on first-period e orts. This implies:
Corollary 2.1. For all tournaments with a positive second-period prize W2 (if W1 <
W ), the optimal weight of past performance is ÷ú = 1.
This means that it is always optimal to weigh past performance just as strongly as
current performance for the second-period prize, given that there is a second-period
prize at all.
I now focus on the optimal spread of prize money across the two periods. I
obtain
ˆV (÷,W1)
ˆW1
= 1
k‡
Ô
2ﬁ
A
1≠ 1 + ÷Ô1 + ÷2
B
.
This expression is negative for all ÷ > 0. This means that if the principal weighs
first-period performance positively in the assignment of the second-period prize,
second-period prize money is more e ective in incentivizing e orts than first-period
prize money. Indeed, with a positive ÷, second-period prize money a ects both
first- and second-period e orts, while first-period prize money is only relevant to
first-period e orts. I obtain:
14Note that from now on, I impose the principal’s budget constraint W2 =W ≠W1.
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Corollary 2.2. For all tournaments with a positive weight of past performance (if
÷ > 0), the optimal first-period prize is W ú1 = 0.
Therefore, if the principal sets a positive weight of past performance, all prize
money should be paid out in the second period.
I now combine Corollary 2.1 and Corollary 2.2:
Corollary 2.3. The optimal policy is ÷ú = 1 and W ú1 = 0.
Hence, if the principal controls both ÷ and W1, it is optimal to set ÷ = 1 and
W1 = 0. To see this, note that Corollary 2.1 and Corollary 2.2 already imply that
÷ = 1 and W1 = 0 is the optimal policy among those with W1 < W . The resulting
payo  is
V (1, 0) = 1
k‡
Ô
2ﬁ
Ô
2W .
For any other policy with W1 = W , the principal’s payo  is
V (÷,W ) = 1
k‡
Ô
2ﬁ
W .
Obviously, V (1, 0) > V (÷,W ), so that ÷ = 1 andW1 = 0 is indeed globally optimal.
2.3 Treatments and hypotheses
With the results from the preceding section, I can now develop normative prescrip-
tions for a principal who, in every period, uses independent tournaments to induce
e orts. Again, I restrict myself to two periods. Suppose that in both periods, the
prize which the principal assigns to the best-performing agent is W2 . In terms of the
framework introduced above, these incentives correspond to a policy with weight
÷ = 0, first-period prize W1 = W2 , and budget W . I call this the baseline policy and
denote the treatment that implements the baseline policy by BASE. Corollary 2.1
and Corollary 2.2 inform the principal on how to improve upon the baseline policy.
Corollary 2.1 tells us that for a given prize structure with equal prizes of W2
in each period, the optimal choice of the weight of past performance is ÷ = 1.
This means that instead of assigning a second-period prize of W2 to the agent who
performs best in period 2, the principal should assign the second-period prize to the
agent who has highest sum of performance over both periods. I call the policy with
weight ÷ = 0 and first-period prize W1 = W2 the partially optimal policy and denote
the treatment implementing the partially optimal policy by PART. This yields:
Hypothesis 2.1. Expected total e orts in PART are higher than expected total
e orts in BASE.
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Table 2.1: Policies
÷ W1 W2
BASE 0 W2
W
2
PART 1 W2
W
2
GLOB 1 0 W
Table 2.2: Point predictions of e orts
BASE PART GLOB
Total e ort 45.4 54.7 64.1
E ort 1 22.7 38.7 32.1
E ort 2 22.7 16.0 32.1
According to Corollary 2.2, e ort provision can be further improved, since for
a positive weight of past performance, the optimal choice of the prizes is W1 = 0
and W2 = W . Hence, there should not be any prize for the best performing agent
in period 1. Instead, the principal should assign all prize money to the agent with
highest sum of performance over both periods. Corollary 2.3 implies that this choice
of policy parameters is the optimal policy. I thus call the policy with weight ÷ = 1
and first-period prize W1 = 0 the globally optimal policy and denote the treatment
implementing the globally optimal policy by GLOB. I obtain the following two
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2.2. Expected total e orts in GLOB are higher than expected total
e orts in PART.
Hypothesis 2.3. Expected total e orts in GLOB are higher than expected total
e orts in BASE.
See Table 2.1 for an overview of the three policies.
To gain an understanding of the size of the e ects, I use the following calibration
for the model parameters: k = 0.066, ‡ = 40, andW = 300.15 Table 2.2 contains the
resulting point predictions for expected total e ort, as well as the point predictions
for the (expected) e orts in period 1 and period 2.
We see that from a theoretical standpoint, choosing the policy parameters opti-
mally has substantial e ects on e ort provision (see row “Total e ort” of Table 2.2),
while it is budget-neutral to the principal. The optimal adjustment of the weight
15These parameter values satisfy the second-order conditions in the first (A2.3) and second period
(A2.1).
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from BASE to PART (the weight adjustment) increases expected total e orts by
more than 20%. Further adjusting the prizes optimally from PART to GLOB (the
prize adjustment, which is conditional on the optimal adjustment of the weight)
increases expected total e orts by another 17%. Overall, jointly adjusting both the
weight and the prizes optimally from BASE to GLOB (the weight-prize adjustment)
increases expected total e orts by roughly 41%. Note that both in PART and in
GLOB the principal does not spend more money on prizes than in BASE.
The point predictions also illustrate how the policy adjustments a ect the distri-
bution of e orts across periods (see rows “E ort 1” and “E ort 2” of Table 2.2). The
weight adjustment increases first- and decreases (expected) second-period e orts. As
discussed above, weighting past performance positively in the second period gives
an incentive to exert more e ort in the first period. However, the positive weight of
past performance induces asymmetry in the second period, which reduces the incen-
tives to exert e ort in period 2. Furthermore, shifting all prize money to the second
period as through the prize adjustment decreases first-period e orts and increase
second-period e orts again. Altogether, the weight-prize adjustment increases both
first- and second-period e orts.
2.4 Experimental design
2.4.1 Laboratory experiment
I conducted three experimental sessions, each consisting of 30 rounds. Every treat-
ment was repeated for 10 rounds. The order of the treatments varied across sessions
(see Table 2.3). To avoid order e ects, the goal in this variation was to alter, across
sessions, the predecessor of each treatment. The variation of the positions of the
treatments was only second priority.16
At the beginning of the sessions, the participants were randomly assigned to
matching groups of size 8, and, in every round, formed randomly determined pairs
with another participant from their matching group.17 Before the first treatment of
a session, the participants received instructions about the general structure of the
experiment and instructions specific to the first treatment. Only after the end of
the first (second) treatment, they received the instructions specific to the second
(third) treatment.18 The instructions were always read out aloud after they had
16Therefore, the design is not perfectly balanced. With my order of the treatments, every treatment
is preceded once by every other treatment, except for BASE, which is preceded twice by PART.
With a perfectly balanced design, every treatment would have been preceded twice by the same
treatment.
17The participants were aware that in every round, the other participant in their pair was randomly
chosen. The instructions did not, however, mention the existence of matching groups.
18Appendix A2.6 contains the instructions.
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Table 2.3: Order of treatments
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3
Rounds 1 – 10 BASE PART GLOB
Rounds 11 – 20 PART BASE PART
Rounds 21 – 30 GLOB GLOB BASE
been distributed. Before the start of the experiment, the participants had to solve
quizzes on the computer screen, which contained control questions on the general
structure of the experiment. Before starting with a treatment, they also had to
answer control questions specific to this treatment.19
Each round consisted of two periods. In the first period, the participants in a
pair simultaneously chose e ort levels between 0 and 55 in increments of 0.5 (see
screenshot on page 111). The instructions referred to e ort as “input” and contained
a table and a graph depicting the costs the participants would have to pay at the
end of each round for choosing any of the admitted input levels (see instructions on
page 107). The underlying cost function was K (eit) = 0.033 · e2it.20
After both participants in a pair had chosen an e ort level, the computer drew
random numbers for both participants from a normal distribution with expected
value of zero and a standard deviation of 28.28.21 The instructions illustrated the
symmetry of the distribution and that small random numbers were more likely
than large numbers. Furthermore, the instructions contained a graph depicting the
distribution of the random number and an explanation of how to read the graph
(see instructions on page 108). The instructions also emphasized that the draws of
the random numbers were independent over time and between participants.
In the next step, the computer determined the participants’ performance (re-
ferred to as “output”) as the sum of their e ort level and the random number. The
instructions emphasized that on average, their output level would be equal to their
input level, and explained in which way the output level would deviate from the
input level through its dependence on the random number. At the end of the first
period, the participants saw their own performance, the performance of the other
participant in their pair, and their relative performance  si1 (see screenshot on
page 112) on the computer screen.
Period 2 worked in the same way as period 1: At the beginning, the participants
simultaneously chose e ort levels. Then, the computer drew random numbers, cal-
culated the performance levels, and displayed the participants’ own and their paired
participant’s performance level as well as their relative performance  si2.
19Appendix A2.7 contains the control questions.
20This implies k = 0.066.
21Áit ≥ N
!
0, 28.282
"
implies  Áit ≥ N
!
0, 402
"
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After the second period, the computer distributed a total of 300 points as prizes
within each pair based on the participants’ performance levels in both periods. The
instructions referred to the prizes as “payments”. The assignment rules in the three
treatments were the following:22
• BASE
Y][ 150 points to participant with higher performance in period 1150 points to participant with higher performance in period 2
• PART
Y__]__[
150 points to participant with higher performance in period 1
150 points to participant with higher sum of performance in
period 1 and period 2
• GLOB
I
300 points to participant with higher sum of performance in
period 1 and period 2
The participants’ payo  from a particular round was then equal to the sum of
the prizes they had received in this round and an endowment of 200 points, less the
costs for their e ort levels in both periods of this round. The endowment ensured
that a participant’s payo  from a round would never be below 0. At the end of
each round, the participants saw their payments, their costs for e ort, and the their
resulting payo  on the computer screen (see screenshot on page 113).
At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly chose one of the 30 rounds
as the one to be paid out to all of the participants (see Cubitt et al., 1998, for the
validity of this approach). Afterwards, the participants were informed about the
round that was chosen for payo , and were able to review all information they had
received during the 30 rounds.
2.4.2 Pre-experimental questionnaire
I used a pre-experimental questionnaire to elicit individual attributes that may ex-
plain variation in e ort choices, and ideally in treatment e ects, across participants.
Note that a common observation in experiments on tournaments (rank-order tourna-
ments, lottery contests and all-pay auctions) is the large heterogeneity in behavior
across participants. According to Dechenaux et al. (2012), important factors ex-
plaining parts of this variation are individual heterogeneity in (1) social preferences,
(2) risk aversion, (3) loss aversion and (4) non-monetary preferences towards win-
ning.23 The pre-experimental questionnaire contained measures to address each of
these factors.
22In case that the performances or the sum of performances was equal, the computer drew the
receiver of the corresponding prize randomly from both participants.
23Dechenaux et al. (2012) also mention demographic di erences as relevant factors. In my data,
sex and age of the participants have no explanatory power.
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To elicit the magnitude of social preferences, I used the SVO Slider Measure
developed by Murphy et al. (2011). It allows me to categorize the participants into
four classical social value orientation types based on their choices in a sequence
of six dictator games (see Table A2.1). The orientation types are the following:
Altruists, who maximize the payo  of the other, prosocials, who maximize the joint
payo  of themselves and the other (without distinction between inequality averse
and inequality tolerant subjects), individualists, who maximize their own payo ,
and competitors, who maximize the di erence between their own and the other’s
payo .24 Murphy et al. (2011) show that the SVO Slider Measure is a reliable and
valid method to elicit social value orientation. For further details, see Appendix
A2.3.1.
To assess the participants’ risk aversion, I used a lottery task similar to the one
used by Dohmen et al. (2011). In the task, the participants had to make decisions for
six choice situations, each between a positive safe payo  and a lottery. The lottery
was the same across situations, while the value of the safe payo  varied between
situations from above to below of the expected value of the lottery. When ordering
the situations in decreasing size of the safe payo  (see Table A2.3), the point at
which the participants switch from choosing the safe payo  to choosing the lottery
provides a measure for their degree of risk aversion. I denote this switching point
by SPRISK. Appendix A2.3.2 contains further details.
To measure loss aversion in risky choices, I employed the lottery task developed
by Ga¨chter et al. (2010). In this task, the participants have to accept or reject six
lotteries. The lotteries yield, with equal chances, a positive payo  and a negative
payo . While the positive payo  is constant, the absolute value of the negative
payo  varies across lotteries between above to below of the value of the positive
payo . When the lotteries are ordered in increasing size of the negative payo 
(see Table A2.4), the point at which the participants start rejecting the lotteries
is informative about their degree of loss aversion. More specifically, the switching
point yields the measure ⁄, which is the coe cient of loss aversion in a simple linear
utility approximation around 0. See Appendix A2.3.3 for further details.
In order to address the issue of heterogeneity in preferences towards winning, I
used the Revised Competitiveness Index developed by Houston et al. (2002), which
aims at measuring “a desire to win in interpersonal situations” (p. 31). The index
is reliable (Harris & Houston, 2010) and correlates positively with other indices
of competitiveness (Houston et al., 2002). It consists of several questions about
competition in daily life contexts (see Table A2.6). The participants’ answers to
the questions yield the overall index value RCI. Appendix A2.3.4 contains further
details.
Table 2.4 provides an overview of the measures generated in the questionnaire.
24Murphy et al. (2011) also propose a method which is able to distinguish inequality averse proso-
cials from inequality tolerant prosocials, consisting of 9 additional dictator games.
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Table 2.4: Measures from pre-experimental questionnaire
Variable Measure for Range of values
SVO social value orientation altruist, prosocial, individualist,
competitive
SPRISK risk aversion 1, 2, ..., 7
⁄ loss aversion 0.87, 1, 1.2, 1.5, 2, 3
RCI preference towards winning 14, 15, ..., 70
Previous research allows me to form hypotheses on the signs of the relationships
between the measures and e ort levels. For instance, several papers document that
more risk-averse participants exert lower e orts in tournaments (Millner & Pratt,
1991; Anderson & Freeborn, 2010; Sheremeta & Zhang, 2010; Price & Sheremeta,
2011, 2012; Sheremeta, 2011; Sheremeta et al., 2013). Hence, I expect the rela-
tion between SPRISK and e ort to be negative. Similarly, the literature usually
associates loss aversion with lower e orts (Kong, 2008; Jo¨nsson, 2013; Shupp et al.,
2013), implying a negative relationship between ⁄ and e ort. Furthermore, a higher
preference towards winning seems to increase e orts (Sheremeta, 2010b; Price &
Sheremeta, 2011, 2012; Sheremeta et al., 2013; Brookins & Ryvkin, 2014), which
suggests that RCI relates positively to e ort.
In contrast to the measures for risk aversion, loss aversion and preference towards
winning, I have no hypothesis on the relationship between the di erent social value
orientation types and e orts. This is because the SVO Slider Measure is di cult to
compare to the social preference measures in previous experiments on tournaments.
For example, Balafoutas et al. (2012) characterize participants according to their
acceptance of advantageous and disadvantageous inequality. It is not clear how a
participant’s choices in this specific elicitation method would relate to choices in the
SVO Slider Measure.25
2.4.3 Procedural details
A total of 96 subjects participated in the experiment. The sessions had 32 par-
ticipants each, lasted for about 120 minutes and took place at the computer lab
of the University of Zurich, Switzerland, in early December 2013. All participants
completed the pre-experimental questionnaire at least eight days ahead of the labo-
25Using dictator games rather similar to those in the SVO Slider Measure, Hernandez et al. (2013)
distinguish between selfish and other-regarding subjects and show that the former exert more
e ort than the latter. For my experiment, this would imply that individualists exert more
e ort than prosocial participants. Nevertheless, this does not imply anything for participants
characterized as competitive by the SVO Slider Measure.
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ratory experiment.26 The participants were recruited from local university students,
excluding economics and psychology majors.27 I used z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) to
program and conduct the experiment and the on-line tool Qualtrics28 to administer
the pre-experimental questionnaire. The design of the experiment and the ques-
tionnaire guaranteed complete anonymity of a participant’s decisions and payo s to
other participants.
Immediately after the laboratory experiment, the participants received, indi-
vidually and in private, the sum of their payo s from the laboratory experiment
and the pre-experimental questionnaire plus a participation fee of 10 Swiss Francs
(CHF).29,30 The average total payo  was CHF 50.35, consisting of an average of
CHF 36.28 from the laboratory experiment and an average of CHF 14.07 from the
pre-experimental questionnaire. In the laboratory experiment, the exchange rate to
convert points to CHF was 10 points per CHF.31
2.5 Results
I split the analysis of the experimental data into three parts. In the first part, I
test the predictions of the theoretical model, while the second part concerns the
explanation of individual heterogeneity in behavior. The remaining part focuses on
the e ect of first-period asymmetry on second-period e orts.
26The average processing time for the questionnaire was about 13 minutes.
27The recruitment was conducted with the software hroot (Bock et al., 2012).
28See http://www.qualtrics.com.
29Because of the delay of payments from the pre-experimental questionnaire, the instructions
for the questionnaire stressed that the decisions of the participants would have real monetary
consequences.
30To match the payo s from the questionnaire to the payo s from the laboratory experiment, I
used the names of the participants, which they provided in both parts.
31At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate was CHF 1.23 per e and CHF 0.91 per US$.
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2.5.1 Predictive power of the theoretical model
Figure 2.1 shows the policy e ects on the means of total as well as first- and second-
period e orts.32,33
As the central result, I obtain:
Result 2.1. The weight-prize adjustment increases total e orts. The increase is
about 10% compared to the baseline policy. There is no evidence for an e ect of the
weight adjustment on total e orts. The prize adjustment (conditional on the weight
adjustment) increases total e orts by about 9% compared to the partially optimal
policy.
Evidence for Result 2.1. Row “Total E ort” of Table 2.5 documents the result.
It contains the sign predictions for the e ects of the policy adjustments, as well as
p-values from tests of one-sided hypotheses that the observed total e orts change
as predicted. Note that the observations are clustered within matching groups.34
Therefore, these and all following hypothesis tests rely on the signed-rank test pro-
posed by Datta and Satten (2008), which provides high power while maintaining the
correct size even if the observations are clustered. The unit of observation is always
the mean of a participant’s (total or period-specific) e ort across all 10 rounds of
a policy. Thus motivated, we see that total e orts do not increase significantly35
through the weight adjustment (p = 0.856). However, total e orts increase signifi-
cantly through the weight-prize adjustment (p = 0.006). Furthermore, total e orts
increase significantly through the prize adjustment (p = 0.001) (conditional on the
32Figure A2.1 depicts the mean first- and second-period e ort choices over the 10 rounds of each
policy. It reveals a slight downward trend in first- and second-period e orts under the baseline
policy. Under the partially and the globally optimal policy, there is a short-lived upward trend
in first-period e orts, which fades away after the first four rounds. The downward trend in the
baseline policy may be due to a learning e ect. However, note that the baseline policy was the
first policy in a session just as often as the partially and the globally optimal policy, and that
these policies do not exhibit a similar time trend. Hence, it seems unlikely that learning is the
reason for the time trend under the baseline policy. Furthermore, Figure A2.1 shows that second-
period e orts exhibit a higher variation over time than first-period e orts under all three policies.
For the partially and the globally optimal policy, this is in line with the theoretical model, as in
both of these policies, the second-period behavior depends on first-period observation noise.
33Figure A2.2 contains histograms of first- and second-period e orts under all three policies. Note
that there are spikes at 0 and 55 (the left and right margin of the choice set), as well as at 30.
Apparently, 30 is a focal point in the choice set. Since focal points are most likely independent
of the policies, the existence of focal points should not conflict with my identification strategy.
34This means that observations are dependent within matching groups. The dependence within
matching groups arises through the repeated interaction of the participants with each other over
the course of the experiment. Since participants interacted only with other participants from the
same matching group, observations are independent across matching groups.
35In this study, I call p < 0.05 significant and p < 0.10 marginally significant.
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Figure 2.1: Means of e orts under the three policies. Heights of bars and values
at bottom of bars correspond to means of e orts. Lengths of whiskers at top of bars
are equal to standard errors of the means. Dotted lines depict Nash predictions for
the corresponding policy. N = 960 per policy. Sample: All participants.
weight adjustment).36 The result is robust to di erent testing procedures.37 The
percentage increases of total e orts through the weight-prize adjustment and the
36Note that the policies came in di erent orders across sessions. I find that when GLOB comes
first (session 3), the e ect of the weight-prize adjustment from BASE to GLOB is significantly
higher than when BASE came first or second and GLOB third (sessions 1 and 2). This may be
due to spillovers from BASE and PART to GLOB in sessions 1 and 2. However, to investigate
such order e ects further, it would be necessary to run additional sessions. In my data, I cannot
distinguish order e ects from session-fixed e ects, as I only observe one session per order. In any
case, note that the e ect of the prize adjustment does not di er significantly between sessions,
suggesting that there are no order e ects for the prize adjustment. Similarly, the e ect of the
weight adjustment (which I find to be zero) does not di er significantly between sessions.
37When using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests based on matching-group means, which rely on less
observations than the test by Datta and Satten (2008), I obtain the same result. Furthermore,
Tobit estimations of the policy adjustment e ects, which impose more distributional assumptions
than the non-parametric tests but take the censoring of e ort choices into account, also yield the
same result.
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prize adjustment follow from the means of total e orts under BASE (63.0), PART
(63.2) and GLOB (69.1) shown in Figure 2.1.38
Table 2.5: Tests of e ects of policy adjustments
Weight adj. Prize adj. Weight-prize adj.
Pred. P-val. Pred. P-val. Pred. P-val.
Total e ort + 0.856 + 0.001 + 0.006
E ort 1 + 0.015 ≠ 0.721 + 0.005
E ort 2 ≠ 0.001 + 0.001 + 0.076
Sign predictions derived from comparison of Nash level predictions for the
di erent policies. Signed-rank tests according to Datta and Satten (2008)
based on each participant’s mean e orts under the corresponding policies
(N = 96). One-sided hypotheses, with H1 corresponding to the prediction.
Sample: All participants.
This means that in order to increase total e orts compared to the baseline situa-
tion, it is necessary to adjust both the weight and the prizes optimally. However, the
e ect is only a fourth of the predicted increase (10% vs. 41% through the weight-
prize adjustment). While the weight adjustment does not increase total e orts, it
still has an e ect on behavior. In fact, I obtain:
Result 2.2. (i) All three policy adjustments a ect the behavior of the participants
and change the distribution of e orts across periods. (ii) Moreover, the predictions
for the directions of the e ects on first- and second-period e orts are correct for the
weight adjustment and for the weight-prize adjustment. For the prize adjustment,
the prediction for the direction of the e ect is only correct in the second period.
Evidence for Result 2.2. I start with part (ii), which follows from rows “E ort 1”
and “E ort 2” in Table 2.5. In line with the predictions of the theoretical model, the
weight adjustment increases first-period e orts (p = 0.015) and decreases second-
period e orts (p = 0.001). Furthermore, the weight-prize adjustment increases
both first-period e orts (p = 0.005) and second-period e orts (p = 0.076) at least
marginally significantly, which is again in line with the prediction. The e ect of the
prize adjustment is not consistent with the prediction in that it does not decrease
first-period e orts significantly (p = 0.721). However, again in line with the pre-
38The censoring of total e ort may potentially lead to an underestimation of the increase when
comparing the means of total e orts between policies. However, Tobit estimations of the policy
adjustment e ects, which correct for the censoring bias, yield an only marginally higher e ect of
the weight-prize adjustment and of the prize adjustment.
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diction, it increases second-period e orts significantly (p = 0.001).39 The result is
robust to using di erent testing procedures.40 Part (i) follows from part (ii).
Result 2.2 (ii) implies that the theoretical model performs fairly well in capturing
the directions of the incentive e ects of the policy parameters.41 Given Result 2.1,
this means that it mainly fails in the prediction of the size of the e ects. This holds
particularly for the weight adjustment, for which the increase of first-period e orts
does not, unlike predicted, compensate the decrease of second-period e orts. As a
consequence, the weight adjustment does not increase total e orts.
Focusing on the accuracy of the level predictions, I obtain:
Result 2.3. (i) There is significant over-expenditure of total e ort under all three
policies. (ii) The extent of over-expenditure decreases with the stepwise adjustment
of the policy parameters towards the optimum.
Evidence for Result 2.3. Row “Total e ort” of Table 2.6 implies the result. It
contains the point predictions for total e orts under the three policies, as well as
the corresponding observed means. Furthermore, it contains p-values of two-sided
hypotheses that the e orts are equal to the predictions. We see that total e orts are
significantly higher than the prediction in BASE (p = 0.002), PART (p = 0.010) and
GLOB (p = 0.050)42 , which implies part (i).43,44 When comparing the predictions
39I find that the e ect of the weight adjustment on first- and second-period e orts does not di er
significantly between sessions, suggesting that there are no order e ects for the weight adjust-
ment. The same holds for the e ect of the weight-prize adjustment on first-period e orts. How-
ever, the e ect of the weight-prize adjustment on second-period e orts di ers between sessions
in a way that is similar to the finding for total e orts: When GLOB comes first (session 3), the
e ect of the weight-prize adjustment on second-period e orts is significantly higher than when
PART comes first or second and GLOB third (sessions 1 and 2). Furthermore, the e ect of the
prize adjustment on first- and on second-period e orts seems to vary at least marginally signifi-
cantly between the sessions in a way that is di cult to interpret. As argued above, for further
investigation, it would be necessary to collect more data.
40I obtain the same result when using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests based on matching group means
or a Tobit model.
41The result that the introduction of a positive weight of past performance increases first- and
decreases second-period e orts is consistent with experimental results on lottery contests in
which the introduction of a carryover of first-period e orts into the second period has the same
e ect (Schmitt et al., 2004; Sheremeta, 2010a).
42More precisely, p = 0.04997758.
43I find that under all policies, over-expenditure in total e ort is always significantly higher in ses-
sion 2 than in session 1, while over-expenditure in session 3 always lies between over-expenditure
in sessions 1 and 2. This may be due to order e ects. However, since I observe the same ranking
of over-expenditure between sessions for all three policies, this observation may as well be due
to session-fixed e ects. To systematically relate over-expenditure to order, it would be necessary
to collect more data.
44Tobit regressions of over-expenditure on a constant yield the same result. When using Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests based on matching group means, the result changes insofar as I cannot reject
no over-expenditure in GLOB (p = 0.110).
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with the observed means, we see that in BASE, over-expenditure is about 17.7
units, which amounts to 40% of the predicted level of total e ort. In PART, over-
expenditure is only 8.5 units or 16%, in GLOB 5 units or 8%.45 This implies part
(ii).
Table 2.6: Tests of level predictions
BASE PART GLOB
Pred. Mean P-val. Pred. Mean P-val. Pred. Mean P-val.
Total e ort 45.3 63.0 0.002 54.7 63.2 0.010 64.1 69.1 0.050
E ort 1 22.7 32.5 0.002 38.7 36.5 0.381 32.1 36.4 0.015
E ort 2 22.7 30.5 0.002 16.0 26.7 0.001 32.1 32.6 0.507
E . 2 | si1 – – – 15.2 26.7 0.001 30.9 32.6 0.117
Signed-rank tests according to Datta and Satten (2008) based on each participant’s mean e ort
under the corresponding policy (N = 96). Two-sided hypotheses. Sample: All participants.
Result 2.3 implies that one reason for the failure of the theory in predicting the
size of the policy adjustment e ects is that it substantially underpredicts e orts in
the baseline policy compared to the other two policies.
The presence of over-expenditure contrasts with observations from most other ex-
periments on rank-order tournaments: As Dechenaux et al. (2012) point out in their
survey article on contest experiments, over-expenditure of e orts is quite common for
lottery contests and all-pay auctions, but an exception in rank-order tournaments.
The authors argue that potential reasons for this absence of over-expenditure are the
convexity of costs and the presence of noise in the decision problem of the agents,
since both are unique features of rank-order tournaments in comparison to the two
other forms of contests. However, these reasons cannot explain the di erence in
over-expenditure between policies in this experiment, as costs and noise structure
are constant across all three situations.
To analyze the issue of over-expenditure further, I now focus on the accuracy of
the period-specific e ort predictions. Note that for the second period and a positive
weight of past performance (as under the partially and the globally optimal policy),
the theoretical model provides two types of level predictions: (1) A prediction of
the average value of second-period e orts across all realized tournaments, and (2) a
prediction of second-period e orts conditional on relative first-period performance
 si1. I obtain:
45Note that one reason for the decrease of over-expenditure with the adjustment of the policy
parameters towards the optimum may be that the predictions come closer to the upper limit of
the choice set (110). However, when estimating the amount of over-expenditure with a Tobit
model, which corrects for this censoring bias, I obtain, under all three policies, only marginally
higher over-expenditure.
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Result 2.4. (i) Under the baseline policy, over-expenditure occurs in both periods.
Under the partially (the globally) optimal policy, over-expenditure occurs only in the
second (only in the first) period. (ii) The results on the second period under the
partially and the globally optimal policy do not change when considering predictions
for second-period e orts conditional on relative first-period performance.
Evidence for Result 2.4. Part (i) draws support from row “E ort 1” and row
“E ort 2” of Table 2.6. In BASE, first- and second-period e orts are significantly
higher than the prediction (p = 0.002 and p = 0.002). In PART, first-period ef-
forts do not di er significantly from the prediction (p = 0.381), while second-period
e orts are significantly higher than the prediction (p = 0.001). For GLOB, the
result is reversed: First-period e orts are significantly higher than the prediction
(p = 0.015), while second-period e orts do not di er significantly from the pre-
diction (p = 0.507).46 This is robust to di erent testing procedures.47 Part (ii)
follows from row “E . 2 | si1” of Table 2.6. The values for the predictions in this
row result from calculating, for every observed  si1, the conditional prediction of
second-period e orts as implied by (2.3), and calculating the mean of the conditional
predictions over all observed  si1. The p-values in this row result from signed-rank
tests based on a participant’s mean deviation in second-period e ort choices from
the corresponding conditional predictions, using two-sided hypotheses that the de-
viations are 0. As in the case of the unconditional predictions, second-period e orts
are significantly higher than the conditional predictions in PART (p = 0.001) and
not significantly di erent from the conditional predictions in GLOB (p = 0.117).48
In summary, this part demonstrates that the predictive power of the theoretical
model is mixed. In Result 2.1, I show that the weight-prize adjustment increases to-
tal e orts, although to a smaller extent than predicted (10% vs. 41%). Furthermore,
I show that total e orts do not increase with the weight adjustment. In Result 2.2,
I demonstrate that all policy adjustments change the distribution of e orts across
periods, while the directions of these e ects correspond widely to the predictions
of the theoretical model. According to Result 2.3, while I observe significant over-
expenditure of total e ort under all three policies, over-expenditure decreases with
46For over-expenditure in first- and second-period e orts under BASE, I find the same result as
for over-expenditure in total e ort: Over-expenditure is always significantly higher in session 2
than in session 1, while over-expenditure in session 3 always lies between over-expenditure in
sessions 1 and 2. Under PART, I find that in contrast to the overall result, there is significant
over-expenditure in first-period e ort in sessions 2 and 3. Over-expenditure in second-period
e ort under PART does not di er between sessions. Under GLOB, over-expenditure in first-
period e ort does not di er between sessions. However, in contrast to the overall result, I find
significant over-expenditure in second-period e orts in sessions 2 and 3. All these results may
be due to ordering or session-fixed e ects.
47The result does not change when using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests based on matching group
means or a Tobit model.
48Part (ii) does not change when using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests based on matching group means.
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the weight adjustment and with the prize adjustment. Finally, Result 2.4 focuses
on the accuracy of period-specific level predictions.
2.5.2 Explaining heterogeneity
So far, I have focused on average behavior. Note that the theoretical model, which
relies on symmetric agents, predicts e ort choices to be equal within pairs. This
holds for all three policies, and, in particular, both for the first and for the second
period.49 However, the behavior of the participants is in stark contrast to this
prediction:
Result 2.5. There is a substantial degree of heterogeneity in behavior across indi-
viduals under all three policies.
Evidence for Result 2.5. The result follows from the histograms in Figure 2.2,
which show, for both periods and all three policies, the observed variation in the
size of the e ort di erence between both members of a pair. The prediction of equal
e orts corresponds to an e ort di erence of 0. Although there is a considerable
share of pairs whose e ort di erence is indeed close to 0, there are much more pairs
with an e ort di erence that is positive, implying asymmetric e ort choices of both
members of the pair. In fact, the means of first- and second-period e ort di erences
under the three policies lie between 14.5 and 20.6 units.
In the following, I analyze explanations for the observed heterogeneity across
participants. To this end, I relate the measures obtained in the pre-experimental
questionnaire to individual behavior in the laboratory.
Figure 2.3 contains histograms of the measures.50 We see that the elicitation
of social value orientation identifies only one participant as an altruist, while no
participant falls into the competitive category. In fact, consistent with the findings
of Murphy et al. (2011), the majority of the participants (60 out of 95) are prosocials.
In the following analysis, I therefore only distinguish between prosocial and non-
prosocial participants by using the dummy variable PROSOC as an indicator for
prosociality. Furthermore, we see that the majority of the participants is risk-averse
(SPRISK > 3, see Appendix A2.3.2) and loss averse (⁄ > 1, see Appendix A2.3.3).
Finally, the mean of RCI (45.7) is close to the mean reported by Houston et al.
(2002) (48.5).
As the central result, I obtain:
49More precisely, the model predicts e orts to be equal across pairs in both periods under the
baseline policy and in the first period under the partially and globally optimal policy. For second-
period e orts under the partially and the globally optimal policy, the model predicts e orts to
be equal only within pairs, as they depend on the realizations of first-period performance, which
may di er between pairs.
50Because of inconsistent choices in the lottery tasks, I exclude one participant from the following
analysis.
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Figure 2.2: Asymmetry in e ort choices. Histograms of absolute values of di er-
ences in e ort choices within pairs. N = 480 per policy. Sample: all participants.
Result 2.6. (i) Loss aversion a ects total e ort negatively under the baseline pol-
icy. (ii) Prosociality a ects total e ort negatively under the globally optimal policy.
(iii) The measures for risk aversion and preference towards winning have no ex-
planatory power on total e ort. (iv) The e ect of loss aversion and prosociality on
total e ort arises mainly through their e ect on second-period e orts.
Evidence for Result 2.6. The result follows from Table 2.7, which shows, sepa-
rately for each policy, regressions of total e ort on the measures from the pre-
experimental questionnaire (Model (1) to (3)). Note that three issues complicate the
estimation: (a) The censoring of total e ort between 0 and 110 as a consequence of
the restriction of e ort choices between 0 and 55, (b) the clustering of observations
within matching groups, and (c) the small number of clusters, here equal to the
number of matching groups (12). To obtain unbiased coe cient estimates, issue (a)
requires the Tobit model.51 Moreover, for an unbiased estimation of the variance-
covariance matrix, issue (b) requires to use cluster-robust standard errors.52 It is
well-known, however, that with few clusters (issue (c)), the conventional cluster-
51Specifically, I use the generalization of the Tobit model to lower and upper censoring introduced
by Rosett and Nelson (1975).
52Clustering of the observations implies correlation in the error structure, which violates the as-
sumption of uncorrelated errors underlying the standard (Tobit) regression model. As a conse-
quence, the conventional estimation of the variance-covariance matrix may be biased.
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Figure 2.3: Histograms of measures from pre-experimental questionnaire. N = 95.
Sample: All participants with non-inconsistent choices in the lottery tasks.
robust sandwich estimator53 for the variance-covariance matrix may be biased as
well (see, for example, Cameron et al., 2008). As a solution, I determine the p-
values of the coe cients with the pairs cluster bootstrap-t procedure (see Appendix
A2.4 for a summary). Cameron et al. (2008) show by simulation that in an ordinary
least squares estimation, this procedure maintains a reasonably correct size with
both clustered observations (issue (b)) and a small number of clusters (issue (c)).
Fehr and Williams (2013) demonstrate how to apply the pairs-cluster bootstrap-t
to a Tobit model.54,55 Thus motivated, Table 2.7 shows that in BASE (Model (1)),
the coe cient of ⁄ is significant and negative, while the coe cients of PROSOC,
SPRISK and RCI are not significantly di erent from 0. In PART (Model (2)), no
53The cluster-robust sandwich estimator is a well-known generalization of the heteroscedasticity-
consistent variance-covariance estimator developed by White (1980).
54The wild cluster bootstrap-t performs even better in the simulations of Cameron et al. (2008).
It is, however, not applicable to a Tobit model, as Fehr and Williams (2013) point out.
55Strictly speaking, the presence of correlated errors makes the likelihood function of the Tobit
model invalid. As a consequence, the coe cient estimates may be biased. It is, however, common
practice in this situation to estimate the parameters with the Tobit model and correct the
standard errors afterwards. The underlying assumption is that the likelihood function of the
Tobit model is still su ciently well-specified to provide unbiased estimates of the coe cients.
This corresponds to maximizing a pseudo-log-likelihood function. For a critical discussion of this
approach, see, for example, King and Roberts (2014).
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Table 2.7: Explanation of variation in e ort choices
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var. Total e ort E ort 1 E ort 2
Policy BASE PART GLOB BASE PART GLOB BASE PART GLOB
CONSTANT 80.64*** 56.51** 50.03** 48.14*** 41.04** 24.92* 34.69*** 17.80 26.14*
(0.001) (0.050) (0.025) (0.002) (0.027) (0.069) (0.003) (0.219) (0.062)
PROSOC -5.51 -3.88 -7.64** -2.94* -2.06 -3.22 -3.03 -1.96 -5.98*
(0.132) (0.279) (0.050) (0.073) (0.464) (0.163) (0.211) (0.384) (0.068)
SPRISK 1.57 4.39 4.19 -0.05 2.79 2.38 1.46 1.50 1.76
(0.567) (0.200) (0.289) (0.974) (0.155) (0.277) (0.440) (0.369) (0.475)
⁄ -7.91** -3.31 -4.33 -3.29 -2.78 -3.20 -4.96*** -1.05 -1.53
(0.042) (0.344) (0.393) (0.145) (0.266) (0.237) (0.008) (0.608) (0.666)
RCI 0.02 -0.02 0.39* -0.11 -0.20 0.24 0.13 0.14 0.19
(0.916) (0.938) (0.060) (0.319) (0.312) (0.117) (0.296) (0.492) (0.195)
ROUND -1.20** -0.10 -0.21 -0.45** 0.20 0.05 -0.87*** -0.31 -0.21
(0.015) (0.700) (0.458) (0.037) (0.293) (0.730) (0.000) (0.158) (0.398)
N 950 950 950 950 950 950 950 950 950
Left-censored 42 23 39 58 30 51 94 177 126
Right-censored 60 47 97 79 133 164 86 85 186
Clusters 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Log-likelihood -4215.42 -4271.19 -4176.57 -3608.09 -3485.75 -3434.95 -3574.80 -3456.78 -3325.95
Bootstrap samples 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
Tobit regressions. Bootstrapped p-values given in parentheses, computed using pairs cluster bootstrap-t with standard errors clustered
on matching group. Sample: All participants with non-inconsistent choices in lottery tasks. úúúp < 0.01, úúp < 0.05, úp < 0.1.
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coe cient is significantly di erent from 0. In GLOB, the coe cient of PROSOC
is significant and negative, while all other coe cients are not significantly di erent
from 0.56,57 This implies parts (i) to (iii). Part (iv) follows from Models (4) to (9)
in Table 2.7, which are regressions of first- and second-period e orts under all three
policies on the measures from the pre-experimental questionnaire. We see that under
those policies in which ⁄ and PROSOC have a significant e ect on total e ort, their
coe cients are at least marginally significantly di erent from 0 for second-period
e orts ((Models (7) and (9)), but not for first-period e orts (Models (4) and (6)).58
Result 2.6 implies that the measures for loss aversion and social value orientation
obtained in the pre-experimental questionnaire contribute to explaining heterogene-
ity in behavior across individuals. This is consistent with previous findings on the
e ort-reducing e ect of loss aversion in lottery contests and all-pay auctions (Kong,
2008; Jo¨nsson, 2013; Shupp et al., 2013) and of other-regarding preferences in lottery
contests (Hernandez et al., 2013).
Aside from a low statistical power of the design, the result that the measures for
risk aversion and preferences towards winning do not explain variation in e orts may
be due to an incorrect measurement of both phenomena.59 This seems particularly
likely in the case of risk aversion. On the one hand, as I mention in Section 2.4.2,
the detrimental e ect of risk aversion on e orts in tournaments is well-documented.
On the other hand, the lower e ect of the weight-prize adjustment than predicted
seems to be consistent with risk aversion: As I argue in Appendix A2.5 with a
simplified model, risk-averse subjects may actually have lower e ort incentives under
the globally optimal policy than under the baseline policy. This would explain why
the e ect of the weight-prize adjustment is lower than predicted by the theoretical
model, which relies on risk neutrality.
Result 2.6 further suggests that the policy parameters a ect the degree to which
loss aversion and social value orientation cause variation in the behavior of the par-
ticipants. Hence, one might as well expect that the e ects of the policy adjustments
56Murphy et al. (2011) suggest the index value itself as a measure for social value orientation,
arguing that it has a higher resolution than the resulting categorization. When substituting the
variable PROSOC by the index value, I never obtain significance in any of the regressions.
57While the coe cient of RCI is marginally significant under the globally optimal policy, its e ect
is apparently not pronounced enough to generate explanatory power on first- and second-period
e orts.
58I also allow for a time trend in the regressions by including the variable ROUND, which counts
for how many rounds the participants have already been interacting under the current policy.
The time trend is significant only under BASE, which is consistent with the observation in
Figure A2.1.
59Of course, this may also hold for the papers finding an e ect of risk aversion and/or preferences
towards winning on e orts, implying that they may have found the e ect of a di erent phe-
nomenon than they claim. For example, the usual measure for preferences towards winning are
the bids of participants in a zero-prize tournament. It is not clear whether this is a good measure
for preferences towards winning, as the discussion of Brookins and Ryvkin (2014, p. 258) implies.
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on total e ort vary with the participants’ level of loss aversion and their social value
orientation. However, when testing this latter hypothesis, I obtain:
Result 2.7. The measures from the pre-experimental questionnaire do not explain
individual variation in the e ects of the policy adjustments on total e ort.
Evidence for Result 2.7. The result follows from the regressions in Table 2.8. In
these regressions, I relate a participant’s mean change of total e ort through a policy
adjustment, i.e. the di erence in the participant’s mean total e orts under the two
involved policies, to the measures from the pre-experimental questionnaire. Since
the dependent variable is not censored, I use ordinary least squares regressions. We
see that the measures have no explanatory power for changes in total e orts through
the weight adjustment (Model (1)), nor through the weight-prize adjustment (Model
(4)) or the prize adjustment (Model (7)).60
Result 2.7 implies that the e ects of the measures from the pre-experimental
questionnaire on total e ort, which I identified in Result 2.6, do not di er signifi-
cantly between policies.61
Instead of explaining absolute e ort levels, the next result relates over-expendi-
ture in total e ort to prosociality:
Result 2.8. (i) Under the baseline and the partially optimal policy, both proso-
cial and non-prosocial participants exhibit a similar over-expenditure of total e ort.
(ii) Under the globally optimal policy, prosocial and non-prosocial participants dif-
fer in their degree of over-expenditure. While non-prosocial participants still exhibit
over-expenditure, the total e orts of prosocial participants do not di er from the
prediction.
Evidence for Result 2.8. The result follows from Table 2.9, which contains regres-
sions of the di erence between total e ort and the prediction on the dummy variable
PROSOC under the three policies. In these regressions, the constant measures over-
expenditure of non-prosocial participants, while the coe cient of PROSOCmeasures
by how much over-expenditure of prosocial participants di ers from that of non-
prosocial participants. We see that both in BASE (Model (1)) and in PART (Model
(2)), the constant is positive and significant, while the coe cient of PROSOC is not
significant. This implies part (i). Part (ii) follows from Model (3) and Model (4).
60I obtain the same result when using a Tobit model to regress e orts on policy dummies interacted
with the measures from the pre-experimental questionnaire.
61Note that I also used the mean e ects of the policy adjustments on first- and second-period e orts
as the dependent variable (Models (2), (3), (5), (6), (8), (9)). The estimates are predominantly
insignificant, with the exception of a few marginally significant estimates (coe cients of ⁄ in
Model (3) and of SPRISK and RCI in Model (5)). As the values of the (adjusted) R2 are all
very low in these regressions, I refrain from further interpretation.
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Table 2.8: Explanation of variation in e ects of policy adjustments
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var. Change in mean e ort by a participant through...
weight adjustment weight-prize adjustment prize adjustment
Total E ort 1 E ort 2 Total E ort 1 E ort 2 Total E ort 1 E ort 2
CONSTANT -14.63 -4.96 -9.67 -23.69** -19.24** -4.45 -9.06 -14.28 5.22
(0.553) (0.647) (0.496) (0.047) (0.046) (0.549) (0.728) (0.393) (0.625)
PROSOC 0.95 0.49 0.46 -1.10 0.58 -1.68 -2.06 0.09 -2.14
(0.631) (0.745) (0.718) (0.777) (0.764) (0.512) (0.530) (0.972) (0.202)
SPRISK 2.51 2.45 0.05 2.78 2.41* 0.37 0.27 -0.04 0.32
(0.508) (0.103) (0.983) (0.228) (0.070) (0.767) (0.947) (0.985) (0.880)
⁄ 4.13 0.56 3.58* 3.66 0.44 3.22 -0.48 -0.11 -0.36
(0.208) (0.767) (0.057) (0.133) (0.786) (0.107) (0.909) (0.962) (0.877)
RCI -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.28 0.28* 0.01 0.35 0.31 0.04
(0.813) (0.781) (0.869) (0.246) (0.086) (0.944) (0.332) (0.230) (0.770)
N 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
Clusters 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03
Bootstrap samples 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
Ordinary least squares regressions. Bootstrapped p-values given in parentheses, computed using pairs cluster bootstrap-t with
standard errors clustered on matching group. Sample: All participants with non-inconsistent choices in lottery tasks. úúúp < 0.01,
úúp < 0.05, úp < 0.1.
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In Model (3), both the constant and the coe cient of PROSOC is significant, im-
plying that in GLOB, non-prosocial participants exhibit over-expenditure, while
over-expenditure of non-prosocial participants is significantly di erent. Model (4) is
a regression of over-expenditure on PROSOC and the dummy variable NOPROSOC
for non-prosocial participants. In this regression, the coe cient of PROSOC mea-
sures the absolute level of over-expenditure of prosocial participants in GLOB.62
Since it is not significant, total e orts of prosocial participants do not di er from
the prediction.
Table 2.9: Explanation of variation in over-expenditure
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Over-expenditure in total e ort
Policy BASE PART GLOB GLOB
CONSTANT 21.77*** 11.95** 12.14***
(0.002) (0.041) (0.006)
PROSOC -5.80 -4.91 -9.36** 2.77
(0.137) (0.224) (0.030) (0.298)
NOPROSOC 12.14***
(0.006)
N 950 950 950 950
Left-censored 42 23 39 39
Right-censored 60 47 97 97
Clusters 12 12 12 12
Log-likelihood -4233.95 -4278.10 -4185.54 -4185.54
Bootstrap samples 10000 10000 10000 10000
Tobit regressions. Dependent variable is calculated as observed total e ort
minus predicted total e ort. Bootstrapped p-values given in parentheses,
computed using pairs cluster bootstrap-t with standard errors clustered on
matching group. Sample: All participants with non-inconsistent choices
in lottery tasks. úúúp < 0.01, úúp < 0.05, úp < 0.1.
Result 2.8 allows me to draw conclusions regarding the role of prosociality for
the e ectiveness of the globally optimal policy in increasing total e orts. The result
implies that I generally observe over-expenditure among the participants, except for
the case of prosocial participants under the globally optimal policy. This reduces
the e ect of the weight-prize adjustment on total e orts compared to a situation
in which prosocial participants would behave similar to non-prosocial participants.
62I do not use likelihood ratio tests when testing linear combinations of the coe cients because
they would not take the clustering in the observations into account.
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Hence, although I cannot show that the e ect of the weight-prize adjustment is
lower among prosocials (Result 2.7), it still seems very likely that one reason for the
overall small e ect of the globally optimal policy is that it induces particularly low
e orts among prosocial participants.
What motivates prosocial participants to exert systematically lower e ort under
the globally optimal policy than non-prosocial participants? Note that the glob-
ally optimal policy induces a higher degree of ex-post income inequality than the
baseline and the partially optimal policy. Indeed, under the globally optimal policy,
there is an income di erence of CHF 30 between both participants, as only one of
both can win the overall prize of CHF 30. Under the baseline and the partially
optimal policy, however, it is also possible that the first- and second-period prize go
to di erent participants, so that an equal distribution of prizes becomes possible.
Therefore, it may be the case that the high degree of ex-post income inequality
under the globally optimally policy reduces incentives for those subjects who have
an aversion against income inequality that benefits themselves (aheadness averse
subjects). Since aheadness averse subjects are likely to to turn out as procoscials
in the SVO Slider Measure, this would provide an explanation for lower e orts of
prosocial participants under the globally optimal policy. Aheadness aversion indeed
seems to play a role in tournament-like incentive systems: As Bartling et al. (2009)
find, aheadness averse subjects self-select systematically less into competition than
non-aheadness averse subjects.
However, it is not at all clear how aheadness aversion would interact with an-
other form of inequality aversion, that is aversion against disadvantageous inequality
(behindness aversion). Subjects who are both aheadness and behindess averse, but
dislike disadvantageous inequality more than they dislike advantageous inequality,
may actually exert more e ort under a policy with high ex-post income inequality
than subjects who are not inequality averse. This discussion highlights the need for
a formal model of inequality aversion when explaining the observations for prosocial
participants under the globally optimal policy, which I leave to future research. Fur-
thermore, the discussion also suggests that in the elicitation of social preferences,
it would be helpful to use the full version of the SVO Slider Measure. The full
version uses nine additional dictator games to distinguish prosocial individuals fur-
ther according to their type of inequality aversion. Such information would likely
help when forming hypotheses about the e ects of the globally optimal policy on
prosocial participants.63
Finally, the above results also suggest that the policy identified as optimal by
the theoretical model is not necessarily the optimal policy for a tournament among
real subjects. Note that the theoretical model neglects both loss aversion and social
preferences. However, the measures for both phenomena explain parts of the varia-
63It was not foreseeable at the time of the experiment that the full version would turn out to be
the preferred elicitation method.
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tion in e orts, suggesting that loss aversion and social preferences play a role in the
behavior of the participants. Therefore, the optimal policy for real subjects is likely
to di er from the one derived in this study. Nevertheless, the theoretical model
still provides reasonable guidance for the optimal design of incentives, as it proved
e ective in increasing e orts despite of behavioral variation among the participants
(see Result 2.1).
To sum up, this part focuses on the determinants of heterogeneity in behavior and
the implications for the design of the policy. After establishing a substantial degree of
heterogeneity in behavior among the participants (Result 2.5), I show that under the
baseline policy (the globally optimal policy), loss-aversion (prosociality) decreases
total e ort through an e ect on second-period e orts (Result 2.6). Furthermore, I
find no explanatory power of loss aversion and prosociality on variation in the e ects
of the policy adjustments (Result 2.7). However, I show that prosocial and non-
prosocial participants exhibit a similar degree of over-expenditure under the baseline
and the partially optimal policy, while under the globally optimal policy, prosocials,
in contrast to non-prosocials, do not exhibit over-expenditure (Result 2.8). This
leads me to the conjecture that one reason for the smaller e ect of the weight-prize
adjustment compared to the prediction is that it induces particularly low e orts
among prosocial participants. I further argue that the optimal policy derived from
the theoretical model may not be the optimal policy in practice.
2.5.3 Understanding the dynamics
In this part, I investigate the e ect of first-period outcomes on behavior in the
second period. Recall that the core of the optimal policy is the positive weight of
past performance in the second period. As argued above, the positive weight gives
additional incentives for first-period e orts, but introduces asymmetry between the
agents in the second period by giving a headstart of ÷ si1 to the agent with si1 > sj1.
As, by (2.3), second-period e orts depend negatively on the size of the relative first-
period performance  si1, this asymmetry reduces incentives in the second period. I
now test whether the observed behavior is consistent with this prediction.
In contrast to the theoretical prediction, first-period outcomes also have an e ect
on behavior in the second period under the baseline policy, in which the weight of
past performance is zero:
Result 2.9. (i) Under the baseline policy, second-period e orts decrease in the size
of a positive relative performance ( si1 > 0) and increase in the size of a negative
relative performance ( si1 < 0). (ii) This e ect is entirely driven by participants
identified as prosocial in the pre-experimental questionnaire.
Evidence for Result 2.9. Table 2.10 supports the result. It contains regressions
of second-period e orts on the size of the relative first-period performance  si1 and
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various interaction terms. To avoid endogeneity of  si1 through its dependence on
first-period e ort ei1, I include ei1 as a control variable.64 Model (1) is a regres-
sion of second-period e orts in BASE on | si1| and on | si1| si1<0, which is an
interaction of | si1| with a dummy variable indicating  si1 < 0. In this regres-
sion, the coe cient of | si1| measures the e ect of a positive relative performance,
while the sum of the coe cients of | si1| and | si1| si1<0 measures the e ect of
a negative relative performance. We see that the coe cient of | si1| is significant
and negative, while the sum of the coe cients of | si1| and | si1| si1<0 is positive
(0.05). Model (2) shows that it is also significant. Instead of | si1|, this regres-
sion includes | si1| si1>0, which is an interaction of | si1| with a dummy variable
indicating | si1| > 0. In this regression, the coe cient of | si1| si1<0 measures
the e ect of a negative relative performance and is significant. This supports part
(i). Part (ii) follows from Model (3). It extends Model (1) by | si1| ·PROSOC
and | si1| si1<0 ·PROSOC, which are interactions of | si1| and of | si1| si1<0 with
PROSOC, the dummy variable indicating that the participant was characterized as
prosocial in the pre-experimental questionnaire. In this regression, the coe cients of
| si1| and | si1| si1<0 measure the e ect of a positive and negative relative perfor-
mance on non-prosocial participants, while the coe cients of | si1| ·PROSOC and
| si1| si1<0 ·PROSOC measure by how much the e ects di er for prosocial partici-
pants. We see that the coe cients of | si1| and of | si1| si1<0 are never significant,
while the coe cients of | si1| ·PROSOC and | si1| si1<0 ·PROSOC are significant.
Hence, the relative first-period performance has no e ect on non-prosocial partic-
ipants, while its e ect on prosocial participants significantly di ers from this zero
e ect. This implies that the e ect of relative first-period performance on second-
period e orts in BASE results only from prosocial participants.
Apparently, the game has a dynamic nature for the participants also under the
baseline policy, although both periods are independent of each other from a monetary
utility perspective. Since only prosocial participants drive the result, it is likely that
inequality aversion plays a role.65 In fact, the directions of the dynamic e ects
under the baseline policy are in line with this conjecture. To see this, note that a
participant with a positive (negative) relative first-period performance is the winner
(loser) of the first-period prize W1. My results imply that for prosocial participants,
second-period e orts of first-period winners are lower than second-period e orts of
64 si1 is endogenous by definition, as  si1 = ei1 + Ái1 ≠ sj1. With ei1 as a control variable,  si1
captures only the variation that is caused by the participant’s first-period observation error Ái1
and the opponent’s first-period performance sj1. As both are exogenous to the decision problem
of the participant, so is  si1 when controlling for ei1. Hence, in Table 2.10, the coe cient of
 si1 is an unbiased estimate of the causal e ect of  si1 on second-period e orts.
65Recall that subjects identified as prosocial in the pre-experimental questionnaire can be both
inequality tolerant and inequality averse.
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Table 2.10: E ect of first-period asymmetry on second-period e orts
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. var. E ort 2
Policy BASE BASE BASE PART PART GLOB GLOB
CONSTANT 2.88 2.88 3.27 12.33*** 12.51*** 14.64*** 14.74***
(0.316) (0.316) (0.244) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
EFFORT 1 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.85*** 0.58*** 0.57*** 0.85*** 0.85***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
| si1| -0.07*** 0.01 -0.20*** -0.16** -0.30*** -0.24***
(0.006) (0.819) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.001)
| si1| · PROSOC -0.12** -0.05 -0.09
(0.039) (0.302) (0.124)
| si1| si1>0 -0.07***
(0.006)
| si1| si1<0 0.12*** 0.05** 0.00 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09* -0.16*
(0.000) (0.030) (0.946) (0.133) (0.271) (0.072) (0.080)
| si1| si1<0 · PROSOC 0.18*** 0.05 0.10
(0.009) (0.686) (0.205)
N 950 950 950 950 950 950 950
Left-censored 94 94 94 177 177 126 126
Right-censored 86 86 86 85 85 186 186
Clusters 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Log-likelihood -3375.33 -3375.33 -3367.07 -3372.44 -3371.78 -3108.25 -3106.20
Bootstrap samples 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
Tobit regressions. Bootstrapped p-values given in parentheses, computed using pairs cluster bootstrap-t with stan-
dard errors clustered on matching group. Sample: All participants with non-inconsistent choices in lottery tasks.
úúúp < 0.01, úúp < 0.05, úp < 0.1.
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first-period losers. Such behavior reduces the expected inequality after the second
period and is, therefore, consistent with inequality aversion.66,67
For the partially and the globally optimal policy, I obtain:
Result 2.10. (i) Both under the partially and under the globally optimal policy,
second-period e orts decrease in the size of the relative first-period performance  si1.
(ii) Under the partially optimal policy, a positive relative first-period performance
( si1 > 0) reduces e orts just as high as an equally sized negative relative first-period
performance ( si1 < 0). Under the globally optimal policy, a positive relative first-
period performance ( si1 > 0) decreases e orts less than an equally sized negative
relative first-period performance ( si1 < 0). (iii) Both under the partially and the
globally optimal policy, the behavior of prosocial and non-prosocial participants does
not di er.
Evidence for Result 2.10. The result follows from Models (4) to (7) in Table 2.10.
Models (4) and (6) are regressions of second-period e orts in PART and GLOB on
ei1, | si1| and | si1| si1<0. In both models, the coe cient of | si1| is negative and
significant, which implies part (i). The coe cient of | si1| si1<0 is not significantly
di erent from 0 in PART, but negative and marginally significant in GLOB. Hence,
in PART, the e ect of a negative relative performance on second-period e orts is not
significantly di erent from the e ect of a positive relative performance. In GLOB,
however, a negative relative performance decreases e orts significantly more than a
positive relative performance. This supports part (ii). Models (5) and (7) extend
Models (4) and (6) by | si1| ·PROSOC and | si1| si1<0 ·PROSOC as additional ex-
planatory variables. In both models, their coe cients are not significantly di erent
from 0, showing that the e ects do not di er for prosocial participants. This implies
part (iii).
According to Result 2.10, the experimental data confirms the theoretical predic-
tion for the e ect of relative first-period performance on second-period e orts under
the partially and the globally optimal policy: A higher size of the relative perfor-
mance decreases e orts in the second period, no matter of whether participants were
ahead or behind in the first period. However, under the globally optimal policy, I
identify an additional demotivation e ect of being behind: A negative relative per-
formance demotivates the participants more than an equally sized positive relative
performance. In contrast to my result for the baseline policy, I do not identify a
66Inequality aversion as an explanation for the observed second-period behavior would be consistent
with results from Drago and Heywood (1991), who find no e ect of previous losing on e orts in
a tournament against an automaton.
67I cannot rule out that reciprocity also plays a role in the observed behavior. However, note that
I obtain the measure for prosociality from the behavior in a dictator game in which reciprocity is
irrelevant. Hence, the explanatory power of prosociality is independent of the role of reciprocity.
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systematically di erent behavior of prosocial individuals. In particular, unlike un-
der the baseline policy, prosocial participants do not exhibit an inequality-reducing
behavior in the second period by exerting less e ort when they were ahead in the
first period and more e ort when they were behind in the first period. Hence, in case
that inequality aversion drives the observations for the baseline policy, the mone-
tary link between the first and the second period through a positive weight of past
performance seems to mitigate such motives in the reaction to first-period outcomes.
Note that the result on the e ect of relative first-period performance under the
globally optimal policy is consistent with the findings of Ederer and Fehr (2007),
who study the issue of performance revelation in an experiment that is very similar
to the globally optimal policy. They also find that the size of the relative first-
period performance decreases e orts in the second period, while their estimates
suggests that a positive relative performance decreases e orts less than negative
relative performance.68,69 Moreover, my findings are consistent with results from
experiments on asymmetric tournaments.70
In summary, this part analyzes the e ect of first-period asymmetry on second-
period e orts. Result 2.9 shows that under the baseline policy, the game has a
dynamic nature for prosocial participants, although both periods are independent
from a monetary utility perspective. More specifically, prosocials exert more e ort
when they lost in the first period and less e ort when they won, which is consis-
tent with inequality aversion. Result 2.10 demonstrates that under the partially
and the globally optimal policy, the behavior of both prosocial and non-prosocial
participants is in line with the theoretical model, as a higher size of first-period
asymmetry reduces second-period e orts. I thus conjecture that the monetary link
between the first and second period through the weight adjustment mitigates the
e ect of inequality aversion on behavior under the baseline policy. Result 2.10 fur-
ther identifies an additional demotivation e ect of being behind under the globally
optimal policy, as a negative performance di erence reduces e orts more than an
equally sized positive performance di erence.
68Ederer and Fehr (2007) do, however, not test whether both e ects are di erent.
69The experiment of Ludwig and Lu¨nser (2012) shares features of the globally optimal policy, but
di ers from the framework in this study in that there is no observation noise in the first period.
They find that second-period e orts decrease in the size of the first-period e ort di erence, while
the e ect is stronger for a negative e ort di erence than for a positive e ort di erence.
70The negative e ect of relative first-period performance on second-period e orts is consistent
with experimental papers showing that e orts in tournaments among asymmetric participants
are lower than e orts in tournaments among symmetric participants (see, for example, Schotter
& Weigelt, 1992; Fonseca, 2009). Note that similar observations can be made in the field: Brown
(2011) uses data from golf tournaments and shows that the presence of highly skilled players
reduces the average performance of other players in the tournament.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this study, I analyze experimentally the e ects of the weight of past perfor-
mance and of the spread of prize money in dynamic tournaments. The experiment
compares e orts under a baseline policy of two independent tournaments to e orts
when the spread of prize money and/or the weight correspond to the optimal so-
lutions characterized by Klein and Schmutzler (2014). Only the policy adjustment
that implements both the optimal weight and the optimal prize spread increases
e orts. However, its e ect is smaller than predicted. By relating the measures from
a pre-experimental questionnaire to behavior in the laboratory, I argue that one
explanation for the small e ect of the optimal policy compared to the prediction is
that it induces particularly low e orts among prosocial participants.
The study provides insights that are relevant for the design of competitive in-
centive systems. It shows that the weight of past performance and the spread of
prize money significantly a ect behavior in dynamic tournaments, and, therefore,
are important dimensions to consider in practice. Furthermore, the study has two
more general implications: First, qualitative predictions from theoretical models on
relative incentives are empirically relevant. Second, for quantitative predictions, it
is important to not only rely on simple material utility models, but to have a closer
look at individuals’ preferences.
However, it should be noted that the experiment relies on a specific parame-
terization of observation noise and e ort costs. This parameterization yields an
intriguingly simple solution: In the optimal policy, the best-performing agent across
both periods receives all the money. This simplicity makes the policy seem attrac-
tive for tournaments in general. In fact, many theoretical and experimental papers
that consider the issue of performance revelation rely on such a structure without
further justification. Nevertheless, the general analysis of Klein and Schmutzler
(2014) shows that the predictions for the optimal size of the weight and for the
spread of prize money crucially depend on the noise and cost parameters. In real
working environments, observation noise and e ort costs are likely to be di erent, if
not unknown. Furthermore, the behavioral phenomena identified in this study, and
many more issues like social preferences towards the principal, attrition, or simply
asymmetric abilities, are supposedly highly relevant for the behavior of employees.
An experiment that tests the e ects of this policy in a field environment would
therefore be an important further step.
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Figure A2.1: Means of e orts over rounds. N = 96 per round and policy. Sample:
All participants.
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Figure A2.2: Histograms of e ort choices. Red lines are Nash predictions for
(expected) e orts. N = 960 per policy. Sample: All participants.
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A2.2 Derivations
This section relies on several results provided in Chapter 1.
A2.2.1 Second-order conditions in the second period
Section A1.1.1 (proof of part (ii)) derives (A1.1) as the condition under which (2.2)
characterizes the unique equilibrium e orts in the second period. Using f2 (s) = „ (s)
and K2 (e) = k2 (e)
2 in (A1.1), I can write this condition as
„Õ (÷ si1 + ei2 ≠ ej2)W2 < k ’  si1 œ R; ’ ei2, ej2 œ R+. (A2.1)
Section A1.6.1 (ii) derives (A1.37) as a su cient condition for (A2.1) to hold. With
‡1 = ‡2, (A1.37) becomes
k >
W
‡2
Ò
2ﬁ exp (1)
.
A2.2.2 Expected second-period payo 
Using ‡1 = ‡2 in (A1.33) gives
C (÷) = 1
‡
Ô
2ﬁ
Ô
1 + ÷2
. (A2.2)
With (A2.2), (A1.3) yields (2.5).
A2.2.3 Second-order conditions in the first period
Section A1.1.3 (proof of part (ii)) derives (A1.8) as the condition under which (2.6)
describes the unique symmetric equilibrium in the first period. With ft (s) = „ (s)
and Kt (e) = k2 (e)
2, (A1.8) becomes
„Õ (ei1 ≠ ej1)W1 + ÷W2
⁄ Œ
0
„ (÷s) [„Õ (s+ ei1 ≠ ej1)≠ „Õ (s≠ ei1 + ej1)] ds
+÷W
2
2
k
⁄ Œ
0
„ (÷s)„Õ (÷s) [„Õ (s+ ei1 ≠ ej1) + „Õ (s≠ ei1 + ej1)] ds < k.
(A2.3)
Section A1.6.1 (ii) shows that (A1.39) is a su cient condition for (A2.3) to hold.
With ‡1 = ‡2, I can write (A1.39) as
k >
W
‡2
Ò
2ﬁ exp (1)
+ W
2
k‡4 (2ﬁ)
3
2
Ò
exp (1)
.
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A2.2.4 Expected second-period e orts
Using ‡1 = ‡2 in (1.21) yields (2.7).
A2.3 Details on pre-experimental questionnaire
A2.3.1 Details on measure for social value orientation
The SVO Slider Measure developed by Murphy et al. (2011) consists of a sequence
of six dictator games. In each dictator game, the participants have to choose one
of nine allocations in terms of payo s for themselves and another participant (see
Table A2.1 and Figure A2.3). As an example, game 5 involves the distribution of
a total surplus of 150 points between oneself and the other.71 The allocations are
constructed in a way that in each dictator game, each of the classical types of social
value orientation either strictly prefers exactly one of the allocations, or is wholly
indi erent between all of them.
Table A2.1: Possible allocation choices in SVO Slider Measure
Game # Receiver Allocation #
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 oneself 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85other 85 76 68 59 50 41 33 24 15
2 oneself 85 87 89 91 93 94 96 98 100other 15 19 24 28 33 37 41 46 50
3 oneself 50 54 59 63 68 72 76 81 85other 100 98 96 94 93 91 89 87 85
4 oneself 50 54 59 63 68 72 76 81 85other 100 89 79 68 58 47 36 26 15
5 oneself 100 94 88 81 75 69 63 56 50other 50 56 63 69 75 81 88 94 100
6 oneself 100 98 96 94 93 91 89 87 85other 50 54 59 63 68 72 76 81 85
Source: Adapted from Murphy et al. (2011).
The categorization of the participants into one of the orientation types is based on
their choices in these dictator games. Let Ao be the average of what the participant
allocated to the other across the six games and As the average of what the participant
71Note that in this dictator game, the price of giving is 1. In the other games, the price of giving
is not equal to 1, so that the total surplus varies between choices.
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allocated to him/herself. Murphy et al. (2011) then define a participant’s SVO index
as
SVO = arctan
A
Ao ≠ 50
As ≠ 50
B
.
Intuitively, in Figure A2.3, the index corresponds to the angle at vertex (50, 50)
between the average allocation chosen and the horizontal. Note that each classical
type would generate a particular index value when faced with the dictator games.
Following Murphy et al. (2011), I determine the participants’ social value orientation
type as the classical orientation type whose index value their own index value is
closest to. Table A2.2 contains the index values implied by orientation types and
the resulting intervals for the empirical categorization.72
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Figure A2.3: Allocations in the SVO Slider Measure. The lines connect the allo-
cations in the six dictator games given in Table A2.1. Source: Adapted from Fehr
and Williams (2013).
I implemented the SVO Slider Measure in the following way. Before making
decisions in the dictator games, the participants were instructed that after the com-
pletion of the questionnaire, they would be randomly paired with another partici-
pant, and that one of the 12 decisions made by both participants in this pair would
72Note that there is a range of possible values for prosocials and individualists. This is due to the
fact that both orientation types are indi erent between the allocations in one of the six dictator
games each.
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Table A2.2: Characterization of SVO types
Orientation type Implied index value Range for characterization
Competitive ≠16.26¶ Æ ≠12.04¶
Individualist œ [≠7.82¶, 7.82¶] (≠12.04¶, 22.45¶]
Prosocial œ [37.09¶, 52.91¶] (22.45¶, 57.15¶]
Altruist 61.39¶ > 57.15¶
Source: Adapted from Murphy et al. (2011).
then be randomly chosen to determine their payo s. Then, every game appeared
separately on the participants’ computer screen. For every participant, the order of
presentation was randomly determined. All payo s were expressed in CHF, using
an exchange rate of CHF 1 per 10 points as given in Table A2.1.
A2.3.2 Details on measure for risk aversion
In the lottery task, the safe payo  varied between CHF X œ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. The
lottery yielded CHF 10 or CHF 0 with equal chances. The choice situations were pre-
sented on one screen, ordered in decreasing value of the safe payo  (see Table A2.3).
Table A2.3: Lottery task to elicit risk aversion
Situation # Safe payo  Lottery
1 CHF 7 50%: CHF 10, 50%: CHF 0
2 CHF 6 50%: CHF 10, 50%: CHF 0
3 CHF 5 50%: CHF 10, 50%: CHF 0
4 CHF 4 50%: CHF 10, 50%: CHF 0
5 CHF 3 50%: CHF 10, 50%: CHF 0
6 CHF 2 50%: CHF 10, 50%: CHF 0
I infer the participants’ degree of risk aversion from the position at which they
switched from choosing the safe amount to choosing the lottery. To this end, I use a
similar argument as Dohmen et al. (2011): Since the expected value of the lottery is
CHF 5, risk-loving subjects should switch before situation 3 (at which the safe payo 
equals the expected value of the lottery), and risk-averse subjects after situation 3.
Hence, the later an individual switches, the higher is the underlying degree of risk
Chapter 2: Motivating Workers in Dynamic Tournaments 95
aversion. I thus define the variable SPRISK as the number of the situation at which
the participants chose the lottery for the first time.73,74
After the completion of the questionnaire, the computer randomly selected one of
the six choice situations for each participant (Cubitt et al., 1998). The participants’
payo  then followed from their decision for the selected situation – if they had chosen
the safe payo , the payo  was equal to the safe payo , while if they had chosen the
lottery, the payo  was randomly chosen between CHF 10 and CHF 0.
A2.3.3 Details on measure for loss aversion
In this task, which was developed by Ga¨chter et al. (2010), the participants have
to make decisions for six choice situations involving a safe payo  of CHF 0 and a
lottery. The lotteries yields, with equal chances, a payo  of CHF 6 or a payo  of
CHF ≠X, while X œ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} (see Table A2.4).
Table A2.4: Lottery task to elicit loss aversion
Situation # Safe payo  Lottery
1 CHF 0 50%: CHF 6, 50%: CHF -2
2 CHF 0 50%: CHF 6, 50%: CHF -3
3 CHF 0 50%: CHF 6, 50%: CHF -4
4 CHF 0 50%: CHF 6, 50%: CHF -5
5 CHF 0 50%: CHF 6, 50%: CHF -6
6 CHF 0 50%: CHF 6, 50%: CHF -7
Source: Adapted from Ga¨chter et al. (2010).
The participants’ level of loss aversion follows from the point at which they start
rejecting the lottery in favor of the safe amount. Following Ga¨chter et al. (2010), a
decision maker is indi erent between accepting and rejecting a lottery that yields a
gain of G and a loss of L with equal chances if
G = ⁄ · L.
73With this definition, a participant who always chose the lottery – and is thus very risk-loving –
receives a value of 1, which is an upper bound for the switching point in the hypothetical case
that there were additional situations above situation 1 with a safe payo  of more than CHF 7.
For a participant who never chose the lottery – and is thus very risk-averse – I set SPRISK to 7,
which is a lower bound for the switching point in the hypothetical case that there were additional
situations below situation 6 with a safe payo  of less than CHF 2.
74The measure which I use is a linear transformation of the measure of Dohmen et al. (2011),
who present the situations in increasing size of the safe amount and set the measure of risk
aversion equal to the value of the safe payo  in the situation at which the participants switch
from choosing the lottery to choosing the safe payo .
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Ga¨chter et al. (2010) define ⁄ as the coe cient of loss aversion. They argue that
⁄ > 1 implies loss aversion, as losses are weighted more heavily than equally sized
gains.75 Ga¨chter et al. (2010) then calculate a participant’s ⁄ as
⁄ = G
a
La
,
where Ga and La are the gain and the loss of the lottery with the highest loss that
is still accepted by a participant. Note that if a participant always (never) rejected
the lottery, I can only determine a lower (upper) bound for ⁄.76 Furthermore, if a
participant was inconsistent and rejected a first lottery but accepted a second that
would have yielded a higher loss than the first, it is not possible to determine ⁄.
Table A2.5 shows the values for ⁄ that follow from the possible choices in the lottery
task.
Table A2.5: Possible choices and implied
values for ⁄
Choice implied ⁄
Always reject > 3
Accept #1, reject #2–#6 3
Accept #1 – #2, reject #3–#6 2
Accept #1 – #3, reject #4–#6 1.5
Accept #1 – #4, reject #5–#6 1.2
Accept #1 – #5, reject #6 1
Never reject Æ 0.87
Source: Adapted from Ga¨chter et al. (2010).
As for the lottery task to elicit risk aversion, the computer randomly selected
one of the six choice situations for each participant after the completion of the
questionnaire (Cubitt et al., 1998) and determined the payo s according to the
decisions for the selected situation.
A2.3.4 Details on measure for competitiveness
The Reversed Competitiveness Index developed by Houston et al. (2002) consists
of 14 statements about competition in daily life contexts (see Table A2.6). The
participants state on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) how they
agree with each statement (Likert, 1932). According to the definition of Houston
et al. (2002), a participant’s RCI value equals the sum of the individual answers and
75This is a special case of the more general model of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), who allow for
probability weighting and nonlinear utility.
76In these cases, I set ⁄ to 3 or 0.87, respectively.
Chapter 2: Motivating Workers in Dynamic Tournaments 97
ranges between 14 and 70.77 In the pre-experimental questionnaire, the questions
appeared separately on the screen in a randomly determined order.
Table A2.6: Statements in Revised Competitiveness Index
# Statement
1 I like competition.
2 I am a competitive individual.
3 I enjoy competing against an opponent.
4 I don’t like competing against other people.
5 I get satisfaction from competing with others.
6 I find competitive situations unpleasant.
7 I dread competing against other people.
8 I try to avoid competing with others.
9 I often try to out perform others.
10 I try to avoid arguments.
11 I will do almost anything to avoid an argument.
12 I often remain quiet rather than risk hurting another person.
13 I don’t enjoy challenging others even when I think they are wrong.
14 In general, I will go along with the group rather than create conflict.
Source: Adapted from Houston et al. (2002).
A2.4 The pairs-cluster bootstrap-t procedure
The following summary relies on Cameron et al. (2008, p. 427). Suppose there are
C clusters. The pairs-cluster bootstrap-t procedure starts with an ordinary least
squares estimation of coe cient j, —ˆj, and a cluster-robust estimation of its standard
error, s—ˆj , based on the whole sample. In the next step, B bootstrap replications
are executed. In each replication, the procedure samples C clusters (i.e., all of the
observations from that cluster) with replacement from the original sample of clusters
and calculates t-statistics based on the resampled data using cluster-robust standard
errors. Precisely, let —ˆj,b be the ordinary least squares estimate of the coe cient in
the bth replication and s—ˆj,b the cluster-robust estimate of its standard error. The
bth t-statistic is then defined as
tj,b =
—ˆj,b ≠ —ˆj
s—ˆj,b
.
77The answers to statements 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13 and 14 are reverse-coded in the calculation of
the overall score.
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In the last step, the p-value for parameter j results from comparing the regular
t-statistic
tj =
—ˆj
s—ˆj
to the empirical distributions of the tj,b. Note that in some of my regressions, I
determine the estimates of the coe cients with the Tobit model instead of ordinary
least squares.78,79
A2.5 E ort incentives with risk aversion
To keep the analysis tractable, I make two simplifying assumptions. First, I assume
that the agents choose first- and second-period e orts simultaneously before the
beginning of the first period. This corresponds to a policy in which the agents
receive feedback on their first-period performance only after they have chosen their
second-period e orts. The literature calls this a no-revelation policy, in contrast
to the full revelation policy that underlies this study. As Klein and Schmutzler
(2014) demonstrate, expected e orts do not di er between a no revelation and a
full revelation policy if e ort costs are quadratic. Second, I assume that in each
period, the agents can only choose zero e ort or a positive e ort level of e > 0. Let
K (e) := K. Quadratic costs imply K > 0.
Suppose agent j chooses ej1 = ej2 = e. Under the baseline policy, the probability
that agent i wins the prize in period t, Wt = W2 , when also choosing ei1 = ei2 = e is
0.5. Similarly, under the globally optimal policy, the probability that agent i wins
the second-period prize, W2 = W , when choosing ei1 = ei2 = e is 0.5. I denote the
ex-post monetary payo  of agent i in period t by ﬁit and the overall monetary payo 
of agent i from both periods by ﬁi. Under the baseline policy, the expected value of
the monetary payo  of agent i in period t for eit = ejt = e is
E (ﬁit)B = 0.5 ·Wt ≠K =
W
4 ≠K,
while its variance is
V (ﬁit)B = 0.5 ·
1
Wt ≠K ≠ E (ﬁit)B
22
+ 0.5 ·
1
≠K ≠ E (ﬁit)B
22
= W
2
16 .
78I implemented the bootstraps in R (R Core Team, 2014) using the AER (Kleiber & Zeileis, 2008),
censReg (Henningsen, 2013), doBy (Højsgaard & Halekoh, 2012), doMC (Calaway & Weston,
2014a), doRNG (Gaujoux, 2014), foreach (Calaway & Weston, 2014b), lmtest (Zeileis & Hothorn,
2002), sampling (Tille´ & Matei, 2013) and sandwich (Zeileis, 2004) packages.
79For the specification of the cluster-robust sandwich estimator in the maximum likelihood case
see, for example, King and Roberts (2014).
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Therefore, under the baseline policy, expected value and variance of the monetary
payo  from both periods for eit = ejt = e are80
E (ﬁi)B = E (ﬁi1)B + E (ﬁi2)B =
W
2 ≠ 2 ·K;
V (ﬁi)B = V (ﬁi1)B + V (ﬁi2)B =
W 2
8 .
Under the globally optimal policy, the expected value of of agent i’s monetary payo 
from both periods for eit = ejt = e is
E (ﬁi)G = 0.5 ·W2 ≠K ≠K =
W
2 ≠ 2 ·K,
and its variance
V (ﬁi)G = 0.5 ·
1
W2 ≠K ≠K ≠ E (ﬁi)G
22
+ 0.5 ·
1
≠K ≠K ≠ E (ﬁi)G
22
= W
2
4 .
We see that E (ﬁi)B = E (ﬁi)G, while V (ﬁi)B < V (ﬁi)G. This means that for
eit = ejt = e, the expected monetary payo s of agent i under the baseline policy
and under the globally optimal policy are equal. However, the variance of the payo 
is lower under the baseline policy. This means that for eit = ejt = e, the expected
utility of a risk-averse agent is lower under the globally optimal policy than under
the baseline policy. Therefore, under the globally optimal policy, it is more likely
that the agent prefers to cut back on e ort by exerting ei1 = ei2 = 0 instead of
ei1 = ei2 = e than it is under the baseline policy. This implies that a risk-averse
subject may have lower incentives to exert a given e ort level under the baseline
policy than under the globally optimal policy.
80To understand the result for the total variance, note that the covariance between first- and
second-period payo  is 0 if the agents choose first-and second-period e orts simultaneously.
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A2.6 Instructions
This section contains the instructions for session 1. The instructions for session 2
and 3 were analogous.
Instructions              f  
General Information 
This is experiment has 3 parts (Part I, Part II, and Part III). Each part is 
divided into 10 periods. Thus, there are 30 periods in total. 
The instructions on this page and on pages 2 and 3 are relevant for all three 
parts. Instructions which are specific to Part I will follow on page 4. 
Instructions which are specific to Part II and Part III will be distributed to you 
before the corresponding part. 
In each period, you will generate a payoff. The payoff depends on your 
decisions in that period and the decisions of others in that period. How you 
generate a payoff will be explained to you in the following. 
Your final payoff from the experiment will be a participation payment of 10 
CHF plus the payoff you generated in one randomly chosen period. The 
period that is randomly chosen will be the same period for all participants. 
Every period is equally likely to be chosen. During the experiment, you will 
not know which period will be chosen. Therefore, you should treat each 
period as if it would be the one that is relevant for your final payoff. 
 
Upon completion of the experiment, you will be paid individually and in 
private. 
Throughout the experiment, payoffs are expressed in terms of “points”. At the 
end of the experiment, payoffs in points will be converted into payoffs in CHF. 
The exchange rate is: 
 
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and 
wait for an experimenter to come to you. During the experiment, you are not 
allowed to communicate with other participants, exclaim, use personal 
electronic devices, or use the computer in a way not specified by the 
experimenter. If you are not following these rules, you may be excluded from 
the experiment and might only receive the participation payment. 
What happens in a period 
In each of the 30 periods, every participant is assigned into a pair with one 
randomly chosen other participant. In the following, we will refer to the other 
randomly chosen participant as the “other”. The participants will never know 
the identity of the other, nor will the other know their identity. 
Three parts, 10 
periods each 
Final payoff 
Exchange rate 
Rules 
Interaction with 
randomly 
chosen 
participant 
Instructions – Page 1/5 
Final payoff = 10 CHF + your payoff from a randomly chosen period 
10 points = 1 CHF 
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Each period consists of two stages. In each stage, the participants must 
make a decision. In the following, this is explained in further detail. 
Stage 1 works in the following way: 
First, each participant individually chooses an input level between 0 and 55 in 
increments of 0.5. The numbers are entered in the corresponding field of the 
computer screen. Choosing a positive input level is costly for the participants. 
A detailed explanation of the costs the participants have to pay for choosing 
a particular input level follows below. 
Second, the computer determines each participant’s output level in Stage 1. 
A participant’s output level depends on the participant’s input level in Stage 1 
and on a random number. This random number is drawn for each participant 
individually in Stage 1. 
 
 
On average, the random numbers are zero, but they can take up positive and 
negative values. Positive and negative values are equally likely, and values 
close to zero are more likely than values further away from zero. On page 2 
of the appendix, you find a detailed explanation of the distribution of the 
random numbers. 
This means that on average, a participant’s output level corresponds exactly 
to this participant’s input level. Thus, a higher input level results on average 
in a higher output level. However, depending on the realization of the random 
number (positive or negative), the output level can positively or negatively 
deviate from the chosen input level. Positive and negative deviations are 
equally likely, and small deviations are more likely than large deviations. 
At the end of Stage 1, the computer screen displays the following information 
to each participant: the participant’s own output level in Stage 1, the other’s 
output level in Stage 1, and the difference between the participant’s own 
output level and the other’s output level. Note that the participants will not 
know the other’s input level, nor will the other know their input level. 
Stage 2 works in the same way: Each participant chooses an input level. 
Choosing a positive input level is costly to the participants. Then, the 
computer draws another random number for each participant and determines 
each participant’s output level in Stage 2, which is the sum of the 
participant’s input level in Stage 2 and the participant’s random number in 
Stage 2. Finally, the computer displays the corresponding information. 
Two stages per 
period 
 
Stage 1: input 
Stage 1: output 
Stage 1: 
information 
Stage 2 
Instructions – Page 2/5 
output level in Stage 1 =    input level in Stage 1 
                                                    + random number in Stage 1 
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At the end of each period, the participants receive payments depending on 
their own and the other’s output in Stage 1 and in Stage 2. The rules 
according to which these payments are made differ between the three parts 
of the experiment. The payment rules in each part will be explained in the 
instructions specific to this part, i.e., the payment rules for Part I are 
explained on page 4. 
A participant’s payoff is calculated in the same way in all three parts: It is 
equal to the difference between the participant’s total payments and the costs 
for the participant’s inputs in both stages, plus a fixed payment of 200 points. 
 
 
 
A participant’s payoff is therefore higher when the participant’s payments are 
higher and the participant’s costs for the inputs are lower. Note that a 
participant’s payoff will never be negative. 
On page 1 of the appendix, you find a table and a graph showing which costs 
the participants have to pay for choosing a particular input level in a stage. 
The costs are increasing in the input level chosen by a participant. That is, 
the higher is the chosen input level, the higher are the costs the participant 
has to pay. 
Note that it is not possible to make predictions about future draws of random 
numbers from draws of random numbers in the past. The random numbers 
are newly drawn for every participant in every stage of every period, and 
these draws are independent from each other. 
Payments 
Payoff 
Costs 
No predictions 
possible 
Instructions – Page 3/5 
payoff from a period =   total payments 
                                               - costs for input in Stage 1 
                                               - costs for input in Stage 2 
                   + 200 
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Instructions specific to Part I 
In Part I, the payment rules after Stage I and Stage II are the following:  
x A first payment of 150 points is given to the participant in the pair who has higher 
output in Stage 1. The participant with lower output in Stage 1 receives no payment. If 
both outputs in Stage 1 are equal, the participant who receives the first payment is 
randomly chosen. 
x A second payment of 150 points is given to the participant in the pair who has higher 
output in Stage 2. The participant with lower output in Stage 2 receives no payment. If 
both outputs in Stage 2 are equal, the participant who receives the second payment is 
randomly chosen. 
 
 
This means that output in Stage 1 only counts for the first payment, and output in Stage 2 
only counts for the second payment. 
Example – Part I 
In the following, you take up the perspective of some participant in one of the 10 periods of 
Part I. Below, you see a picture of the computer screen after Stage 1 and Stage 2. Note 
that the numbers only serve as an example to illustrate the rules of Part I, and are not a 
recommendation towards what you should do. 
 
  
Instructions – Page 4/5 
150 points to participant with higher output in Stage 1 
150 points to participant with higher output in Stage 2 
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In Stage 1, you chose an input level of 18.5. The computer then determined your output 
level in Stage 1 as 23.96. This means that your random number was +5.46 (23.96 + 5.46 = 
18.5). The other’s output level in Stage 1 was 16.51. The computer thus displays the 
difference between your and the other’s output level as 7.45 (23.96 - 16.51 = 7.45). 
In Stage 2, you chose an input level of 10.50. The computer then determined your output 
level in Stage 2 as -1.72. This means that your random number was -12.22 (10.5 - 12.22 = 
-1.72). The other’s output level in Stage 2 was 27.84. The computer thus displays the 
difference between your and the other’s output level as -29.56 (-1.72 - 27.84 = -29.56). 
Then, you and the other received payments depending on your and the other’s output in 
Stage 1 and in Stage 2. First, since your output in Stage 1 (23.96) was higher than the 
other’s output in Stage 1 (16.51), a payment of 150 points was given to you. Second, since 
your output in Stage 2 (-1.72) was lower than the other’s output in Stage 2 (27.84), a 
payment of 150 points was given to the other. Thus, your total payments were 150 points 
(150 + 0 = 150). 
The costs for your input level of 18.5 in Stage 1 were 11.29 points, and the costs for your 
input level of 10.5 in Stage 2 were 3.64 points.  
Your payoff from this period are your total payments (150 points) minus your costs for 
input in Stage 1 (11.29 points) and for input in Stage 2 (3.64 points), plus the fixed 
payment of 200 points. Your payoff from this period is thus 335.07 points (150 - 11.29 - 
3.64 + 200 = 335.07). 
Suppose this period would be randomly chosen to be relevant for your final payoff. Your 
final payoff would then be 45.51 CHF, which is the sum of the 10 CHF participation 
payment and the payoff from this period converted into 33.51 CHF (= 355.07/10). 
Instructions – Page 5/5 
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Instructions specific to Part II 
In Part II, the payment rules after Stage I and Stage II are the following: 
x A first payment of 150 points is given to the participant in the pair who has higher 
output in Stage 1. The participant with lower output in Stage 1 receives no payment. If 
both outputs in Stage 1 are equal, the participant who receives the first payment is 
randomly chosen. 
x A second payment of 150 points is given to the participant in the pair whose sum of 
output in Stage 1 and output in Stage 2 is higher. The participant whose sum of output 
in Stage 1 and output in Stage 2 is lower receives no payment. If both participants have 
the same sum of output in Stage 1 and output in Stage 2, the participant who receives 
the second payment is randomly chosen. 
 
 
 
This means that output in Stage 1 counts both for the first payment and for the second 
payment, while output in Stage 2 only counts for the second payment. 
Example – Part II 
Reconsider the example from Part I. You had an output level of 23.96 in Stage 1 and of 
 -1.72 in Stage 2. The sum of your output in Stage 1 and output in Stage 2 is then  
22.24 (23.96 + (-1.72) = 22.24). 
The other had an output level of 16.51 in Stage 1 and of 27.84 in Stage 2. The other’s sum 
of output in Stage 1 and output in Stage 2 is then 44.35 (16.51 + 27.84 = 44.35). 
With the rules of Part II, payments are as follows: 
First, since your output in Stage 1 (23.96) is higher than the other’s output in Stage 1 
(16.51), a payment of 150 points is given to you. Second, since your sum of output (22.24) 
is smaller than the other’s sum of output (44.35), a payment of 150 points is given to the 
other. Your total payments are thus 150 points (150 + 0 = 150). 
Suppose you chose the same input levels as in the example for Part I. Your costs for input 
are thus 11.29 for Stage 1, and 3.64 for Stage 2. Your payoff from this period is thus 
335.07 points (150 - 11.29 - 3.64 + 200 = 335.07). 
 
Additional Instructions – Page 1/1 
150 points to participant with higher output in Stage 1 
150 points to participant with higher sum of output 
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Instructions specific to Part III 
In Part III, the payment rules after Stage I and Stage II are the following:  
x A payment of 300 points is given to the participant whose sum of output in Stage 1 and 
output in Stage 2 is higher. The participant whose sum of output in Stage 1 and output 
in Stage 2 is lower receives no payment. If both participants have the same sum of 
output in Stage 1 and output in Stage 2, the participant who receives the second 
payment is randomly chosen. 
 
This means that output in Stage 1 and output in Stage 2 both count for the payment. 
Example – Part III 
Reconsider the example from Part I. You had an output level of 23.96 in Stage 1 and of 
 -1.72 in Stage 2. The sum of your output in Stage 1 and output in Stage 2 is then  
22.24 (23.96 + (-1.72) = 22.24). 
The other had an output level of 16.51 in Stage 1 and of 27.84 in Stage 2. The other’s sum 
of output in Stage 1 and output in Stage 2 is then 44.35 (16.51 + 27.84 = 44.35). 
With the rules of Part III, payments are as follows: 
Since your sum of output (22.24) is smaller than the other’s sum of output (44.35), a 
payment of 300 points is given to the other. Your total payments are thus 0 points (0 + 0 = 
0). 
Suppose you chose the same input levels as in the example for Part I. Your costs for input 
are thus 11.29 for Stage 1, and 3.64 for Stage 2. Your payoff from this period is thus 
185.07 points (0 - 11.29 - 3.64 + 200 = 185.07). 
  
Additional Instructions (II) – Page 1/1 
300 points to participant with higher sum of output 
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Costs for input level depending on choice of input level 
input 
level 
costs for 
input level 
(in points)  
input 
level 
costs for 
input level 
(in points)  
input 
level 
costs for 
input level 
(in points)  
input 
level 
costs for 
input level 
(in points) 
0.0 0.00 
 
14.0 6.47 
 
28.0 25.87 
 
42.0 58.21 
0.5 0.01 
 
14.5 6.94 
 
28.5 26.80 
 
42.5 59.61 
1.0 0.03 
 
15.0 7.43 
 
29.0 27.75 
 
43.0 61.02 
1.5 0.07 
 
15.5 7.93 
 
29.5 28.72 
 
43.5 62.44 
2.0 0.13 
 
16.0 8.45 
 
30.0 29.70 
 
44.0 63.89 
2.5 0.21 
 
16.5 8.98 
 
30.5 30.70 
 
44.5 65.35 
3.0 0.30 
 
17.0 9.54 
 
31.0 31.71 
 
45.0 66.83 
3.5 0.40 
 
17.5 10.11 
 
31.5 32.74 
 
45.5 68.32 
4.0 0.53 
 
18.0 10.69 
 
32.0 33.79 
 
46.0 69.83 
4.5 0.67 
 
18.5 11.29 
 
32.5 34.86 
 
46.5 71.35 
5.0 0.83 
 
19.0 11.91 
 
33.0 35.94 
 
47.0 72.90 
5.5 1.00 
 
19.5 12.55 
 
33.5 37.03 
 
47.5 74.46 
6.0 1.19 
 
20.0 13.20 
 
34.0 38.15 
 
48.0 76.03 
6.5 1.39 
 
20.5 13.87 
 
34.5 39.28 
 
48.5 77.62 
7.0 1.62 
 
21.0 14.55 
 
35.0 40.43 
 
49.0 79.23 
7.5 1.86 
 
21.5 15.25 
 
35.5 41.59 
 
49.5 80.86 
8.0 2.11 
 
22.0 15.97 
 
36.0 42.77 
 
50.0 82.50 
8.5 2.38 
 
22.5 16.71 
 
36.5 43.96 
 
50.5 84.16 
9.0 2.67 
 
23.0 17.46 
 
37.0 45.18 
 
51.0 85.83 
9.5 2.98 
 
23.5 18.22 
 
37.5 46.41 
 
51.5 87.52 
10.0 3.30 
 
24.0 19.01 
 
38.0 47.65 
 
52.0 89.23 
10.5 3.64 
 
24.5 19.81 
 
38.5 48.91 
 
52.5 90.96 
11.0 3.99 
 
25.0 20.63 
 
39.0 50.19 
 
53.0 92.70 
11.5 4.36 
 
25.5 21.46 
 
39.5 51.49 
 
53.5 94.45 
12.0 4.75 
 
26.0 22.31 
 
40.0 52.80 
 
54.0 96.23 
12.5 5.16 
 
26.5 23.17 
 
40.5 54.13 
 
54.5 98.02 
13.0 5.58 
 
27.0 24.06 
 
41.0 55.47 
 
55.0 99.83 
13.5 6.01 
 
27.5 24.96 
 
41.5 56.83 
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Distribution of the random numbers 
In every stage of every period, a participant’s random number is drawn from a normal 
distribution with expected value 0 and standard deviation 28.28. 
The following graph shows the probabilities that the random number lies between two 
values (in steps of 5 units): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
How to read the graph: The horizontal bars each represent a certain range of possible 
values for the random number. On the horizontal axis, you can read the left and the right 
boundary of a range. On the vertical axis, you can read the probability that the random 
number lies within this range. 
Example: The probability that the random number lies between +5 and +10 is about 6.8%. 
This is equal to the probability that the random number lies between -10 and -5. This 
means that if you choose an input level of, say, 20, the probability that your output level 
lies between 25 and 30 is about 6.8%, and the probability that your output level lies 
between 10 and 15 is also 6.8%. 
Note that by adding up the probabilities of the four bars to the right of zero (7, 6.8, 6.4, 5.8) 
and of the four bars to the left of zero (5.8, 6.4, 6.8, 7), you learn that the probability that 
the output level is within +/- 20 units around your input level is about 52%. 
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A2.7 Control questions
This section contains the control questions that the participants had to solve at the
beginning of the experiment and before treatment BASE (here shown for session 1).
The control questions for treatments PART and GLOB were analogous to those for
BASE.
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A2.8 Computer interface
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Chapter 3
A Matter of Perspective: How
Fairness Views Depend on
Relative Income
joint with Lea Cassar
3.1 Introduction
The redistribution of income has been and will presumably remain one of the most
debated aspects of public policy in modern economies. Furthermore, many other
economic policy measures that do not aim at redistribution per se, but have redis-
tributive consequences, are subject to controversial discussions. It emerges clearly
from these debates that preferences for redistribution vary significantly between indi-
viduals. What explains this variation? As emphasized by Giuliano and Spilimbergo
(2014, p. 787), our knowledge on this issue is still very limited: “Despite the crucial
role of preferences for redistribution in explaining institutional outcomes, little em-
pirical work has been done on how these preferences are formed and how and why
they change over time”.
A well-established finding in the empirical literature is the negative relationship
between preferences for redistribution and income (Fong, 2001; Alesina & La Fer-
rara, 2005; Alesina & Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007; Alesina & Giuliano, 2011; Luttmer &
Singhal, 2011; Giuliano & Spilimbergo, 2014; Owens & Pedulla, 2014; Powdthavee
& Oswald, 2014).1 A simple explanation for this pattern is self-interest: While
1All of these papers use survey data. Kataria and Montinari (2012) and Durante et al. (2014) pro-
vide experimental evidence for a negative relationship between income and tax choices. Agranov
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high-income individuals want less redistribution to avoid high taxes, low-income
individuals want to benefit from transfers and thus support more redistribution.
In this study, we argue that self-interest might not represent the full story. Em-
pirical evidence suggests that preferences for redistribution are not only driven by
self-interest, but also by individuals’ views on what is a fair distribution of income,
henceforth fairness views (Cappelen et al., 2007; Alm˚as et al., 2010; Cappelen et al.,
2010, 2013). In our experiment, we show that relative income has a causal e ect on
these fairness views. This suggests that income a ects individuals’ preferences for
redistribution for reasons that go beyond the self-interest channel – because it also
changes their view on what is a fair income distribution.
The studies revealing a negative relationship between preferences for redistri-
bution and income cannot tell whether this is due to a causal e ect of income on
fairness views, and, therefore, whether the observed negative relationship goes be-
yond reasons of self-interest. This lack of evidence can be easily attributed to the
endogeneity of income and/or to the di culty of disentangling the e ect of fairness
views from selfish motives when eliciting preferences for redistribution from field
data.2 Experiments represent, therefore, a useful complementary tool to address
both of these issues.3
A series of experimental papers focuses on understanding the di erent types
of fairness views present in society (Frohlich et al., 2004; Cappelen et al., 2007;
Alma˚s et al., 2010; Cappelen et al., 2010, 2013; Mo¨llerstro¨m et al., 2014). These
papers, however, treat fairness views as exogenous and do not investigate how they
and Palfrey (2014) obtain an analogous result for the relationship between productivity and tax
choices.
2Even when income is exogenously generated, as in Owens and Pedulla (2014) and Powdthavee and
Oswald (2014), individuals who experience a positive income shock may report a lower preference
for redistribution because of selfish motives, i.e., to reduce the tax burden at their new position in
the income distribution, and/or because their fairness views become less egalitarian. In this latter
case, but not necessarily in the former, individuals would vote for low redistribution even when
they have no private interests at stake. This di erence in motives, however, is hardly observable
in field data.
3A related strand of literature focuses on the relationship between giving and income (Buckley &
Croson, 2006; James & Sharpe, 2007; Pi  et al., 2010; Erkal et al., 2011). While these papers
obtain mixed results, they cannot clarify the relationship between fairness views and income either.
On the one hand, this is due to the challenge of inferring fairness views from giving behavior,
for which it is necessary to have variation in the way how income di erences between givers
and receivers were generated, as well as to disentangle selfish motives from fairness motives, e.g.
through the estimation of a structural model as introduced by Cappelen et al. (2007). The papers
focusing on the relationship between income and giving satisfy neither of these two requirements.
Note, however, that the results of Erkal et al. (2011), who find in their experiment that high-
income individuals give less than low-income individuals, at least suggest that fairness views of the
participants di er across incomes. A further reason why the studies on the relationship between
income and giving cannot clarify a causal e ect of income on fairness views is the endogeneity of
income in these studies. However, in the experiment of Buckley and Croson (2006) and in one
treatment of Erkal et al. (2011), income is exogenous, but has no e ect on giving.
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are formed or why they may vary among individuals. The determinants of these
fairness views, and in particular the potential role of income, remain, therefore,
largely unknown.4,5
This study reports the results from a laboratory experiment that was designed
to investigate (1) if individuals’ relative income a ects their fairness views and (2)
whether this e ect depends on how the income is generated. The experiment con-
sisted of an income generation phase and a distribution phase. In the income gen-
eration phase, participants received a high or a low income either through luck or
through an e ort-based tournament. In the distribution phase, we asked a subset
of subjects to make distributive decisions over the incomes of two other pairs of
subjects – one pair in which income di erences were due to luck, and one in which
income di erences were due to e ort. Thus, in contrast to previous studies, the
distributors in our experiment were neither stakeholders, as they had no monetary
stakes when making the decisions, nor were they impartial spectators, as they had
participated in the income generation phase. This novel design enabled us to test
how the distributors’ outcomes in the income generation phase – not only the rela-
tive income but also whether the latter was generated by luck or by e ort – a ected
their fairness views. Furthermore, we elicited fairness views about the distribution
of income from luck and about the distribution of income from e ort.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that low-income individ-
uals redistribute significantly more than high-income individuals when the source
of income di erences is the same as the one they experienced themselves. That
is, when inequalities are due to luck (e ort), an individual who received a low in-
come by lack of luck (e ort) redistributes significantly more than an individual who
received a high income by luck (e ort). The e ect remains unchanged when con-
trolling for individual performance in the e ort-based tournament, suggesting that
self-selection into di erent income levels does not drive the results. We thus con-
clude that relative income, and how the latter is generated, has a causal e ect on
individuals’ fairness views, and therefore, on preferences for redistribution beyond
the self-interest channel.
Second, subjects’ responses in a post-experimental questionnaire suggest that
the e ect of income on redistributive choices comes along with a consistent shift in
beliefs about the degree of individuals’ responsibility for a specific outcome. More
4Other studies try to investigate whether fairness principles may be chosen in an opportunistic way,
i.e., to maximize one’s own monetary payo  (Rodriguez-Lara & Moreno-Garrido, 2012; Ubeda,
2014; Tokumaru, 2014). In a related study, Becchetti et al. (2011) analyze how the choice of a
distribution criterion depends on the knowledge of one’s position in the income distribution. In our
experiment, however, since participants had no monetary stakes when making their redistributive
decisions, such opportunistic behavior was ruled out by design.
5Barr et al. (2012) relate the participants’ social status to their behavior in a dictator game. They
find that high-status individuals tend to acknowledge entitlement owing to e ort more than low-
status individuals. They cannot, however, show that this is due to a causal e ect of social status,
as they cannot control for self-selection.
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specifically, individuals who received a high income by e ort (luck) attribute out-
comes in the tournament (lottery) more to internal factors (i.e., factors under their
control) compared to individuals who received a low income by lack of e ort (luck).
One interpretation of these findings is that the e ect of relative income on fairness
views results from a change of beliefs about one’s responsibility over an outcome.
This belief follows a self-serving bias in responsibility attribution, that is, it takes
credit for personal successes and denies responsibility for failures (Miller & Ross,
1975; Bradley, 1978).
This study provides two main contributions to the literature. First of all, we
enrich the literature on the determinants of preferences for redistribution. We show
that relative income a ects preferences for redistribution through its e ect on views
about what is a fair distribution of income. Second, we contribute to the growing
literature on fairness views. We show that people’s fairness views are not fixed,
but endogenous to the process of income generation, as they depend on people’s
relative income. Furthermore, our results on the self-serving bias in responsibility
attribution emphasize the importance of beliefs for fairness views.
The study also has important implications for our understanding of how soci-
eties think about redistribution. Our results suggest that personal income changes
individuals’ views about a fair distribution of income in society. This implies that
the conflict between rich and poor in the debate about redistribution is not only a
battle of personal interests, but also of di erent ideologies. This di erence in ideolo-
gies is such that it increases the discrepancy in preferences for redistribution that is
already caused by selfish motives. This means that there will be disagreement be-
tween rich and poor about income redistribution even if people are able to abstract
from their own personal stake in this redistribution. Our results further imply that
the di erences in ideologies between rich and poor are, at least to some degree, the
result of di erent individual outcomes in the process of income generation. As a
consequence, an increase in income inequality is likely to boost the polarization in
political preferences, making it harder for societies to reach a consensus about the
optimal level of redistribution in the long run.
In the following, we describe the design, experimental procedures and identifi-
cation strategies in greater detail (Section 3.2), present the results (Section 3.3),
discuss potential channels underlying the e ects (Section 3.4), and conclude (Sec-
tion 3.5).
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3.2 The experiment
3.2.1 Design
The experiment consisted of two phases: An income generation phase and a distribu-
tion phase. At the beginning of the experiment, we instructed the participants only
about the income generation phase, while telling them that the second phase would
concern the distribution of the incomes generated in the first phase. After the in-
come generation phase had been completed, we explained details of the distribution
phase. We describe the two phases below.
3.2.1.1 Income generation phase
At the beginning of the income generation phase, the participants were randomly
paired. Next, they executed a real e ort task. We used a variant of the slider task
introduced by Gill and Prowse (2012). This computerized task consists of a screen
containing 48 sliders, which are initially positioned at zero and can be moved as far
as 100 using the mouse cursor (see instructions on page 141).6 The goal is to set
as many sliders as possible to exactly fifty within 120 seconds. In our experiment,
we confronted the participants with a series of five of these screens, each for 120
seconds. The total number of sliders adjusted to exactly fifty in the five screens
represented the participants’ e ort in the task. Before the sequence of five screens
started, the participants had 60 seconds to practice the task. After the time was
up, the participants saw their e ort on the computer screen.
After all participants had completed the task and had seen their e ort, every
pair of participants was randomly assigned to one of two treatments – a lottery
treatment and a tournament treatment. More specifically, half of the pairs within a
session was assigned to the tournament treatment, while the other half was assigned
to the lottery treatment.
Each treatment implied a di erent income generation process in assigning a high
and a low income within a pair. In the tournament treatment, a high income was
assigned to the participant in the pair with higher e ort in the task, and a low
income to the other participant. In the lottery treatment, the two incomes were
randomly assigned within the pair. The income levels were constant across both
treatments. We paid 25 Swiss Francs (CHF) as high income and CHF 5 as low
income.7 At the end of the income generation phase, the participants observed their
own income, the income of the participant they were paired with, and the process
that had generated the incomes within their pair. They did, however, not observe
the e orts of the other participants in the tournament.
6We deactivated the mouse wheels and keyboards by software, so that the participants could only
use the mouse cursor to manipulate the sliders.
7At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate was CHF 1.22 per e and CHF 0.89 per US$.
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The income generation phase thus produced four types of participants (see Ta-
ble 3.1): Those with high income from the lottery (HiLot), those with low income
from the lottery (LoLot), those with high income from the tournament (HiTour),
and those with low income from the tournament (LoTour).
Table 3.1: Types in the income generation phase
Lottery Tournament
High income (CHF 25) HiLot HiTour
Low income (CHF 5) LoLot LoTour
3.2.1.2 Distribution phase
In the subsequent distribution phase, each pair was randomly assigned to one of two
roles – distributors, who kept their income from the first phase, and non-distributors,
whose incomes were subject to redistribution by the distributors. Per session, there
were two pairs of non-distributors – one from those pairs whose incomes had been
generated through the lottery, and one from those pairs whose incomes had been
generated through the tournament.
In the next step, the distributors were asked to distribute the total income that
was earned within each non-distributor pair between both members of that pair.
This means that every distributor made two distributive decisions: One for the pair
from the lottery treatment, and one for the pair from the tournament treatment.8
The order of presentation was random, but it was always made very clear for which
pair the decision was currently made. Before confirming the redistributive choices,
the distributors had the possibility to go back and change the choices for both pairs
if they wanted to. The decisions were such that for each pair, the distributors
had to enter how much of the total income (CHF 30) should be distributed to the
participant who had earned CHF 25, and how much of it should be distributed to the
one who had earned CHF 5. The amounts given to both participants had to sum up
to CHF 30 and were entered in multiples of CHF 0.5.9 At the end of the distribution
phase, the decisions of one distributor were randomly chosen and applied to the non-
distributor pairs. As final payo , the distributors received their income from the
first phase, while the non-distributors received what had been distributed to them
by the randomly chosen distributor.
8While this may generate a demand e ect on how to distribute income from di erent sources, this
does not generate a demand e ect for the main question addressed in this study, namely, if there
is any di erence in distributive decisions between individuals with di erent relative income.
9See instructions on page 145 and page 146 for screenshots of the computer interface.
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3.2.2 Procedural details
In total, 262 subjects participated in the experiment. We conducted 8 sessions with
32 to 34 participants each. The experiment lasted about an hour. It took place at the
computer lab of the University of Zurich, Switzerland, in March and April 2014. We
recruited our participants from local university students, excluding economics and
psychology majors.10 To program and conduct the experiment, we used the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The instructions used neutral language, avoiding terms
like “tournament”, “winner”, or “distributor”.11 We kept the participants’ identity
and their decisions anonymous throughout the experiment. The average payo  was
CHF 25 (ca. US$ 28), including a participation fee of CHF 10 (ca. US$ 11). We
paid all payo s individually and in private immediately after the experiment.
3.2.3 Identification strategy
We use the distributors’ decisions in the distribution phase to infer their views on
what is a fair distribution of income – both for situations in which income di erences
are due to luck (the lottery treatment) and for situations in which income di erences
are due to e ort (the tournament treatment).12
We believe that the distributive decisions identify the participants’ fairness views
for the following reasons: First, since the distributors’ incomes were una ected by
their own distributive decision, there was no self-interest involved in the redistri-
bution. Second, as the instructions made very clear that the distributors’ incomes
were not subject to any decisions by the non-distributors, the distributors had no
reason to make accommodating distributive decisions in order to induce recipro-
cal behavior on the side of the non-distributors. Third, there was no reason for
strategic decisions, since a distributor’s decision would either be discarded or fully
implemented. Fourth, distributive decisions were made only after the incomes had
been generated. Furthermore, details about the distribution phase were unknown
in the income generation phase. Therefore, distributive decisions had no incentive
e ects in the first stage.13
The variation of the distributors’ income in the first phase allows us to identify
the e ect of relative income on their fairness views. First, we compare the distribu-
10The recruitment was conducted with the software hroot (Bock et al., 2012).
11The instructions are contained in Appendix A3.2.
12Clearly, the outcome of the tournament also depends on luck. Potential random factors are
ability to handle the mouse, physical and mental state at the day of the experiment, and, most
importantly, the performance of the opponent. This is, however, realistic in that there is no
real-world income generation process which depends solely on e ort. We therefore believe that
it is still reasonable to interpret income from the tournament as income acquired through e ort.
13We cannot rule out that subjects who are not motivated by any fairness consideration made their
distributive choices at random. However, this only adds noise to the data and thus, if anything,
makes it harder to find any e ect.
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tive decisions of those with high income from the lottery (HiLot) and those with low
income from the lottery (LoLot). Since the selection of participants into both types
was random, this gives us the causal e ect of relative income from luck. Second, to
obtain the e ect of relative income from e ort, we compare the decisions of those
with high income from the tournament (HiTour) and those with low income from
the tournament (LoTour). In this comparison, however, we need to control for self-
selection. This is because more competitive or able individuals, who are more likely
to end up with high income from the tournament by exerting systematically higher
e ort, may have di erent fairness views than others. As a consequence, di erences
in fairness views between HiTour and LoTour could simply result from a higher
share of competitive or more able individuals among type HiTour. We control for
self-selection by exploiting the random variation in income between individuals with
similar e ort in the tournament. Indeed, among individuals with similar e ort, some
were randomly matched with a participant with lower e ort than theirs and thus
received a high income, while others were randomly matched with a participant with
higher e ort than theirs and thus received a low income. The causal e ect of income
from e ort can be identified through the randomness of this matching.14 Further
details about our strategy to control for selection will be given below.
Table 3.2: Identification strategy
Comparison E ect
HiLot vs. LoLot income from luck
HiTour vs. LoTour income from e ort
HiLot vs. HiTour income generation for high income
LoLot vs. LoTour income generation for low income
By keeping the distributors’ income levels constant and varying the process that
generated their income, we test whether there is an e ect of the source of income
on people’s fairness views. This means that we separately compare the distributive
decisions of those with high income (HiLot and HiTour) and of those with low income
(LoLot and LoTour). While the selection into both income generation processes was
random, there has still been a self-selection of individuals into both types from the
tournament (HiTour and LoTour). Therefore, we also control for selection in the
latter two comparisons. A design feature that facilitates this is the fact that all
participants, before being allocated to the treatments, were required to complete
the e ort task. While this feature probably increased the discrepancy between the
experimental and the natural environment, it did not only allow us to control for
selection, but also avoided that individuals who were in the tournament treatment
14Note that if there were no randomness involved in the generation of income from e ort, it would
not be possible to identify any causal e ect.
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had an informational advantage about the experience of solving the task. The latter
could have led to di erent redistributive choices compared to individuals in the
lottery treatment.15 Table 3.2 summarizes our identification strategy.
3.3 Results
First of all, we confirm the well-established result that inequalities which are due to
e ort tend to be accepted more than inequalities which are due to luck (Cappelen
et al., 2007; Alma˚s et al., 2010; Cappelen et al., 2010; Krawczyk, 2010; Rustichini
& Vostroknutov, 2014; Kataria & Montinari, 2012; Vostroknutov et al., 2012; Cap-
pelen et al., 2013; Durante et al., 2014).16 As Figure 3.1 shows, the average amount
distributed to the individual with low income from the tournament (LoTour) is
approximately 40 percent lower (signed-rank p=0.00) than the average amount dis-
tributed to the participant with low income from the lottery (LoLot). Thus, we
can be confident that the distributive situations induced in our experiment are com-
parable to those in earlier studies, and that even though the distributors did not
have any material interest at stake, their fairness motives were strong enough to
incentivize their redistributive choices.
We now focus on the di erences in distributive decisions between types. Out of
our 230 distributors, we observe 59 of type HiLot and 59 of type LoLot, as well as
56 of type HiTour and 56 of type LoTour. Figure 3.2 shows the distributive decision
of all four types for the pair from the lottery (left panel) and for the pair from the
tournament (right panel).
15It is important to mention, however, that we cannot fully rule out informational asymmetries
between participants in di erent treatments. More specifically, in the tournament treatment par-
ticipants could infer from their income whether the e ort of the participant they were matched
with was higher or lower than theirs. Therefore, compared to individuals in the lottery treat-
ment, individuals in the tournament treatment had an informational advantage through their
performance in the task relative to others. It is not clear, however, how this might a ect the com-
parison we are interested in. On the other hand, the alternative – also informing the participants
in the lottery treatment about how their performance in the task compared to the performance
of the participant they were matched with – bears the risk of mitigating the treatment e ect:
Lottery winners may not feel as a winners anymore if they knew with certainty that they would
have won the tournament anyway.
16Consistent with these experimental findings are the results of Fong (2001), Bullock et al. (2003),
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007), Isaksson and Lindskog
(2009) and Alesina and Giuliano (2011). Using survey data, they show that preferences for
redistribution are increasing in the individuals’ belief to which degree economic outcomes are the
result of luck rather than of e ort. They show that preferences for redistribution are decreasing
in the individuals’ level of subjective freedom.
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Figure 3.1: Decisions for both distributive situations. Heights of bars and values
at bottom of bars correspond to means of amount (in CHF) distributed to the
participant with low income. Lengths of whiskers at top of bars are equal to standard
errors of the means.
3.3.1 Relative income from luck
We first analyze the e ect of relative income from luck. On average, HiLot dis-
tributes about CHF 2.5 or 13 percent less to the non-distributor of type LoLot than
LoLot does (rank-sum p=0.01). Surprisingly, LoLot distributes even significantly
more than half of the total income that was earned in the pair to LoLot, which
essentially reverses the inequality in this pair (CHF 18.5, signed-rank p=0.00).17
This result, which could be interpreted as in-group bias or spite towards lottery
winners on the side of the lottery losers, is consistent with previous evidence.18 On
the contrary, we find no di erence in how much HiLot and LoLot distribute to the
non-distributor of type LoTour (rank-sum p=0.63).19 We conclude:
Result 3.1. We find a causal e ect of relative income from luck on fairness views.
The e ect is such that individuals with low income from (lack of) luck redistribute
significantly more than individuals with high income from luck when inequalities are
due to luck.
17The amount distributed to LoLot by HiLot is not significantly higher than half of the total
income (signed-rank p=0.16).
18Rustichini and Vostroknutov (2014) find in a di erent experimental setting that individuals are
willing to reduce the lottery winnings of others at a cost to themselves.
19See Figure A3.1 for histograms of the distributive decisions of HiLot and LoLot for the pair from
the lottery.
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Figure 3.2: Distributive decisions of the four types. Heights of bars and values
at bottom of bars correspond to means of amount (in CHF) distributed to the
participant with low income. Lengths of whiskers at top of bars are equal to standard
errors of the means.
3.3.2 Relative income from e ort
Next, we consider the e ect of relative income from e ort by comparing the dis-
tributive decisions of HiTour and LoTour. There is no di erence in how much both
distribute to the non-distributor of type LoLot (rank-sum p=0.43). However, Hi-
Tour distributes about CHF 5 or 40% less to the non-distributor of type LoTour
than LoTour does.20 This di erence is significant (rank-sum p=0.00), but, as argued
above, may be due to selection e ects.
In order to control for potential selection, we regress the amount in CHF dis-
tributed to the participant with low income from the tournament on a dummy
variable for HiTour, and various controls for the distributors’ e ort in the income
generation phase. We use linear and quadratic specifications, as well as fixed e ects
for e ort bins of di erent sizes. An e ort bin of size x means that we split the range
of observed e ort levels (0 to 169) into intervals of size x, and allow for a common
fixed e ect among all distributors whose e ort levels are in the same interval. This
keeps the distributors’ e ort level constant, so that the dummy variable captures
only the variation that is caused by switching from low income to high income.
This variation is purely exogenous: If the distributors’ e ort is fixed, whether they
received high income in the tournament depends on the random event of whether
they had been matched with a partner who had a lower e ort than themselves. As a
20See Figure A3.2 for histograms of the distributive decisions of HiTour and LoTour for the pair
from the tournament.
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result, the coe cient of the dummy variable is an unbiased estimate of the e ect of
income from e ort, while the coe cients of the various controls measure the selec-
tion e ect. Note that an alternative interpretation of the coe cient of the dummy
variable is that it measures the e ect of luck that made e ort pay o .
Table 3.3: E ect of income from e ort on CHF distributed to LoTour
Control for e ort None Linear Quadratic FE(10) FE(5) FE(2.5)
Constant 13.78*** 16.16*** 18.33*** 15.00** 15.00** 15.00**
(0.93) (2.60) (4.27) (7.03) (7.09) (7.28)
HiTour -5.34*** -4.50*** -4.72*** -3.92** -3.69* -4.05*
(1.31) (1.57) (1.61) (1.76) (1.91) (2.13)
F-test contr. (p) 0.330 0.506 0.677 0.725 0.844
N 112 112 112 112 112 112
R2 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.22 0.29 0.38
Adj. R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.03
Ordinary least squares regressions. Dependent variable: CHF distributed to LoTour. Sample:
HiTour and LoTour. FE(x) means fixed e ects for e ort bins of size x. úúúp < 0.01, úúp < 0.05,
úp < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.3 shows the regression results. They suggest that the di erence in dis-
tributive decisions between HiTour and LoTour is not caused by selection, but by
realized income itself. In fact, the estimate of the coe cient of the dummy variable
is always negative and at least marginally significant. Furthermore, we can never
reject the joint hypothesis that the coe cients of the controls are all zero (see row
“F-test contr. (p)” in Table 3.3), suggesting that e ort, and thus selection, has no
predictive power. We believe that a bin size of 2.5 is su cient to control for selection.
Otherwise, one would have to argue that distributors whose e ort levels di er by
2.5 or less units both exhibit a systematically di erent probability of receiving high
income and di er significantly in their fairness views – a case that is unlikely.21,22
Hence, we obtain:
Result 3.2. We find a causal e ect of relative income from e ort on fairness views.
The e ect is such that individuals with high income from e ort are less averse to
inequalities that are due to e ort than individuals with low income from (lack of)
21With a bin size of 5 or 2.5, the coe cient of the dummy variable is only marginally significant.
Note that there is a tradeo  when decreasing the bin size further: While the control of the
selection e ect improves, the variation in the dummy variable decreases, because there are fewer
distributors with di erent income levels per bin. Hence, an explanation for the lower significance
with a bin size smaller than 10 is the limited sample size.
22Note that the amount distributed to HiLot is restricted to the interval [0, 30]. When using a
Tobit model rather than ordinary least squares to take this censoring into account, the estimate
of the coe cient of the dummy variable is always significant.
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e ort. The e ect is entirely driven by the luck that made the e ort of high-income
individuals pay o .23
3.3.3 Income generation
We now investigate whether, keeping the amount of income constant, the source
of this income has an e ect on fairness views. When comparing the decisions of
distributors with high income (HiLot and HiTour), we find no di erence in how
much both distribute to LoLot and to LoTour (ranks-sum p=0.58 and p=0.45),
suggesting that there are no di erences in distributive decisions between income
generation processes for high income. However, when we compare the decisions of
distributors with low income (LoLot and LoTour), the picture is di erent. On the
one hand, LoLot distributes more to non-distributors of type LoLot than LoTour
does. This di erence is close to being marginally significant (rank-sum p=0.10).24
On the other hand, LoTour distributes significantly more to non-distributors of
type LoTour than LoLot does (rank-sum p=0.01). To control for selection, we
proceed analogously as for the e ect of income from e ort and regress the amounts
distributed to each participant on a dummy for LoTour, as well as on various controls
for e ort. Table A3.1 and Table A3.2 show the results. The estimates for the
coe cients of the dummy variable are at least marginally significant with linear and
quadratic controls for e ort.25 We conclude:
Result 3.3. There is a causal e ect of the income generation process on the fairness
views of low-income individuals, as the latter become more averse against the sources
of inequalities that made themselves poor. There is no evidence for an e ect of the
income generation process on the fairness views of high-income individuals.
3.4 Channel
Di erent explanations, not necessarily mutually exclusive, can account for the ob-
served variation in the redistributive decisions, and thus in the fairness views, of
the four types of distributors. One explanation for the results is a self-serving
bias in attribution of responsibility. Earlier research has demonstrated that people
take credit for personal successes and deny responsibility for failures (Miller & Ross,
23This contrasts with Erkal et al. (2011), who attribute their finding of a negative relationship
between giving and income primarily to self-selection.
24When using a t-test, we obtain marginal significance of the di erence (p=0.05).
25When using the Tobit model, we also obtain a marginally significant estimate when using fixed
e ects for e ort bins of size 10.
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Figure 3.3: Beliefs about income generation processes. Heights of bars and values
at bottom of bars correspond to means of belief about luck dependence of the process.
Lengths of whiskers at top of bars are equal to standard errors of the means.
1975; Bradley, 1978). More specifically, successful individuals tend to attribute their
outcome to circumstances under their control (so-called internal factors), whereas
unsuccessful individuals tend to attribute their outcome to circumstances not under
their control (so-called external factors). For our experiment, this would predict
that high-income individuals from the tournament (HiTour) tend to attribute the
outcome of the tournament more to internal factors than low-income individuals
from the tournament (LoTour). Analogous predictions would hold for high-income
and low-income individuals from the lottery (HiLot and LoLot).26 Given the well-
established result that individuals favor a more equal distribution of income when
the latter is due to luck – an external factor – rather than e ort or choice – which are
internal factors – (see discussion in Section 3.3), this would explain our observations
for redistributive behavior: If distributors of type HiTour attribute the outcome of
the tournament less to external factors than LoTour, they would redistribute less
than LoTour in the pair of non-distributors whose incomes were generated in the
tournament. A similar argument would hold for the distributors of type HiLot and
LoLot.
We test this hypothesis of self-serving bias by analyzing the participants’ re-
sponses to a survey conducted at the end of the experiment. Participants were
26It might seem absurd at first why anyone would believe that internal factors play a role in
the lottery – whose outcome is random. However, certain philosophies such as Buddism view
an individual’s fortune as the result of past actions. Hence, it is at least possible that some
high-income individuals from the lottery attribute their success to such internal factors. This
perspective would deny pure randomness of the lottery.
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asked to state, on a scale from 1 to 10, to what extent they thought that the out-
come in the tournament treatment was due to e ort rather than to luck, where “1”
represented “all due to e ort” and “10” represented “all due to luck”. Similarly, the
participants were asked to choose, from 1 to 10, to what extent they thought that
the outcome in the lottery treatment was due to “individual attributes (e.g. karma,
religiousness)” rather than to luck, where “1” represented “all due to individuals
attributes” and “10” represented “all due to luck”.27
Figure 3.3 shows the average beliefs of all four types of distributors regarding
the lottery (left panel) and the tournament (right panel).
Consistent with the self-serving bias hypothesis, we find that HiTour distributors
believe significantly less (rank-sum p=0.00) in the luck dependence of the tourna-
ment than LoTour distributors do. This result does not change when controlling
for self-selection (see Table A3.3).28 Similarly, although to a smaller extent, HiLot
distributors believe significantly less (rank-sum p=0.00) in the luck dependence of
the lottery than LoLot distributors do.29 While the latter might seem surprising,
as individuals cannot be responsible for the outcome of a lottery, this is consistent
with previous evidence by Gurdal et al. (2013), which shows that principals blame
agents for the outcome of a lottery regardless of the agents’ choices. We obtain:30
Result 3.4. High-income individuals believe less in the luck dependence of their
outcomes compared to low-income individuals.
Thus, Result 3.4 identifies a self-serving bias on responsibility attribution as a
potential channel of the e ect of relative income and of its generation process on
individuals’ fairness views.
Note that another explanation for the variation in the redistributive decisions is
a direct in-group bias: Be nicer to those who are similar to yourself. If individuals
with the same relative income and the same process of income generation develop
a group-identity feeling, this may explain why, on average, non-distributors receive
more from a distributor of their own type than from a distributor of a competing
type.31 This applies in particular to low-income individuals from lack of luck, who
redistribute significantly more than half to low-income individuals from the lottery.
27We always asked the question about the outcome of the tournament treatment first.
28HiTour and LoTour also di er in their belief regarding the lottery (rank-sum p=0.02).
29For histograms of the beliefs, see Figure A3.3 and Figure A3.4.
30Similar results follow when comparing beliefs between individuals with the same income, but
di erent income generation process. LoTour believes significantly more in the luck dependence
of the tournament than LoLot (rank-sum p=0.00), and vice-versa (rank-sum p=0.01). HiLot
attributes outcomes from the lottery significantly more to internal factors than HiTour (rank-
sum p=0.00). The reverse, however, is not true (rank-sum p=0.56).
31On average, HiLot receives CHF 14.0 from HiLot, but only CHF 11.5 from LoLot. Similarly,
LoLot receives CHF 18.5 from LoLot, but only CHF 16.0 from HiLot. Analogous comparisons
hold for HiTour and LoTour: HiTour receives CHF 21.6 from HiTour, but only CHF 16.2 from
LoTour. LoTour receives 13.8 from LoTour, but only 8.4 from LoLot.
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Previous evidence on redistributive choices has indeed shown the e ect of in-group
favoritism based on race (Luttmer, 2001), on age and gender (Cardenas & Sethi,
2010), on risk-taking choices (Costard & Bolle, 2011), and on field of studies (Klor
& Shayo, 2010). In our experiment, distributors had only information about the
individuals’ relative income and the process that generated that income. Therefore,
these were the only characteristics that may have generated a group-identity feeling.
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that a pure in-group bias is also playing a role in
the redistributive decisions (especially for low-income individuals from the lottery)
besides the self-serving bias on responsibility attribution, as both channels cannot
be distinguished in our data.32
Finally, we would like to point out a further implication of Result 3.4: It suggests
that the individuals’ experience in terms of their economic outcomes a ects their
beliefs about how these outcomes have come about. This aligns well with previous
papers that emphasize an e ect of past experience, such as communism (Alesina &
Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007) and recessions (Giuliano & Spilimbergo, 2014), on beliefs.33
We add to this literature by showing that idiosyncratic events, not only phenomena
a ecting the society as a whole, play a role in the formation of beliefs about in-
equality, too. Furthermore, our findings suggest a substantial degree of subjectivity
in these beliefs: Even when the luck dependence of an income generation process in
known and fixed (as in the lottery), there are individuals whose beliefs deviate from
this objective truth (HiLot).
3.5 Conclusion
In this experiment, we vary the participants’ income and the way their income is
generated. We then elicit their fairness views through their redistributive decisions
over other participants’ incomes. We find a causal e ect of relative income on fairness
views. This e ect is such that in comparison to high-income individuals, low-income
individuals redistribute significantly more when the source of inequalities is the same
as the one that made themselves poor. We then argue that an explanation for this
result is a self-serving bias on responsibility attribution, which is supported by our
data: Compared to low-income individuals, high-income individuals tend to believe
more that their outcome is the result of internal rather than external factors.
Our results suggest that personal income changes individuals’ views about a fair
distribution of income in society. More specifically, we show that personal income
32When regressing the amount distributed to LoTour on a dummy variable for HiTour and beliefs
for the tournament, both variables have explanatory power for the distributive decisions. This
suggests that income a ects distributive choices not only through a change of beliefs. Therefore,
self-serving biases in the beliefs may not the be the only relevant channel.
33Theoretical papers focusing on belief formation and how it a ects redistributive policies are
Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2006).
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may increase the acceptance of income di erences. This would create conflicting
ideologies between rich and poor and increase the discrepancy in preferences for
redistribution beyond what is already caused by selfish motives. As a consequence,
rising income inequality, by increasing the polarization in political preferences, is
likely to make it even harder for societies to reach a consensus about redistribution
in the long run.
One should, however, always be cautious when generalizing from the results of a
particular study. Note that what we identify is essentially an e ect of relative income
made in an experiment on individuals’ views about what is a fair distribution of
income from that experiment. Of course, the fair distribution of income in society is
a much more fundamental question than that of a fair distribution of experimental
income. Furthermore, the experiment was designed to test the validity of some
hypotheses in isolation, namely, in the absence of additional features that may play
a role in a natural environment. For instance, in the field, individuals do not actually
make direct redistributive decisions over other people’s incomes, but use their voting
right to influence redistribution. Furthermore, their voting decisions often a ect
their personal income in addition to the income of others. While new treatments
can always be run to study the role of each of these environmental features, it is
precisely the absence of these features in our experiment that allowed us to rule
out selfish motives and strategic behavior and, thus, to identify the causal e ect of
relative income on individuals’ fairness views. These fairness views have been shown
to be a significant determinant of preferences for redistribution in the laboratory and
in the field. Therefore, we believe that our study, by increasing our understanding
of how these fairness views may be formed, leaves a message that is relevant for
future theoretical and empirical studies on distributive justice: Fairness views about
income distribution should not be treated as exogenous, as they are likely to depend
on individuals’ relative income.
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Appendix
A3.1 Tables and figures
Table A3.1: E ect of income generation on CHF distributed to LoLot
Control for e ort None Linear Quadratic FE (10) FE(5) FE(2.5)
Constant 18.50*** 20.86*** 23.22*** 16.93*** 17.51*** 17.21***
(0.75) (2.05) (3.03) (5.74) (5.83) (5.76)
LoTour -2.09* -2.44** -2.19* -1.93 -2.51* -2.21*
(1.07) (1.11) (1.13) (1.17) (1.27) (1.30)
F-test contr. (p) 0.218 0.270 0.206 0.397 0.318
N 115 115 115 115 115 115
R2 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.19 0.28 0.40
Adj. R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07
Ordinary least squares regressions. Dependent variable: CHF distributed to LoLot. Sample: LoLot
and LoTour. FE(x) means fixed e ects for e ort bins of size x. úúúp < 0.01, úúp < 0.05, úp < 0.1.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table A3.2: E ect of income generation on CHF distributed to LoTour
Control for e ort None Linear Quadratic FE(10) FE(5) FE(2.5)
Constant 9.87*** 15.50*** 16.13*** 12.31 13.31* 12.86
(0.99) (2.66) (3.96) (7.62) (7.73) (7.78)
LoTour 3.90*** 3.06** 3.13** 2.69* 1.69 2.14
(1.41) (1.44) (1.48) (1.55) (1.68) (1.76)
F-test contr. (p) 0.025 0.080 0.258 0.438 0.496
N 115 115 115 115 115 115
R2 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.21 0.29 0.39
Adj. R2 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05
Ordinary least squares regressions. Dependent variable: CHF distributed to LoTour. Sample:
LoLot and LoTour. FE(x) means fixed e ects for e ort bins of size x. úúúp < 0.01, úúp < 0.05,
úp < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A3.3: E ect of income from e ort on belief about tournament
Control for e ort None Linear Quadratic FE(10) FE(5) FE(2.5)
Constant 4.46*** 4.48*** 5.68*** 7.00*** 7.00*** 7.00***
(0.27) (0.77) (1.25) (1.96) (1.94) (1.97)
HiTour -1.45*** -1.44*** -1.56*** -1.41*** -1.48*** -1.38**
(0.38) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49) (0.52) (0.58)
F-test contr. (p) 0.980 0.484 0.092 0.102 0.279
N 112 112 112 112 112 112
R2 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.28 0.37 0.46
Adj. R2 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.17 0.19 0.16
Ordinary least squares regressions. Dependent variable: Belief about luck dependence of tourna-
ment. Sample: HiTour and LoTour. FE(x) means fixed e ects for e ort bins of size x. úúúp < 0.01,
úúp < 0.05, úp < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure A3.1: Histograms of distributive decisions of HiLot and LoLot for pair
from lottery
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Figure A3.2: Histograms of distributive decisions of HiTour and LoTour for pair
from tournament
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Figure A3.3: Histograms of beliefs of HiTour and LoTour for tournament
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Figure A3.4: Histograms of beliefs of HiLot and LoLot for lottery
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A3.2 Instructions
 
1 
 
General Instructions 
Introduction 
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. During the next 60 minutes, you 
will make decisions that determine your earnings and the earnings of other participants. You 
will also receive a fixed participation fee of CHF 10. Upon completion of the experiment, 
you will be paid all of your earnings and the participation fee, individually and in private. 
Anonymity 
All of your interactions with other participants are completely anonymous. You will never 
learn the identity of the participants with whom you interact. They will also never learn your 
identity. You will not know which choices were made by a specific participant and no other 
participant will know which choices were made by you. 
Rules of Conduct 
During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants, exclaim, 
use personal electronic devices, or use the computer in a way not specified by the 
experimenter. If you are not following these rules, you may be excluded from the experiment  
Phases 
In this experiment, there are two phases. We will now describe Phase 1. Details about Phase 2 
will be provided after Phase 1 is completed. 
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Instructions for Phase 1 
Pairs 
At the beginning of Phase 1, you will be randomly paired with another participant. In the 
following, we will refer to the participant you are paired with as “your paired participant.” 
Task 
At the beginning of Phase 1, all participants will individually complete a task. The task will 
consist of a sequence of 5 screens with 48 sliders each (see picture of the computer screen 
below). 
 
Each slider is initially positioned at 0 and can be moved as far as 100. Each slider has a 
number to its right showing its current position. You can use the mouse in any way you like to 
move each slider. You can readjust the position of each slider as many times as you wish. 
Your goal is to position as many sliders as possible at exactly 50. For each screen, you 
have 120 seconds to position all the sliders. After the 120 seconds are over, a new screen will 
appear. In total, 5 screens will be presented to you. The total number of sliders positioned at 
exactly 50 in the 5 screens represents your score in the task. 
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Earnings generation 
After all participants have completed the task, the computer will randomly assign your pair, 
namely you and your paired participant, to one out of two earning rules. Each pair is equally 
likely to be assigned to each of the two earning rules. The earning rule to which your pair is 
assigned will then determine your earnings and the earnings of your paired participant. The 
two rules are the following: 
1) SCORE RULE 
If your pair is randomly assigned to the Score Rule, the participant in your pair who achieved 
a higher score in the task receives earnings of CHF 25, and the participant who achieved a 
lower score in the task receives earnings of CHF 5. Thus, two cases are possible, depending 
on your score and the score of the other: 
x Case 1: If your score in the task is higher than the score of your paired participant: 
Your earnings are CHF 25 
The earnings of your paired participant are CHF 5 
x Case 2: If your score in the task is lower than the score of your paired participant:  
Your earnings are CHF 5 
The earnings of your paired participant are CHF 25 
x In the case that your score and the score of your paired participant are equal, the 
computer will randomly determine who receives earnings of CHF 25 and who receives 
earnings of CHF 5.  
2) LOTTERY RULE 
If your pair is randomly assigned to the Lottery Rule, the computer will randomly determine 
who receives earnings of CHF 25 and who receives earnings of CHF 5. Thus, two cases are 
possible. Both cases are equally likely. 
x Case 1 (probability 50%) 
Your earnings are CHF 25 
The earnings of your paired participant are CHF 5 
x Case 2 (probability 50%) 
Your earnings are CHF 5 
The earnings of your paired participant are CHF 25 
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Therefore, if your pair is randomly assigned to the Lottery Rule, your score in the task has 
no effect on your earnings or on the earnings of your paired participant in Phase 1. 
Remember that which of the two rules will generate the earnings in your pair will be 
randomly determined after the task has been completed. More specifically, the computer will 
randomly assign half of the pairs in the experiment to the Score Rule and half of the pairs in 
the experiment to the Lottery Rule. In case of an uneven number of pairs, the remaining pair 
will be randomly assigned either to the Score Rule or to the Lottery Rule.  
Practice round 
Before you complete the actual task, all participants will be asked to practice the task for a 
period of 60 seconds. The screen will look exactly as in the actual task. The purpose of the 
practice round is to make participants familiar with the task. Thus, the score that you achieve 
during the practice round has no effect on your earnings or on the earnings of your paired 
participant in Phase 1.  
Overview of Phase 2 
Phase 2 of the experiment concerns the distribution of earnings from Phase 1. Details of Phase 
2 will be provided after Phase 1 is complete.  
 
This concludes the General Instructions and the Instructions for Phase 1. 
If there are any questions now or at any point during the experiment, please raise your hand, 
and one of us will approach you individually. 
 
 
Summary of Phase 1 
x All participants complete the task. 
x Computer randomly assigns pairs either to the Score Rule or to the Lottery Rule. 
x Earnings in Phase 1 are determined according to the assigned rule. 
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Instructions for Phase 2 
Types 
At the beginning of Phase 2, the computer will randomly assign your pair, consisting of you 
and your paired participant, to one of two types: Type D (Distributors) or Type N (Non-
Distributors).  
More specifically, all pairs will be of Type D, with the exception of two randomly selected 
pairs who will be of Type N: one pair whose earnings in Phase 1 were generated through the 
Score Rule and one pair whose earnings in Phase 1 were generated through the Lottery Rule.  
To summarize, there will be two pairs who are of Type N: one pair from the Score Rule and 
one pair from the Lottery Rule. These two pairs will be randomly selected.  
Participants in the other pairs will be of Type D.  
Decisions and Earnings of Type N participants 
Type N participants will NOT make any decisions in this phase. However, their earnings may 
be affected by decisions made by Type D participants in Phase 2. 
Decisions and Earnings of Type D participants 
All Type D participants will be asked to make decisions about the distribution of earnings of 
Type N participants from Phase 1 (a detailed explanation of how these choices will be made 
follows below). The earnings of Type D participants will remain fixed, as they were at the end 
of Phase 1. This means that the earnings of Type D participants are not affected by anything 
that happens in Phase 2.  
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select one Type D participant 
whose decisions will then be applied to determine the final earnings of Type N participants. 
Therefore, Type D can affect the earnings of Type N participants, but nobody can affect the 
earnings of Type D participants. 
Type D participants will make the following decisions about the distribution of earnings of 
Type N participants: for each of the two randomly selected Type N pairs, Type D 
participants will be asked to divide the sum of earnings within the pair, namely CHF 30 
(25+5), between the two participants forming the pair.  
So overall, Type D participants will make two decisions about the distribution of earnings 
from Phase 1:  
x Each Type D participant will make one decision for the pair of Type N participants 
whose earnings in Phase 1 were generated through the Score Rule. 
Chapter 3: How Fairness Views Depend on Relative Income 145
 
6 
 
x Each Type D participant will make one decision for the pair of Type N participants 
whose earnings in Phase 1 were generated through the Lottery Rule.  
Recall that each Type N pair ended Phase 1 with one participant whose earnings were CHF 25 
and one participant whose earnings were CHF 5, so the sum of earnings within each pair is 
CHF 30. So Type D participants can distribute any amount between CHF 0 and CHF 30 to the 
two Type N participants in the pair, but the amounts distributed to both Type N participants 
must sum up to the sum of earnings of the pair, which is CHF 30. Note that all amounts must 
be multiples of CHF 0.5. 
So for the pair of Type N participants whose earnings in Phase 1 were generated through the 
Score Rule, Type D participants will be asked to decide (see picture of the screen below) 
x how many CHF out of the CHF 30 to distribute to the participant who received 
earnings of CHF 25 through the Score Rule, and 
x how many CHF out of the CHF 30 to distribute to the participant who received 
earnings of CHF 5 through the Score Rule. 
 
Similarly, for the pair of Type N participants whose earnings in Phase 1 were generated 
through the Lottery Rule, Type D participants will be asked to decide (see picture of the 
screen below) 
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x how many CHF out of the CHF 30 to distribute to the participant who received 
earnings of CHF 25 through the Lottery Rule, and 
x how many CHF out of the CHF 30 to distribute to the participant who received 
earnings of CHF 5 through the Lottery Rule. 
 
Remember that after all Type D participants have made their decisions, one Type D 
participant will be randomly selected, and only the decisions of this randomly selected Type 
D participant will be applied to determine the earnings of the Type N participants. This means 
that, if you are a Type D participant, your decisions may end up entirely determining which 
earnings each of the four Type N participants receives. At the end of the experiment, Type D 
participants will be informed whether their decisions were selected to count or not.  
Final payments to Type D participants after the experiment 
After the experiment, Type D participants will be paid their earnings from Phase 1, plus the 
participation fee of CHF 10. Phase 2 has no effect on their payments. 
  
Chapter 3: How Fairness Views Depend on Relative Income 147
 
8 
 
Final payments to Type N participants after the experiment 
After the experiment, the participants in the two Type N pairs that were randomly selected by 
the computer will be paid the earnings that were distributed to them by one randomly selected 
Type D participant in Phase 2, plus the participation fee of CHF 10. 
End of the experiment 
Once everyone has completed Phase 2, the amount that will be paid to you will appear on 
your computer screen. Then, you will be asked to answer a few questions. When you are 
finished answering the questions, please wait patiently at your seat until you are called to 
collect your payment in private. 
 
 
Summary of Phase 2 
x The computer randomly selects 2 pairs, one from the Score Rule and one from the 
Lottery Rule, to be of Type N. The remaining pairs are of Type D.  
x All Type D participants make decisions about the distribution of earnings of the two 
pairs of Type N participants from Phase 1. 
x The computer randomly selects one Type D participant whose distributive decisions 
will count for the payment of the four Type N participants after the experiment.  
x Experiment ends.  
x Type D participants are paid their earnings from Phase 1.  
x Type N participants are paid the amount distributed to them by the randomly selected 
Type D participant 
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